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FOREWORD.
Religion in the strict sense of the term is based on 
revelation. Whether we confine our attention to the study 
of Christianity or include within our survey the other 
great historical religions such as Judaism, Brahmanism, 
Buddhism 7 and Islam, we are confronted by the fact that 
religion claims to have its roots in a Divine manifestation. 
Positivism, or, as it has been called, the Religion of 
Humanity, would appear to be an exception to this rule; 
but it is questionable whether, in strict parlance, Positivism 
can be called a religion, and even were we to concede its 
claim to the name, its lifelessness and failure to secure 
for itself a standing in religious thought and life are 
such as to warrant us in ignoring it in the generalisation 
that we have made that religion is founded on revelation.
The bulk of modern religious literature
is, however, strangely silent respecting it; it is either 
treated as a udeful hypothesis, incapable of proof or 
disproof, or quietly ignored. Many factors have tended to 
produce this condition of things. (I) We are not quite so 
confident as formerly that a clean-cut line can be drawn 
between what is and what is not revelation. The task 
was much easier when revelation was identified with the 
Scriptures, which had to be accepted on authority; it was 
then possible to set it over against Reason as being both 
distinct from and superior to it. It is now generally 
recognised, however, that revelation includes more than
(2)
the Scriptures, and that it is by no means in 
necessary contradiction to Reason. The clean-cut line 
therefore disappears. But the process of eliminating 
clean-cut lines is not peculiar to the realm with which 
we are dealing; it may be seen in all the varied spheres 
of modern thought. It is no longer possible to draw such a 
line between Animate and Inanimate Nature, nor between 
Reason and Instinct, yet the characteristics of each 
are clear enough even though in actual examples they tend 
to shade off into each other. Take an illustration from the 
everyday world; youth is not manhood, but the fact that we 
cannot just say in any particular case when the one passes 
into the other, does not justify us in ignoring the 
distinction between them. That we cannot clearly draw 
the line between revelation and non-revelation, in any 
particular case, does not warrant us in assuming that the 
distinction between them has disappeared. 
(2) Another factor that has led to the ignoring of the 
revelational aspect of religion is that modern thought has 
made untenable the foundations on which revelation was 
supposed to rest. It has shattered what might be called thas 
NAIVE conception of the Bible as revealed truth,and 
undermined the traditional arguments for the existence of 
God to a degree that has weakened our confidence in them. 
It does not follow, however, that because our methods of
formulating revelation have proved inadequate, that we must 
reject the notion; rather must we seek to express it
afresh in terms that will commend it to the thought of 
our age, and we shall probably discover that in the 
re-statement it will have acquired a richer content. 
(3). A third factor has been the remarkable success 
which has attended the efforts of those who have 
concentrated on the study of other aspects of religion. 
The triumphs of Anthropology and of the application of 
the Historical Method to the data of religion may be 
cited as examples. Special mention ought also to be made 
of the dominance of Psychology in the religious thought 
of modern times. There is, however, a very real danger 
of assuming that the psychological explanation of religious 
phenomena is the full explanation. It was this which led 
Boutroux speaking of the psychological method to say: 
"This method, if it succeeds, will sooner or later lead 
to the abolition of the fact itself .. .Contrary then, to 
the other sciences,which leave standing the things they 
explain, the one just mentioned has this remarkable 
property of destroying its object in the act of describing 
it, and of substituting itself for the facts, in proportion 
as it analyses them ". (Science and Religion. pp/^G./f?). 
Boutroux has not stated the position with sufficient care, 
nevertheless he calls attention to a very real danger. 
On the one hand, it is not possible to isolate religious 
experience and deny to science the right to investigate 
it from its own particular angle: that is to say, whatever
(4)
appears in consciousness is material for Psychology. 
On the other hand, a theology which limited itself to 
the domain accessible to Science, would be deprived of 
the right to any opinion concerning the universal validity 
of its affirmations. To the psychologist, every mental 
state is of interest as a mental state, but its full truth 
and value lies outside his area and require tests other 
than those which belong to his particular science. For 
its purpose, Science abstracts a group of phenomena , 
which poseess common characteristics, and treats it as a 
self-contained whole. This is a necessary procedure and 
serves a useful end. To affirm however, that the conclusions 
reached by this method exhaust the significance of the 
phenomena is to ignore the element of "abstraction" in 
the procedure by which they have been reached. Let us 
suppose a world in which all are blind. To a few of these 
men there comes the gift of sight, and they go to a wise 
but blind psychologist, and relate their experiences of 
opening the eyelids and looking out upon the world with 
its far distances. "Ah", he says, "it is when you open 
the eyelids that this happens, and when you close them, 
it disappears; that which you think you see is to be 
explained as being just a function of open eyelids". 
They answer: "But it is real, what we see is not something 
of ourselves, but something beyond". Now both are right
(5)
so far as they go. The psychologist without the experience 
of sight can get no farther than the describing of a 
glerious experience as the function of some mental or 
physical state. We may say therefore that the dominance 
of religion by psychology cannot be permanent, inasmuch 
as the psychological interpretation of an experience is 
only one of the many that are possible and may be of least 
significance to the experient.
There are many new elements in modern thought which 
encourage us in the task of seeking to restate the problem 
of revelation.
(1) The chasm which Locke imagined to exist between 
SUBSTANCE and its QUALITIES, and the separation which 
Kant made between NOUMENA and PHENOMENA tend to disappear. 
It is becomingly increasingly evident that there is no 
thing-apart-from-its-qualities, and that the distinction 
between noumena and phenomena, so far from being absolute, 
is of such a kind that we may describe phenomena as 
noumena imperfectly known. The disappearance of this chasm 
opens up great possibilities for the restatement of the 
metaphysical basis on which the affirmation of revelation 
rests.
(2) Another factor,worthy of our consideration, is , that 
most thinkers of the present day would admit that
(6)
subjectivity enters into all knowledge without invalidating 
its truth, and this compels us to restate the epistemological 
aspect of the problem. When we come to that stage in our 
discussion, we shall make it clear that subjectivity and 
objectivity enter into all experience, that even illusion 
presumes both subject and object, the distinction between 
illusion and fact being that in the former we have 
inadequately or Inaccurately apprehended some portion of 
Reality. The epistemological problem therefore will be, 
not as to whether subjectivity enters into our apprehension 
of revelation, but as to whether such apprehension is 
true.
(3) A further consideration to which we shall have to give 
attention concerns the nature of Ultimate Reality and the 
many-sidedness of our ways of apprehending it. It is
becoming generally recognised that Reality includes more
va/-ti£g 
than EXISTENTS, that is to say, that values , including
ideal values that cannot be called existent,enter into 
Reality, and that cognition, limiting the use of the word 
to the rational aspect of our consciousness , is but one 
way of apprehending Reality. Knowledge is infinitely more 
than a mere generalisation of percepts; appreciation, 
equally with perception, is a passport to Reality. The 
beauty of a rose is not less real than the substance of 
its petals. In other words, value is anat essential
(7)
constituent of Reality. But value is always value for a 
person or persons, and this leads us to take account of 
significant facts which have emerged with respect to the 
nature of personality, such as its unity, its individual 
and social character, and above all what we may call its 
IDEALITY, in which, as it seems to us, personality is in 
contact with the infinite personality of God.
For Christianity, the problem of revelation 
is focussed in Jesus Christ. To state the problem of the 
supreme revelation in terms of personality rather than 
substance relieves it of many of the antimonies by 
which it is beset and enables us to see in a much clearer 
way its relative and absolute aspects. The metaphysical 
terminology in vogue in the early days when Christianity was 
being formulated, is no longer adequate to express the 
living truth which it sought to conserve, and the deep and 
abiding facts with their eternal values demand a larger 
setting. Our thesis will therefore move from the general 
problems to a study of the Final revelation in Christ, and 
of its nature as being revelation by Incarnation. Our aim 
throughout will be to seek to restate our thoughts concerning 
revelation in terms of personality.
The importance of establishing a basis on
which we can tfffirm the revelational character of religion 
must be obvious to those who think of it as being infinitely
(8)
more than man's highest thought, and who regard it as other 
than a somewhat vague hypothesis which more or less sustains 
man in his moral endeavours. If religion is to mean anything, 
it must be such that we may conceive of it as resting 
upon the self-manifestation of the Love that lies at the 
heart of Reality. The changed attitude of our modern thought, 
which gives to personality and values such vital significance, 
seems to open up a promising way of achieving this. The 
great mgstery of revelation will always be with us, but 
many of the sharp antinomies which confront those who 
seek to relate it to the rest of experience would 
disappear,if they kept before them the fact that it is 
concerned with a personal relationship^and that the most 
helpful way of conceiving it is not in terms of substance 
but of personality.
It is impossible to survey the whole area 
of revelation, and it is necessary that some indication 
should be given of the limits within which we purpose to 
keep. Only outstanding problems will be discussed, and 
especially those on which, as it seems to us, light is 
thrown by the new orientation of thought to which reference 
has been made. Some things have been omitted which to 
many may seem of greater importance than those which have 
found a place in our discussion; all that I can plead is, 
that in some cases I feel I can add nothing to what has
(9)
been said by others, and in other cases certain things 
have been ignored as having little bearing on the problem 
with which we are here concerned. The thesis is in the 
nature of an apologetic, using the term in a very wide 
sense, and at the most can only be regarded as a 




It is impracticable at the outset of our discussion 
to give a full definition of what we mean by revelation, 
and yet it is necessary that we should indicate in some 
way the sense in which we propose to use the term.
The word may be taken in the narrower sense 
as referring to a definite set of historical documents, 
which are to be accepted as authoritative in the matter 
of religious belief, as for example, the canonical books 
of the Scriptures with Protestants ?and these plus the
Apochrypha and Tradition by the Roman Catholics. Sabatier
a
uses it in this sense when he says: The common starting 
point of both the Protestant and Catholic Dogmas of 
Authority is the notion of an external divine revelation, 
consisting in a doctrine or an institution decreed by 
God and supernaturally communicated to men as an external 
law to command the intelligence and the will" (The Religions 
of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit, p 185). 
Thus to restrict the term has the merit of definiteness, 
but this is more than counterbalanced by disadvantages 
which are numerous and fairly obvious.
It is more than doubtful whether, in view 
of such factors as the application of the methods of 
Historical Criticism to the Scriptures, the growth of our 
knowledge concerning the formation of the Canon, and the
(II)
progress achieved in Anthropological research and in the 
study of Comparative Religion, such isolation can be 
justified. To ban the efforts of those who seek to apply 
to the Bible principles which have been found helpful 
in elucidating the sacred literature of other religions 
savours of obscurantism, and certainly conveys the impression 
that our attitude is one of fear rather than of faith. 
Further, thus to detach the Scriptures from the revelation 
which came to man before they were writtenand from that 
which has been coming in ever-fuller ieasure since, is 
to purchase isolation at the cost of attenuating the 
significance of the vast religious experience through 
which they have been interpreted and enriched, and to 
surrender the inwardness of religion by making it to 
rest upon a written record rather than upon the continuous 
work of the Holy Spirit. The disadvantages of extending 
the term revelation to cover more than the Scriptures 
are infinitesimal as compared to the loss to religion 
through limiting it to these. The place which the Bible 
holds with respect to revelation will be dealt with 
in the section on Revelation and History, but in the 
meantime,we may affirm that this widening of the connotation 
of the term by no means robs the Scriptures of their 
unique significance but tends to bring them into vital 
relationship with religious experience.
(12)
We have to be careful however not to make 
our definition so wide as to practically obliterate the 
dividing line between what is and what is not revelation. 
This fault is characteristic of Schleiermacher. He says: 
"What is revelation? Every original and new communication 
of the Universe to man is a revelation. .. .every intuition 
and every original feeling proceeds from revelation. If 
nothing original has been generated in you, when it does 
come, it will be a revelation for you also, and I counsel 
you to weigh it well" (On Religion. Speeches to its 
cultured despisers. Tr by Oman. 1895. p 89) . In one 
sense the definition is too narrow, inasmuch as it limits 
revelation to intuition and feeling, and in another sense 
it is too broad to be serviceable.
We may best define revelation by its relation to 
religion, as being its historical and experimental basis. 
It is that in the religious consciousness which we assign 
to a divine source. Such a definition carries with it 
an objective reference to something outside ourselves, 
which is not so much acquired as given, which is not the 
product of our highest thoughts or exalted feelings but 
their condition, which, in a word, bears the character of 
self-communication from God. This is not to affirm that 
it is un-mediated. It may be recognised that Nature, 
History, Feeling, Thought ?and Conscience are all mediators,
(15)
but that which gives it its distinct character as 
revelation is that its ORIGO ET TONS is God.
Further, we have to distinguish between 
revelation as experienced by a particular individual or 
group of individuals and as it is in its total reality. 
The full significance of any revelation may not be 
apprehended by an individual or race. The experience through 
which we have knowledge of God is that of a reality 
distinct from and unexhausted in the experience as mine. 
Here as elsewhere the principle of development works 
and possesses two aspects. There is a progressive 
revelation on the part of God, and a progressive apprehension 
of it on our part. On the one hand, we cannot deny to God 
the freedom and initiative which we ourselves possess; there 
is no A PRIORI reason why He should not manifest Himself 
again and again, in varied ways, upon the plane of history. 
On the other hand, in these historic acts we are continually 
discovering a new content, and their full significance is 
never wholly ours. It was owing to the failure to make 
this distinction, i.e. between the full content of any 
revelation and our limited but progressive apprehension 
of it, that Sabatier became entangled in a subjectivism 
from which there was no escape. One of his three-fold 
criteria of revelation was that it must be "INTERIOR"
(Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion. p/>56r); that being
/l
so, his only way to get back to objectivity was by
(14)
affirming "that a vibration set up in a soul resounds in 
kindred souls.... thus the inner revelation becomes 
consistent and objective in history; it forms a chain, 
a continuous tradition, and becoming incarnate in each 
human generation, remains not only the richest of heritages 
but the most fecund of historical powers". It is a curious 
kind of objectivity that Sabatier gives us, consisting 
apparently of soul-vibrations crystallising into traditions 
It appears to us that an historical fact, such as the 
Incarnation, possesses a much clearer right to be called 
"objective" than the feelings and emotions which it may 
have kindled in human hearts. The objectivity which 
Sabatier ascribes to inward feelings is quite other than 
that of the supernatural order which is necessary to 
affirm their character as revelation. The confusion arises 
from the application of the term "revelation" both to an 
historical fact and also to our limited apprehension of 
its significance. Any consistent theory of revelation must 
allow for this ambiguity.
Rothe gives us a view of revelation which,
whilst it contains much that is valuable, cannot altogether 
be regarded as satisfactory. (An interesting summary of 
his theological position is to be found in "History of
c7? FtSHEft,
Christian Doctrine, pp 516-522). Speaking of revelation,
\
he says: "Divine Revelation works on incessantly as the
(15)
co-efficient in all human knowledge, independently of its 
being known and recognised as revelation" ( Zur Dogmatik. 
p 78. Quoted in Bruce "The Chief End of Revelation" p 56). 
The definition has the advantage over that of Sabatier's 
of bringing out the independence which revelation has of 
our apprehension of it. Moreover he maks it clear that 
there are not several orders of revelation such as Natural 
and Supernatural, Special and General, but only one. 
The fact that the supernatural is mediated through Nature 
does not make it other than supernatural with respect to 
its origin. The term "revelation" has often been used to 
denote truth communicated in an abnormal way as distinct 
from the knowledge of God obtained by natural means, but all 
our knowledge of God, through whatever medium it may have 
come to us, is from one ultimate source, namely, the 
revelation or disclosure which God makes of Himself. 
Rothe did good service by emphasising this unity of 
revelation, but his definition as given above is too broad 
to be serviceable. Let it be granted that it is not possible 
to make a clear-cut line between knowledge and religious 
knowledge; yet there is a distinction, and the particular 
problem with which we are concerned is the latter. To 
widen the issue but tends to confusion. Nor is it quite
satisfactory to define revelation as being merely "the
>i 
divine co-efficient, it is more than that,being the basis
(16)
of our religious knowledge; it is that self-manifestation 
of the Divine in history and experience from which we 
gather fuller and yet fuller satisfactions for our 
religious needs.
Rothe is also interesting inasmuch as he affirms 
that revelation has two sides. It is MANIFESTATION, the 
objective acts of God in Providence as it is concerned, in the 
old Dispensation, with the Hebrew people, and in the new 
with Christ, and INSPIRATION, an illumination of the mind 
for the interpretation of them. (See Fisher's History of
A 
Christian Doctrine). In criticism of this position we should
say that no purpose seems to be served by using the word 
manifestation to express what is usually covered by the 
word revelation. The distinction however between revelation 
and inspiration is one which cannot be ignored. The 
latter is concerned with the process by which the content 
of revelation becomes ours; it is that purifying and 
quickening of the human spirit by which it is fitted to 
become the organ of the divine revelation. Sabatier 
provides us with an illustration of the confusion which 
results from the ignoring of this distinction when he 
writes: "Revelation may be said to consist of the creation, 
purification, and progressive clearness of the consciousness 
of God in man - in the individual and in the race" 
(Outlines of a Philos of Religion. p 55.). Here process
(17)
is confused with content. Inspiration is the divine 
equipment by which we are fitted to recitwe, interpret, 
or communicate the self-manifestation of God, which is 
revelation. The terms are often loosely employed as 
synonymous, but for the purpose of clear thinking it 
is better to keep them apart. Inspiration is the 
handmaid of revelation and confusion results when the 
maid is taken for the mistress.
We are now in a position to indicate
A
the significance which the term "revelation will have 
for us in the study on which we have embarked. It will 
be used in a wider sense than that of the Scriptures. 
Its content will be the religious consciousness viewed 
as having its origin in the self-disclosure of God. 
Quickened by the Holy Spirit, we have learned and are 
learning to discern in various phases of individual 
experience and in certain events in history, ( in a 
sense we may agree with Rothe and say, in the whole 
of experience and history), the outpouring of the light, 
love and power of God, which are essential constituents of 
His nature. These manifestations have been of a kind that 
we can ascribe to no other source but Him. The pages that 
follow will be concerned with the problems which such a 
faith involves; with the arguments which may appear to 
invalidate it, the philosophic basis on which it rests,
(18)
the criteria by which we distinguish it as revelation, and 
with the position which we claim for Christ in it as 
centre and crown.
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Section 2. ...THE PURPOSE OR END OF REVELATION. 
At this point we must give some consideration to the 
question of the purpose which revelation serves, or, 
to put it from another point of view, the end which 
it is designed to accomplish. Dr A.B Bbuce has a very
able treatise on this subject, entitled "The Chief End
// 
of Revelation, which presents very cogently the
argument against the view which once was commonly held, 
that the chief end of revelation was to give us, in the 
form of historical and authoritative facts, certain 
doctrines concerning God, which the unaided reason was 
powerless to discover. Whilst the present writer agrees 
with his destructive criticism, he feels that the 
constructive part of the work is unsatisfactory.
A brief historical resume will enable us 
to set the problem in perspective. In the age of 
Scholasticism, revelation was regarded as giving information 
about God supplementary to that which was discoverable 
by reason. For example, Thomas Aquinas held that "Reason 
could demonstrate the Unity of God; Revelation alone 
could make known to us the Trinity of Persons therein", 
and the Schoolmen generally maintained that the Trinity, 
the Incarnation, and other specifically Christian doctrines 
must be accepted as revealed facts and beyond dispute. 
There was some division of opinion as to which side of
(Zo)
the line they had drawn between reason and revelation t 
certain doctrines occupied, most of them maintaining 
that reason could prove God and Immortality, though 
Duns Scotus took the opposite view and held that these 
could not logically be proved. They were all agreed 
however in regarding revelation, not as the whole of 
our consciousness of God, but as that portion of it 
which came to us, not through reason, but through 
certain unquestionable and definitive facts. Even Spinoza, 
in "Tractatus Theologico Politicus" (published 1670) 
maintains "that we may now disregard Paul's philosophy 
and theology, and attend only to the few elementary 
truths in the teaching of which the prophets, apostles, 
and Christ are all at one" (Bruce. Chief End of Revelation. 
p 35"). Spinoza differed from the Schoolmen in making 
reason a criterion of revelation, but common to both 
there was this idea of revelation as consisting of a 
few elementary truths.
The next period to be considered is
that in which fall the movements known in this country 
as Deism, and in Germany as the Aufklarung. These 
greatly exaggerated the powers of human reason and spoke 
as if "common sense" alone were infallible and omnipotent. 
They held that revelation was simply a republication 
of the laws of Nature, and in so far as it claimed to be 
anything more than that, was a lie invented to give
(21)
authorit4tive sanction to the doctrines and practices 
of the Church. Prominent amongst the English Deists were 
Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Thomas Hobbes, John Toland, 
Anthony Collins, Woolston, Matthew Tindal, Shaftesbury, 
and Bolingbroke. Their views exhibited considerable 
differences, but characteristic of them all was this 
emphasis on the sufficiency of Nature and the power of 
reason to discover in it the necessary truths of religion. 
They erased the line which the Schoolmen had drawn between 
revelation and reason by subordinating the former to the 
latter. Their belief in a Deity stood in no need of a 
revelation inasmuch as it had for its sure foundation 
the argument from design. Their theories were built on 
the optimistic assumption that the world, on the whole,
i
was very good, and in so far as there were minor imperfections 
here and therein that was necessary was a little renovating. 
They believed in Immortality, not on the strength of any 
revelation concerning it, but because Nature Suggests 
certain very apt analogies of it. On the Deistic theory 
there seemed to be no real necessity for revelation, 
and the most that it could do was to confirm the findings 
of man's intellectual genius. The superficial optimism 
of the Deist tended to minimise the stern facts of life 
which made revelation practically necessary. What is to 
be noted, however, is that the notion that revelation
(22)
consists of doctrine was the common ground of the Deists 
and of those who refuted them.
Turning now to the Aufklarung, let us glance 
at one of its most representative thinkers, Reimarus. 
From him came what was probably the most bitter attack on 
the traditional conception of revelation. This was embodied 
in the "Wolfenbuttel Fragments'1 , published after the death 
of their author by Lessing. The method which Reimarus 
pursued was that of destroying the claim of the Bible 
to be revelation. He laid down two postulates, that if 
the Bible were a revelation, (I) It would be given in the 
form of a system of doctrine expressed in precise terms, 
and (2) That men of irreproachable character would be 
selected as the medium of communication. Now it must be 
granted, that if revelation be regarded as divinely* 
communicated doctrine, it is by no means easy to answer 
the criticism of it as pat forward by this somewhat vulgar 
thinker.
Lessing himself is much more interesting than 
Reimarus. Although the instrument through which the work
of the latter was given to the world, he differs essentially
7?£/n( ARv s 
from him in tone and outlook. For whilst tho former was
bent on destroying the foundations on which revelation
Le ffiFVC( . 
was supposed to rest, tho latto-r was anxious to rehab ili44te
it on a basis not contrary to reason. This he seeks to do
(25)
in his book "The Education of the Human Race". His position 
is, that what education is to the individual, revelation 
is to the race. Education is revelation coming to the 
individual, and revelation is education which has come and 
is coming to the race. From this premise he proceeds to 
argue that revelation gives to man nothing which he might 
not educe from himself, but only accelerates the process 
and orders it. The Old Testament is the First Primer, 
and when its truths had become firmly established in reason, 
there came the Second Primer which is the New Testament, and
the process of revelation still goes on. Lessing has a fine
A. 
grasp of the progressive charcter of revelation , and brings
out what is often overlooked, namely, the contribution made 
by the F*MP** Ethnic Religions, but he has not broken free 
from what might be called the paedogogic conception of 
revelation. The Bible consists of two Primers, and what it 
reveals consists of "ideas" or doctrine. If that be 
granted, there is no inherent necessity for it, inasmuch 
as all that it accomplishes is to hurry-up things a little.
Now what our historical resume has shown 
is > that revelation rests on a very precarious foundation 
when it is conceived to be merely supernaturally- 
communicated doctrine, and is left open to attack from 
all sides. Yet it was on this assumption that the older 
school of apologists vainly sought to defend it. The
(24)
revolt against a theory of revelation which was indefensible 
was bound to come, and it came in the work of Schleiermacher 
and others. In them we witness the attempt to secure for 
revelation a firmer foundation by denying that its 
essential character is doctrinal. The revolt however 
appears to have over-carried. If revelation be no£ 
supernaturally-communicated doctrine, what is it? To this, 
Dr Bruce answers: "What if revelation consisted not so 
much in the communication of a body of truth as in the 
intimation of a gracious purpose 1*? (The Chief End of 
Revelation, p 25). But unless we are to purge the phrase 
of all rational significance and to leave it a barren 
eubject lacking a predicate, we must recognise that 
"the intimation of a gracious purpose" has a co^jitive 
content and therefore a doctrinal significance. To limit 
revelation to the mere intimation of a gracious purpose 
is to narrow its scope even more than did the Schoolmen. 
The purpose which revelation serves if to give us a 
saving knowledge of God, and that being so, it can neither 
be limited to nor separated from doctrine. To imagine 
that we have secured revelation against rationalistic 
attack by stripping it of doctrinal significance is a 
mistake, for that is to surrender an element in it from 
which it derives meaning and value. A theory which does 
not leave room for the revealing of God in His inner
(25)
social nature, in His cosmic activities, and in His 
relations with men only escapes criticism by becoming 
meaningless.
We have spoken of the purpose of revelation as 
being to give us a knowledge of God. Professor James, however, 
has pointed out that there are two kinds of knowledge, 
and provided that we do not treat the distinction as 
absolute and seal each up in water-tight compartments, 
there is much to be said for it. He writes: "There are two 
kinds of knowledge broadly and practically distinguishable; 
we call them respectively KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUAINTANCE and
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT. Most languages express the distinction; thus,
> 
noscere, scire; kennen, wissen; connaitre,savoir; .. .I know
the colour of a pear when I see it and the flavour of a 
prar when I taste it...but ABOUT the inner nature of these 
facts or what makes them what they are I can say nothing 
at all. I cannot impart ACQUAINTANCE with them to anyone 
who has not already made it himself. I cannot DESCRIBE 
them, make a blind man guess what blue is like, or tell 
a philosopher in just what respect distance is just what 
it is, and differs from other forms of relation. At most 
I can say to my friends, Go to certain places and act in 
certain ways and these objects will probably come". ( 
James. Principles of Psychology.Vol I. p 221). The 
distinction appears to be this, that KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUAINTANCE 
is the immediate and direct experience, whereas KNOWLEDGE
(26)
A80UT is concerned with ideas and abstract thoughts. 
The latter is conceptual, descriptive, representative, 
communicable, and under it come all universals, 
scientific formulas, and the like. Now, which kind of 
knowledge does revelation give; is it the KNOWLEDGE ABOUT 
GOD or ACQUAINTANCE WITH GOD? The contention which is here 
put forward is that the knowledge which revelation is 
designed to give is of the latter type, but with this 
important proviso, that the distinction between the 
two types must not be extended so as to imply separation, 
otherwise we should be shut up to individualistic and 
subjective views of revelation. The fact is that the types 
are mutually involved and are never to be found in isolation. 
The phrase "KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUAINTANCE" appears to us to 
be better expressed by the word "experience", a word which 
does not confine us to the individualistic implications 
which James 1 phrase seems to bear, for experience is 
never a purely individual affair. It is not difficult to see 
how, if we press the distinction which he made to the 
point of absolute separation, revelation by a mediator 
becomes impossible; all that such a mediator could do 
would be to tell us to go to certain places and act in 
certain ways and the objects will probably come. What we 
contend for is, that it is not a matter of separation but 
of emphasis. The purpose of revelation is to give us
(27)
ACQUAINTANCE WITH GOD, that is, to bring us into personal 
and living fellowship with Him. It is therefore something 
bigger than either the communication of doctrine, or the 
intimation of a gracious purpose, and can only be fully 
expressed in terms of personality and life.
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Section 5. THE ORGAN OF REVELATION. 
The conclusion of our last section was that revelation 
must be interpreted in terms of life and personality, 
and we are now to consider some of the difficulties that 
have arisen through ignoring this and endeavouring to 
limit our apprehension of revelation to one aspect of our 
personality, abstracted from the rest. Until recent times, 
the mind was regarded as constituted by various faculties, 
the traditional classification of which was three-fold, 
namely, Emotional, Volitional, and Intellectual or Cognitive 
The modern emphasis is on the unity of consciousness, and 
what were formerly regarded as separate faculties are 
now held to be but aspects of this unity. It is no longer 
possible to limit the channel through which revelation 
becomes ours to one of the three aspects of consciousness. 
Such a limitation tends to impoverish the content of 
revelation. It is here maintained that it is MYSELF as 
an entity that apprehends the knowledge of God, and that 
though some one aspect may be more prominent than another 
in mediating it, yet it is accepted as revelation by 
my personality and not by some aspect of it.
(A) Let us first of all examine the theory which would 
limit religious knowledge to Feelinr or Intuition. The 
great name that comes to our mind in this connection is 
that of Schleiermacher (1768-1854). The contribution
(29)
which he made to religious thought has had an influence 
that is incalculable, and in so far as it was a protest 
against the barren abstractions of the theology of his 
time, a theology which ignored the subjective  lement in 
religion and the infinite variety and richness of the 
Christian experience, it was all to the good and sorely 
needed. Like most protests , however, it swung to the 
other extreme and lent itself to a subjectivity which 
seriously imperilled the idea of religion as founded on 
revelation. His position is most clearly stated in 
his work "On Religion - Speeches to its cultured Bespisers", 
first published in 1799. He affirms:"The contemplation of 
the pious is the immediate consciousness of the universal 
existence of all finite things, in and through the Eternal. 
Religion is to seek this and find it in all that lives 
and moves, in all growth and change, in all doing and 
suffering. It is to have life and to know life in 
Immediate feeling, only as such an existence in the 
Infinite and Eternal" (Ibid. Tr by Oman.1895.p 36). TKK 
He distinguishes morality from piety: the former shows 
itself as manipulating, as self-controlling, whilst the 
latter appears as a surrender, a submission to be moved 
by the whole that stands over against man (Ibid, p 57). 
He rules out the cognitive aspect of religion by affirming 
that "any effort to penetrate into the nature and substance
(50)
of things is no longer religion but seeks to be a science 
of some sort" (Ibid, p 49). Theology is thus sharply 
distinguished from religion. When we enquire as to where 
revelation comes in, he answers: "Every original and 
new communication of the Universe to man is a revelation", 
but qualifies this by giving as its criterion that the 
religious must " at least be conscious of his feelings 
as the immediate product of the Universe, for less would 
mean nothing. He must recognise something individual in 
them, something that cannot be imitated, something that 
guarrantees the purity of their origin from his own heart"
(Ibid, p qo}.
Now it is to be noticed, that in making this 
last qualification, Schleiermacher is scarcely consistent 
with his own premises. For when he qualifies fEELING IN 
GENERAL by making it KEELING AS THE IMMEDIATE PRODUCT 
OF THE UNIVERSE AND RECOGNISED BY THE INDIVIDUAL AS 
SOMETHING INDIVIDUAL AND THAT CANNOT BE IMITATED, he has 
introduced a cognitive  leient, and it is no longer pure 
feeling. It has embarked on what he would call, the region 
of science, and has become "a theology of some sort". It 
is impossible to differentiate feeling in any way, or to 
delimit it, without bringing in the cognitive element 
which he supposed to be alien to religion.
Putting this aside, let us examine
(51)
Schleiermacher's position. Its strength lies in the fact 
that religion is put forward not as a theory but as an 
experience, direct and immediate in its nature: its 
weakness is that that experience is regarded as being 
limited to pure feeling. As Schleiermacher himself would 
admit, the feelings themselves demand to be understood by 
reference to the situations in which they arise and the 
part they play in the total adjustment process. When 
this process of unification and adjustment with other 
factors has been carried out, has the feeling deteriorated 
into something less than revelation? For example, is 
religion limited to that first fine feeling that thrilled 
us when we became conscious of Christ's call, and is it 
a less thing when we have coordinated it with the 
revelation of the New Testament Christ, and the religious 
experience of the Church? As a matter of fact, the feeling 
itself may develop in continuity and intensity by thus 
linking it up with the situation in which it arose and 
with the rest of experience. Pure feeling is evanescent, 
save as it acquires content of some kind; without that alloy, 
in time, it tends to disappear.
And this also requires to be said, that whilst 
the emotional aspect of our consciousness is very important 
as a means of religious insight or as the medium through 
which revelation is apprehended, it is not the only factor,
(32)
nor is it always first in respect of time. The contention 
of the activists that the will is a powerful factor 
cannot lightly be set aside. We find it expressed in 
the words of Our Lord, "If any man will do his will, he 
shall know of the teaching whether it be of God, or 
whether I speak of myself? Not only rapture but obedience 
is a necessary qualification for further insight, and 
nothing so extends the horizons of vision as faithfulness 
in the matter of duty. As food requires to be transformed 
into energy if appetite is to remain, so vision not 
translated into service chokes the channels through which 
further light may come. In severing the vital inter- 
rclatedness between religion and morality, Schleiermacher 
impoverished both.
In a similar way, it may be pointed
out that the exercise of the intellect may lead to a 
closer and deeper fellowship with God, even though the 
way to this may be through the valley of doubt. A very 
powerful illustration may be found in the biography of 
Prof G.J Romanes. Intellectual pursuits such as those 
which fall within the ambit of Natural Science have tended 
to enlarge the area of revelation, and not, as some have 
supposed, to narrow it, and this is even more true of 
Philosophy. We are not denying that feeling enters into
t
all revelation, but only that it is to be Imited to this.
(35)
Religion cannot be reduced to a single phase of mental 
life, for in all consciousness the entire mind is 
involved. The abandonment of Faculty Psychology makes
Schleiermacher's position untenable. Whilst any of the
>*«-<*0
three aspects of conscious^ thought, feeling, or will '
A
may be uppermost in religious experience, the others are 
not absent. It is WE who feel, and WE as conscious beings.
The tendency of Schleiermacher, as of all 
who unduly stress the element of feeling, is towards a 
Pantheism in which revelation as we understand it, that 
is, as based on a personal relationship between God and 
man, tends to become obliterated. This has often been 
repudiated by his followers, and whilst it may be admitted 
that he sought to guard his position in many ways, yet 
it cannot be denied that the drift of all theories which 
centre religion exclusively in feeling is in that direction. 
Over against thought and will, feeling is the element 
which destroys personal distinctions. The psychology of 
a crowd furnishes many apt illustrations of this. We are 
not therefore surprised when Schleiermacher affirms: 
" Every form, every creature, every occurrence is an 
action of the Universe upon us, and religion is just the 
acceptance of each separate thing as a part of the whole, 
and of each limited thing as an exhibition of the Infinite H 7 
Ibid, p 279). Such a theory leaves little room for
(54)
revelation in the sense given above, for the possibility 
of such lies in keeping clear the distinction between 
God, Man 7 and the Universe.
(B). Again, there are those who centre religion 
exclusively in the Will, who practically make it synonymous 
with moral activity. Such was Kant (1724-1804). His 
position with respect to the limits of knowledge will be 
discussed at a later stage, but what we are concerned with 
now is his emphasis on the primacy of the will in morality 
and religion. For it was Kant, who, by his distinction 
between the "practical" and the "theoretical" reason, 
gave the impulse to the movements which have stressed 
will rather than cognition as the basis of our religious 
knowledge. His position is all the more extraordinary 
when we recall his teaching about the nature and unity of 
human experience; his doctrine that all our human knowledge 
involves an interpretation of the data of our senses in 
the light of what he called the "unity of apperception". 
He held that all facts of which a human experience can 
obtain knowledge are known to us as the possible objects 
of an insight which we conceive to be virtually one, 
as the insight of our own truly knowing Self, the presupposed 
unity of which is the condition «f all our knowledge. 
But he limits this unity to the realm of the theoretical
(35)
reason and passing to that of the practical reason he 
leaves it behind and lays exclusive stress on Will.
His position is as follows: "Nothing can 
possibly be conceived in the world or even out of it, 
which can be called good without qualification, except 
a Good Will 11 (Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic 
of Ethics. Abbot's trans. 1900. p 10). This Good Will 
belongs entirely to the realm of the practical reason: 
it owes nothing to experience, nor can experience confirm 
it. "Reason of itself, independent of all experience, 
ordains what ouffiit to take place" (Ibid.p 29). This 
postulate is fundamental to Kant's position- and on it 
he proceeds to build a series of affirmations with 
respect to Freedom, Immortality and God. The reasoning 
throughout suffers from the absolute dualism of the 
practical and theoretical reason.
For example, the freedom for which he
argues amounts to no more than freedom from the chain of 
physical necessity, it is an idea barren of all content 
which stands over against the world of phenomena. At a 
later stage, in dealing with the metaphysical problem, we 
shall see that the postulate of freedom is essential for 
the reconciliation of existents and values, but the 
freedom there enunciated will not be of the abstract 
and unconditioned character which is to be found in Kant.
(36)
When he says we ought, therefore we can, arguing from his 
own premises, one fails to discover where the logical 
connection comes in. The sentence only possesses meaning 
as implying that a moral ideal carries with it, by virtue 
of the fact that it is an ideal, the possibility of its 
realisation, but such a moral ideal is distinct from the 
"categorical imperative" inasmuch as it possesses a content. 
A modern writer has summed up Kant's inconsistency with 
respect to the theory of freedom in these words: "Following 
out Kant's conception we arrive at an intelligible cause- 
Will, which we recognise to be free, and which may be 
the unconditioned condition of phenomena, but about which 
nothing more can be said. Here Kant's system seems to 
groan beneath the impossible burden of contradiction 
it attempts to carry" (Orchard.Mod Theories of Sin. p 35)
Kant's postulates of Immortality and
God suffer in similar fashion from this dualism which 
allows no empirical content to the Good Will. As regards 
the first of these, his position is that an entire 
conformity of the will to the moral law is the supreme 
and the first and the foremost part of the highest good, 
and therefore necessary. Such conformity is nowhere to be 
found in the world of sense and can only be attained by a 
PROGRESSES AD INPINITUM, hence the postulate of Immortality. 
Now in "The Critique of Pure Reason", he also gives an
(37)
argument for God and Immortality from the theoretical 
reason: "In the wisdom of a Supreme Being, and in the 
shortness of life, so inadequate to the development 
of the glorious powers of human nature, we may find 
equally suffidAent grounds for a doctrinal belief in the 
future life of a human soul" (Bonn's tr.pp 500f J. He
calls this however "doctrinal belief" and characterises
// 
it as wanting in stability". To us the argument seems
much more concrete and real than that derived from the 
practical reason, for in the latter both "will" and "moral 
law" are thought of as unconditioned by experience, and 
when closely analysed seem to evaporate into 
philosophic abstractions. In the closing section of our 
thesis it will be maintained that we may reasonably 
postulate Immortality for the realisation of the values 
implicit in revelation, but this is other than Kant's 
contention, inasmuch as it presumes that the transcendental 
sphere is not unrelated to the world of phenomena.
As regards the postulate "God", his position 
is that happiness as the agreement of Nature with Morality 
presupposes a cause of Nature, distinct from Nature, 
which contains within itself the ground of that connection, 
and thus arrives at the postulate of the COMPLETE good 
in which virtue and happiness coincide, which is identical 
with that of the existence of God. Here again, the
(58)
argument is seen to suffer from the same inherent dualism 
to which we have more than once referred, Kant fails to 
see that Morality functions in and through Nature, and he 
is therefore compelled to bring in an hypothesis to 
reconcile a dichotomy which does not really exist but 
whieft" is the creation of his own theory.
The significance of the Kantian theory
for religion may be illustrated by the following passage: 
*Even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared 
with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognise 
Him as such; and so He says of Himself, "Why call ye ME (whom
you see) good; none is good (the model of good) but God
a 
only ( whom you do not see)? (Fundamental Principles of
the Metaphysic of Morals, p 50). The importance of this 
sentence is that it is the logical conclusion to which 
the Kantian theory leads. If Kant meant no more than 
that a man has the power to recognise the Highest when 
he sees it, that will be granted; it is indeed essential 
to the development of our argument. But the words and 
context show that he meant more than that, namely, that 
beeause Christ comes up to our ideal of moral perfection 
we call Him the Holy One of the Gospels. This must be 
strenuously denied. On the contrary it would be truer to 
say that it is because He transcends our ideals, disturbs, 
quickens,and transforms them, that we recognise in Him
(59)
the Holy One. KantB is quite logical here; if morality 
be divorced from experience then example counts for nought. 
On this basis revelation becomes impossible. The Holy One 
of the Gospels is such as fitting in with our ideal of 
moral perfection, and therefore our task is not to fit in 
our lives with the truth revealed in Him, but rather just 
to go on trying to realise the highest good, the conformity 
of the Will, which is free, to the Moral Law which is 
unconditioned.
Now Kant has this advantage over
Schleiermacher that his system of thought is not open 
to the charge of subjectivism, and that it permits us 
to conceive of religion in terms of activity rather than 
submission. No theory of revelation can be satisfactory 
which does not allow for the activity of the consd ousness 
in the apprehension of it. No doubt submission is an 
element in the process, but it is not the whole. To speak 
of active submission Involves a paradox^but it is a kind 
of paradox which is by no means confined to the religious
-&4.tl«*a
aspect of our life, but io peculiar to all personal 
relationships. From the religious point of view, both aspects 
are involved in that line of Tennyson's "Our wills are 
ours ...To make them Thine?In this stressing of the active 
side «f religion, Kant rendered a very real service. He is
(40)
one with Schleiermacher , however, in denying any positive 
content to religion. That is a necessary deduction from 
his premise that the only absolute good is a Good Will. 
But a Good Will, as separated from cognitive and emotional 
factor^ is a pure abstraction and meaningless. We cannot 
will that which we do not know, nor can will operate 
independently of desire. The will does not work in a 
vacuum. From the ethical point of view, his exclusive 
emphasis on the will cannot be justified, inasmuch as 
the noblest actions in history have been inspired not so 
much by Duty as by Love. Moreover it excludes from morality 
all intellectual values. If religion be, as Kant affirmed, 
simply regarding our duties as divine commands, it appears 
to be no more than morality sanctioned by the divine 
signature, and thus infinitely less than that which the 
religious experience of the ages has testified concerning
it.
It is not suiorising that Kant found
no place in his system of thought for revelation. Whilst 
not repudiating revelation in general, he contended that 
there was no specific proof, and regarded it as an invention 
of man at a primitive level of Society, having its origin 
in the desire to reinforce moral sanctions. If the 
will is isolated from the rest of consciousness, and made 
supreme, it is difficult to see how any other conclusion
(41)
could be reached. Whatever gratitude may be due to Kant 
for the shattering blow which he levelled at both 
Dogmatism and Empiricism, it still remains true, that 
no satisfactory theory of revelation can be built on a 
basis which cleaves the consciousness of man, and makes 
exclusive in its validity the part which it has detached 
from the whole.
(C) Finally we come to those who emphasise the intellectual 
aspect of the mind as the organ of revelation. In our age 
the revolt against intellectualism is so pronounced that 
It will not be necessary to develop the argument at any 
great length. Von Hugel has expressed very tersely the 
grounds on which this revolt is based: "The Analytical 
Faculty seems habitually, instinctively, to labour at 
depersonalising all it touches, and thus continually to 
undermine and discrown the deeply personal work and world 
of the experimental forces of the soul. Indeed the 
thinking seems to be doing this necessarily, since by its 
very essence it begins and ends with laws, qualities, 
functions, and parts, with abstractions that at best 
can be but skeletons and empty forms of the real and
the actual, and which of themselves tend to represent
// 
all Reality as something static not dynamic( The Mystical
Element of Religion. Vol I. p 76).
(42)
Very typical of those who have limited religion to 
intellectual channels is Hegel (I770-I83I). In a sense 
Hegel may be called a development and remoulding of Kant, 
but he goes beyond Kant and affirms that phenomena are 
reality. It is characteristic of him that he lays great 
stress on history, but it is history distorted to make it 
fit in with his theory. He holds that history is religion, 
it is the Absolute coming to self-consciousness through 
Thesis and Antithesis to Synthesis. All this is purely 
doctrinaire, it is a theoretic logic which springs not 
from the reasonableness of the material, but, so to speak, 
out of one's own head, and is then imposed on history. 
At times it would seem, according to Hegel, as if history 
were the object of revelation, but then, in his system, 
subject and object are so identified or so inextricably 
confused that it is difficult to disentangle them. 
The general trend of his thinking, however, is in the 
direction of obliterating personal distinctions, and 
therefore towards Pantheism. It seems impossible to find 
a place for revelation, in the sense in which we are 
using the term, in a system which defines religion as 
the consciousness of the finite being of its identity 
with the Infinite.
The revolt against intellectualism, 
however, stands in danger of ignoring the function of
(43)
reason as a source of religious insight. Unless reason be 
allowed to function, the content of revelation is necessarily 
limited to what comes through feeling or intuition, 
which, whilst they constitute one of the richest sources 
of our spiritual experience are at the same timeito* the 
most capricious and whimsical elements in our personality. 
Even those abstract conceptions which are inadequate as 
a statement of the full and absolute truth of life may jfet 
become a preparation for intuitions and experiences on a 
higher plane than any, which, apart from these we could 
reach. Moreover, reasoning is by no means limited to 
this abstract species. It is only through reason that 
we can reach a synthetic view of all the factors that 
enter into experience, and see them as a cosmos and not 
a chaos. 7/hen we affirm of something that is given that 
it is revelation, there necessarily enters into that 
judgment the element of v&Iae ; but the value of anything 
depends in some measure on its place in the system of 
which it forms a part; and if reason be indispenable as
A
enabling us to discern the system of which any experience 
is but a part, it must have a real significance as an 
organ of revelation and cannot be ignored. It is only 
when it is emphasised in such a way as to imply that 
logical truth is full truth and the final arbiter in all 
problems that it stands condemned.
(44)
The position that we have now reached is, that to make 
anything less than the full personality the organ of 
of revelation is to involve ourselves in great difficulties. 
In the apprehension of revelation, any of the three 
aspects of consciousness - feeling, will, or cognition - 
may predominate, yet they are all involved, and it is 
myself as an entity and not a part of me that lays hold 
on the Divine self-manifestation. Mr J.B Pratt has well 
expressed this point of view, when he says: "Religion 
presupposes always an object of some sort, and involves 
some sort of content; but it is itself a relatively active 
state of consciousness, which is not to be described in 
terms of the given, but as a subjective response to the 
given. Thus it is not to be confined to any one of the 
three traditional departments of the mind - knowing, feeling, 
and willing - but involves factors that belong to each of 
them" ( The Religious Consciousness, pp 2f.).The significance 
of our findings will become apparent at a later stage 
when we come to show that revelation must be conceived 
in terms of Personality, that is,of a unity which involves 
but transcends the unity of consciousness, a unity which 
is many sided,including not only intellectual elements, 
but the sense of beauty, the mystic intuition, and that 
deep and unchangeable direction of will which we 
characterise as loyalty. To limit revelation to a particular
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aspect of our personality is to narrow its meaning. Nothing 
human is alien to the divine, and through the myriad 
channels of our nature there comes the power, wisdom, 
and love which transcend our finitude. It may come through 
submission, through lying still, as the Psalmist puts it: 
"While I was musing, the fire burned"; or it may come 
through strenuous activity, but what is insisted upon is 
that it is revelation for a centre of consciousness, possesses 
value for such, is apprehended by such, and that to 
hypostatise some aspect of our being and make it the 
exclusive organ of revelation is a false abstractedness.
Bibliography. Section.5. (Page.45.A.)
(1) John Caird. "Philosophy of Religion".
Maclehose. I860.
(2) L.T.Hobhouse. "Mind in Evolution".
Macmillan. 1915.
(5) Hoernle' "Matter, Life, Mind & God".
(Especially Chapter .V.)
Methuen. 1925.
(4) Von Hugel. "The Mystical Element of Religion"
J.M. Dent.1908.
(5) James. "The Will to Believe".
Longman. Green. 1903.
(6) Kant. "Critique of Pure Reason".
Bonn 1 s Phil Lib. 1855.
(7) Kant. "Fundamental Principles of
Metaphysics of MoralsVTr Abbott. 
Longman Green. 1900.
(8) Oman. "Faith & Freedom".
Hodder & Stoughton. 1906.
(9) Orchard. "Modern Theories of Sin".
James Clarke & Co. 1910.
(10) J.B.Pratt. "The Religious Consciousness".
(Especially Chs XVI. XVII.) 
Macmillan. 1921.
(11) Royce. "Sources of Religious Insight".
T & T Clark. 1912.
(12) Schleiermacher. "On Religion. Speeches to its
cultured despisers".(Tr Oman) 
Keegan Paul. 1893.
(13) Stahlin. "Kant, Lotze, & Ritschl" (Tr.Simon) 
T & T Clark. 1899,
(46)
Section. 4. THE ABNORMAL IN REVELATION. 
Our definition of revelation as the divine self-manifestation 
in history and experience naturally leads us to expect 
to find abnormal elements in revelation, understanding by 
this term, occurrences which cannot be fitted in with what 
is known as Natural Law. Natural Law however must be 
regarded not as something static, but as an ordered unity 
of knowledge to which additions are being continually made 
as the result of which it wears a changing and a growing 
aspect. It may be defined in the same way as Mr Pratt defines 
the religious consciousness, namely, as a subjective 
response to the given. It is the system or order under 
which man finds it possible and convenient to group 
phenomena. At this point we may postulate that it is not 
an order which the mind imposes on Nature, but which is 
suggested to the mind by its contact with Nature. From the 
present point of view it may be recognised that it is an 
imperfect unity and that there are many factors at work 
in the universe which seem to fit but badly into the 
scheme which Nature has suggested to us. The finitude 
of man sets limits to the number of things which can be 
brought into that unity of ordered knowledge which is 
termed Natural law, and we may assume that if he possessed 
wider powers of generalisation,many things which appear 
to be abnormal would be seen to be normal.
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Phenomena may be classified according to an ascending 
scale, the lowest phase of which would be Matter, and the
highest Spiritual Autonomy. The difficulty of generalising
SCAL£ 
increases as we ascend the SAG«-. It therefore follows that
in the realm of Spiritual Autonomy, the number of facts 
which cannot be classified under Natural Law will be 
proportionately large. We should therefore expect to find 
in revelation much that is abnormal. It is, however, a 
mistaken notion to assume that the leading characteristic 
of revelation is abnormality, or to postulate that the 
Divine is the inexplicable or the inexplicable the Divine. 
The two are by no means coterminous. There are a multitude 
of inexplicable things which cannot be defined as revelation, 
events which have hitherto defied the endeavour to relate 
them to a cause, but which in themselves possess no 
distinctively religious significance; whilst, on the 
other hand, if revelation were purely inexplicable in 
character, it would be meaningless.
The position which we are to substantiate is, 
that whilst abnormality is a constituent of revelation, 
it is not its criterion. If it were so, it would indeed 
be on parlous ground inasmuch as the area of the abnormal 
is being constantly attenuated by the labours of Science 
and Philosophy. If revelation is to be limited to the 
residuum of their investigations, then religion must be
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in permanent hostility to them, inasmuch as they are 
reducing the base on which it rests. Yet this was the 
position taken up by Dr Mozley in his Hampton Lectures, 
published under the title "Supernatural Religion", in 
which he maintained that "Revelation consists of a system 
of inscrutable mysteries, undiscoverable by reason and 
incomprehensible to reason, which therefore have no 
self-evidencing power, but can be accredited only by 
miraculous deeds wrought by the agents of revelation"
d^^e*^ &*ve£, »J tfwe-4. a-S''tn~
(Quoted. Bruce. Apologetics, p 162). Now if this were so,
it would seem to follow that the revelation of yesterday
may be non-revelation today owing to some discovery
which has been made concerning its nature. A few generations
ago, the eclipse of the Sun was assigned to the realm of
the miraculous, and awakened in human hearts feelings of
awe and reverence, being regarded as a manifestation of
the Divine wrath towards man, but now the phenomena of
the eclipse fit in with Natural Law, and it is possible
to predict exactly when it will take place. On Dr Mozley's
theory, those responsible for this discovery, have thereby
lessened the area of revelation. Thus the area of revelation
is thought of as being in inverse ration to human progress
and the most backward races of the earth are the possessors of
a bigger revelation than the most enlightened. The issue
of such a theory is obscurantism of the worst type.
(49)
The fact that so able a scholar can put forward 
this theory Illustrates the necessity of arriving at 
some clear notion as to the place which the abnormal 
occupies in revelation. There are three outstanding modes 
along which the Divine self-manifestation has been made to 
us, namely, Prophecy, Miracles, and Mysticism, and we shall 
now deal with these, with the sole object of elucidating 
the significance of the abnormal in revelation.
(A) PROPHECY.
Prophecy is a characteristic of all religion, but our 
study will best attain its end by limiting ourselves to 
the type represented in the Old Testament. In the 8th 
century B.C. there appeared in Israel a group of men 
who proclaimed moral and religious truths of an excellence 
far and away beyond that of the period. They claimed to 
speak, not in their own name, but in the name of God, and 
often prefixed to their utterances "Thus saith the Lord". 
Their preaching exhibited a lofty ethical tone: they 
laid the emphasis on purity of motive and rightness of 
heart and brought their hearers face to face with the 
inwardness of moral and spiritual truth. In them the 
religion of Israel reached its high-water mark, for the 
quality of their utterances was far in advance of those 
who had preceded them, and if we except certain of the
(50)
Psalms, of those who followed them. On occasion, they 
ventured to make predictions, not all of them being 
actually fulfilled in history, but which, on the whole, 
showed a marvellous grasp of the realities of the historical 
situation. Many of their utterances have come down to us, 
and are held by Christians generally to be revelation.
But why so? Is it the mystery of their personality 
or the accuracy of their predictions that accredits 
their writings as being revelation? They may be described 
as abnormal, in the sense that they cannot be explained 
by their antecedents or their environment, that it is 
beyond the power of those who believe in a rigid historical 
continuity to tell us how such characters should appear at 
such a time, but this abnormality cannot be the proof that 
their message has revelation value, inasmuch as it is not 
the fact of abnormality but the kind of abnormality which 
decides that. All genius is abnormal, and yet there is a 
very real difference between genius and revelation; in 
the latter we postulate a givenness in a way which we do 
not in the former, and it is the right to postulate this 
givenness which is in question. If abnormality be the 
criterion, revelation becomes a species of genius. 
Nor can it be the case that the fulfilment of their 
forecasts of the future accredits the claim which they 
made to speak for God, for in that case, the greatest of
(*>)
the prophets would be the one who had made the greatest 
number of accurate predictions.
Two reasons may be given for ascribing
to the utterances of the prophets the character of revelation. 
They must be taken as complementary and as involving each 
other. (I) First of all, they form a vital link in the 
self-manifestation of God which culminated in Christ: they 
are part of a chain which at every point rises above 
historical continuity: their teachings were not annulled 
but fulfilled in Christ. We here make the assumption for 
which we shall have to give reasons later on , that in 
some sense the revelation in Christ was final, and that in 
the process which reached unto Him the prophets are an 
essential factor, and that this is one of the vital 
reasons why their words come to have for us the character 
of revelation. What gives them that place is not their 
genius but rather that they were in what we have come 
to recognise as the main stream of development.
But (2) secondly, what enables us to claim for 
the words of the prophets the character of revelation 
Is their moral majesty and spiritual reality. In them 
there is that Sternal quality which commends them to us 
as the Word of God, a word uttered in time but for all time. 
Our personality is quickened in its deepest aspect by 
contact with them, and when they affirm "Thus saith the
(52) 
H
Lord, we are confident that they were not adding the
Divine signature to their own utterance, but stating
a literal fact, which the deepest things in our spiritual
nature recognises as true. It is not sufficient to answer
that this is merely a subjective judgment, for subjectivity
enters into all our judgments, and the question rather is
as to whether it is true, that is, as to whether in
making it we have adequately and accurately apprehended
the facts. Such a question can be better solved by appreciation,
than by logic. It is enough for us that a multitude,
in eluding men and women of the finest type of character
have found in them the very Light of God, the motive
and inspiration of their noblest deeds. Further than that
we cannot and need not go.
We are now in a position to answer the question 
as to why we speak of the words of the prophets as 
revelation. They were abnormal and appeared in the world 
as men born out of due timej they possessed such a clear 
insight into the moral and spiritual basis of Society 
that they were able to predict the future with a great 
measure of accuracy J but it is not on these grounds that 
we ascribe to their utterances the character of revelation, 
but on the grounds of their intrinsic moral and spiritual 
worth, and of their place as essential factors in the 
historic process which culminated in Christ.
(55)
(B) MIRACI£S.
The foregoing discussion has prepared the way , in some 
measure, for our understanding of the relation between 
miracles and revelation. It is not within the scope of 
our discussion to reason out the problem as to whether 
miracles are possible. For the purpose of our argument 
we assume that they are. Any other position involves the 
denial that any transcendental factor can enter the realm 
of Mature or experience, and the conception of the world 
as a closed circle. Such a position apart from any religious 
considerations is beset with grave difficulties from the 
scientific and philosophical side. A scientist-philosopher,
Professor C Lloyd Morgan, in his Gifford Lectures on
* 
"Emergent Evolution^has put the case very fairly with
respect to the new elements which enter into the Universe. 
He says: "But the orderly sequence, historically viewed,
appears to present, from time to time, something genuinely
„ •' 
new. Under what I here call emergent evolution ) stress is
laid on the incoming of the new. Salient examples are
afforded in the advent of life, in the advent of XKfiKKtixx
ikmgkt mind^and in the advent of reflective thought.
But in the physical world emergence is no less exemplified
in the advent of each kind of atom, and of each new
kind of molecule" ( Pub 1922. p I). It is true that on
page 13 he rejects the notion that the new comes into
(54)
nature by a special insertion AB EXTRA, but the idea of 
"special insertion" is not necessary to maintain our position. 
If there be any doubt as to his attitude, the passage on 
page 36 dispels it: "For better or worse, while I hold 
that the proper attitude of naturalism is strictly agnostic, 
therewith I, for one, cannot rest content. For better or 
worse, I acknowledge God as the NISUS through whose activity 
emergents emerge, and the whole course of emergent evolution 
is directed. Such is my philosophic creed, supplementary 
to my scientific policy of interpretation." If Prof Morgan's 
position be accepted, the A PRIORI argument against miracles 
disappears. If it were true, it would make any doctrine 
of revelation untenable. It is an assumption however of 
a purely doctrinaire character and incapable of proof. 
Putting it on one side therefore, and postulating the 
possibility of miracles, we have to face the question as 
to whether these are to be regarded as the constituent 
elements of revelation , or as outside revelation, 
accrediting it as such. It is logically inadmissible to 
treat miracle as a constituent of revelation and the proof 
of it, for this involves us in a vicious circle of reasoning 
from miracles to revelation and vice versa.
Let us put the question in a concrete form 
and study it from the point of view of the miracles that 
are ascribed to Jesus; can we regard them as accrediting 
Him as the revealer of God? It is irrelevant at this point
(55)
to introduce the question of their moral and spiritual 
character, for what we are dealing with is their 
miraculousness. From this eviscerated point of view, all 
that the miracles of Jesus attest is that He possessed 
powers of an uncommon kind, but as to the source of 
these powers they tell us nothing. But it is the source of 
the powers that constitutes the character of the miracle 
as revelation or non-revelation, and as to that the 
purely miraculous tells us nothing. The miracles Af Jesus, 
separated from the moral and spiritual significance which 
they possess ?cannot acclaim Jesus as the revealer of God.
Looking at the problem from another point of 
view, let us suppose a case in which there had been 
brought to light information which took away from a 
particular incident in the life of Jesus the miraculous 
character which hitherto it had possessed, as for example, 
that the clay which Jesus put upon the eyes of the blind 
man had medicinal qualities, and that it was only the 
general ignorance of this that had led to this act of 
restoring sight being put down as a miracle; would the
act of making the blind man see lose its character of
1 revelation. It certainly would, if revelation were limited
to the abnormal. The position is not relieved by the 
assumption that the residuum of miracles performed by 
Jesus, which remain unexplained, attest the character
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of Jesus as revealer, and that on the strength of these we 
may ascribe the character of revelation to all His words 
and actions, for that is to make a part of His life 
to accredit the whole, and it is only by inference that 
we are able to give the value of revelation to those 
things in that life which He held in common with others.
So far from accrediting the function 
of Jesus as the revealer, His miracles gain credence 
through our conviction that He is such. It is the Impression 
made upon us by His moral and spiritual character, and the 
fact that the miracles are in harmony with this, that 
Is a prime factor in our belief in their historical reality. 
If an old document were discovered which related how Besus 
had turned an innocent child into a ravenous wolf, we 
should reject it as absurd, not on the ground that it was 
too great a miracle to be believed, but that it belied 
the character of Jesus as the revealer of God.
Revelation is always supernatural in its 
origins, and as such, we may expect that sometimes it 
will be manifested in forms that are beyond our 
comprehension, but that which attests it cannot be the 
form which is incidental to its communication, but its 
essential character, which we are able to recognise as 
being God-like. It would be strange indeed if to Deity 
were denied the power, which we in some measure possess,
(57)
of initiative; it would be stranger still, if the only 
sign that He could give us of His presence were of the 
kind which violated the permanent order of the Universe. 
The assumption that miracles alone can authenticate 
revelation has its basis in a profound distrust of the 
human capacity to evaluate experience and discover within 
it the revelation of God; or perhaps it would be better to 
say that it arises from the lack of confidence in the 
reasoning powers of man. No-one will question the limitations 
of human reason, and there would be some justification 
for the position taken up by Dr Mozley, if we were limited 
to that in our apprehension of revelation, but that is 
not so. In apprehending anything as revelation, the 
judgment affirmed is that of the whole personality, and 
apart from our capacity to make this Judgment, no miracle, 
by reason of its abnormal character,could authenticate 
anything as being a revelation of God. The words of 
Spinoza, on this point, are very apt: "You seem to take 
away the authority and value of miracles, whereby alone 
as nearly all Christians believe, the certainty of the 
Divine revelation can be established" writes Oldenberg 
to Spinoza, who replies: wAs regards miracles, I am of the 
opinion that the revelation of God can be established 
only by the wisdom of the doctrine, not by miracles, or 
in other words, by ignorance" (Quoted, The Finality of 
the Christian Religion. G.B Poster.pII9 ).
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(C ). MYSTICISM.
The thirst phase of religion which gives us the opportunity 
of studying the abnormal element in revelation is that of 
Mysticism. Many writers have been careful to point out 
that Kftysticism in itself is not abnormal, but it is 
not denied that this element is often found associated 
with it. To a greater or less degree, it is characteristic 
of all religion. Dr Inge maintains that it has its root 
in the dim consciousness of the beyond, which is the raw 
material of all religion (Bampton Lectures 4n Christian 
Mysticism. 1899. p 5). We may take this further and point 
out that it possesses a double quality, being a revolt 
against the limitations of space and time, and a yearning 
for the fulness and the immediacy of the experience of 
the Divine. Whilst, in the form we know it, it is a 
comparatively late development, originating in a revolt 
against formalism and an excessive confidence in the 
powers of human reasoning in matters of religion, yet it 
has its counterpart in the " ecfetacy" which is a part of 
primitive religion. In dealing with mystical phenomena, 
therefore, we are concerned with what is more than a 
merely accidental and temporary phase of religious
experience.
The definitions of mysticism are so
numerous and conflicting, that our task would be well-nigh
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hopeless, if we were to attempt to survey the whole 
ground. However, we are fortunate in possessing a careful 
and critical study of a typical mystic, Catherine of 
Genoa (Pr Von Hugel. "The Mystical Element of Religion" ), 
which admirably serves our purpose. Catherine believed 
that she had revelations from God, Divine self-disclosures 
of His nature, incapable of being expressed in language, 
and of which words served merely to give a faint 
symbolical representation. These revelations came to her, 
either when her body was in a state of coma or trance, 
or when, by a psychical discipline, she had excluded from 
her mind all thoughts concerning things temporal and 
spatial, and left, as it were, the wires clear to receive 
the message of the Eternal. Her life was characterised 
by a certain moral beauty, and she exhibited abnormal 
powers such as those of prediction.
Now Mysticism illustrates the tendency, 
which we have already criticised , to confine religion 
to mere feeling or intuition (See Section:"The Organ of 
Revelation), but the problem for us at this point is 
a s^omVhat different one, namely, that of defining the 
relation between the abnormal element and revelation. 
Taking Von Hugel as our guide, we note, that in the case 
of Catherine, what was regarded by her contemporaries as 
substantiating her claim to be the recipient of revelation,
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was just this abnormal element. He discusses her last 
mysterious illness and the consultation which the 
doctors had with respect to her: "But examining her 
and inspecting everything with great diligence, they 
finally concluded that such a case must be a supernatural 
and divine thing, since neither the pulse nor any of the 
secretions nor any other symptom showed any trace of 
infirmity" (Vol.1, p 211). Their position was that which 
wag assumed by Dr Mozley with respect to miracles, namely, 
that abnormality accredits revelation. But Von Hugel 
proceeds to point out that the psycho-physical states, 
which were described by her physicians as " directly 
Miraculous " would be classed by us as "explicable
neural abnormalities" ( Vol.11, p 5). So it would
seem, that if the proof of Catherine's receptivity to 
revelation lay solely in these "directly miraculous" 
concomitants, then, in the light of fuller knowledge 
which can explain these, that proof is discredited. 
We arrive at the same result by approaching the subject 
along another line, by noting that Von Hugel stresses 
the fact that Catherine possessed a "highly nervous, 
delicately poised, immensely sensitive and impressionable 
psycho-physical organism and temperament", which would have 
been her ruin had it not been controlled by other factors, 
a mind and will which were its equal, and a rich
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historical, institutional religion (Vol I, p 220). 
This is merely saying that Catherine's abnormality 
furnished the means along which revelation was mediated, 
but that, if certain other factors had been absent, that 
which was mediated would have been at the furthest remove 
from revelation. That which was supposed to accredit 
Catherine as a seer, is thus seen to be neutral, and only 
becomes a means of communication with the Unseen when allied 
with other elements of an elevating type.
Prom this discussion of Prophecy, Miracles, and Mysticism, 
I trust that it has become clear, that abnormality, of 
itself, cannot accredit an experience as being revelation. 
Many experiences, even those of a religious character, 
which appear to have their origin in something or someone, 
extraneous to ourselves, an inexplicable source that 
can be npne other than the Divine, may, on a closer 
analysis, be discerned as the product of our own mind. 
For example, the Christian Mystic feels that Christ or 
the Virgin Mary is present, whereas the Mahommedan 
Mystic never feels that. One would not go so far as 
to say: "In short, the mystical revelation can be traced 
down to the formal conditions, physiological and 
psychological, of the mystic himself...The mystic acquires 
his religious convictions precisely as his non-mystical
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neighbour does, through tradition and instruction 
grown habitual, and reflective analysis. The mystic 
brings his theological belief* to the mystical experience; 
he does not derive them from it*1 (Quoted by J.B.Pratt. 
"The Religious Consciousness" p 450). It holds however 
of the form in which the mystic seeks to express his 
experience.
The criteria of revelation have their basis 
in the fact that there is a kinship between God and man, 
by which he is able to discriminate between the things 
which are and which are not from Him. Inexplicability 
cannot be the criterion of revelation, inasmuch as its 
nature is to contract or expand, and therefore to employ 
it as such can only be compared with the use of an 
elastic tape measure. Abnormality may or may not be 
associated with revelation, but one thing is certain, 
it cannot be made the test to discriminate between 
what is and what is not revelation.
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Section.5. REVELATION AND HISTORY.
We defined revelation as the self-manifestation of God 
In history and experience, and up to this point we have 
for the most part been concerned with its relations to 
the latter, but we must now carefully consider what 
position it occupies with reference to the former, namely, 
history. At the outset, we are confronted with an xjcxi 
A PRIORI objection to history being treated as the plane 
on which God's self-manifestations, may be made. We are told 
that the nature of revelation is such that it must be 
true under all conditions, in every time and place, and 
for all men. On the other hand, history appears to be 
the realm of the accidental and relative, that is to say, 
it possesses just those characteristics which constitute 
it not the medium but the antithesis of revelation. Lessing 
put the problem in its most uncompromising way when he 
asked as to whether that which is contingent and accidental 
could be the revelation of necessary and eternal truth 
(Vide. A Sabatier. "The Religions of Authority and the 
Religion of the Spirit", p IfI). The problem is deep 
and fundamental. If we accept this antithesis between 
revelation and history as being absolute, it follows that 
not history alone but individual piety ceases to be 
a revelation of God, for the same qualities that unfit 
the one to be revelation are also found in the other. 
Unless we can resolve the antithesis, the issue is Deism.
(64) 
The difficulty arises from the fact that
NECESSARY AND ETERNAL and ACCIDENTAL AND CONTINGENT
are construed as purely logical terms, and as such are 
exclusive of each other. Employing the same method with 
respect to individual experience, it is possible to affirm 
that God is INFINITE, man is FINITE, and taking the mxtwx 
terms in their purely logical significance as being mutually 
exclusive, arrive at the position that the former cannot 
manifest Himself in and through the Aatter. Antitheses of 
this character require careful examination to see whether 
the terms which constitute them are not employed in a 
bigger sense than that of the merely iogical. It is being 
recognised more and more that logical forms are inadequate 
to express all the facts of experience, especially those 
of a personal nature. The significance of aesthetic 
appreciation overflows any logical formula into which 
we may seek to compress it, and this is still more true 
of personal relationships such as friendship and love.
Employing the terms in a purely logical 
sense , revelation cannot be regarded as necessary and 
eternal truth set over against the contingency of other 
truths. Our view all the way through has been that it is 
to be regarded as a process, involving progressive 
self-manifestation on the part of God and progressive 
apprehension of its significance on the part of man.
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If we use the terms "necessary and eternal" of revelation 
we do so not with the object of stating a logical 
proposition, but as an affirmation of the significance 
and value which it possesses, and similarly when we say 
that history is "contingent and accidental", we cannot 
mean that no necessary and eternal element abides in it, 
but only that it is the changing form through which the 
Eternal is expressed. The difficulty which Lessing imagined 
to be insurmountable vanishes when we scrutinise the terms 
which created it. In the method which we are following, 
namely, that of stating revelation in terms of a personal 
relationship between God and man, it follows that it 
cannot be regarded as a necessity lifted above all 
relations, nor can history be treated as the accumulation 
of chance happenings.
In seeking to define the relation between revelation
and history, we cannot ignore the fact that the evolutionary
method which predominates in Natural Science, is now being
applied to historical phenomena. It is often assumed that
the evolutionary method is necessarily committed to the
theory that the universe is a self-enclosed order, that
nothing new can enter into it, that its movement is but
a self-unfolding of latent potentialty. If that standpoint
be taken, it is certainly difficult to find a place
for revelation as we understand it in a scheme of things
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into which no "novelty" ever comes. Science,however,is 
by no means committed to this type of evolutionary theory, 
which rests, not on any particular evidence but on the 
presuppositions of its advocates. We have already noted 
(p P 53 f») the position of the acfocates of Emergent 
Evolution, who admit the incoming of the new in the 
sequence of natural events, and if that be granted, it 
would appear to follow that we cannot deny that the same 
kind of thing happens in historical phenomena. Ivl. Bergson 
puts forward a theory known as dispersive evolution, in 
which the process of evolution is set forth as being not 
like that of a cannon-ball which follows one line, but 
like that of a shell, which bursts into fragments the moment 
it is fired off; and these fragments being, as it were, 
themselves shells, in their turn burst into other fragments, 
themselves in their turn destined to burst, and so on 
throughout the whole process (Vide F.B.Jevons. "The Idea 
of God in Early Religions".pp 123 ff . ) . Such a theory, 
whilst it emphasises an aspect of evolution which is 
constantly disregarded, namely,that its nature is not 
that of a uniform and unchanging progression in one 
direction, cannot be said to adequately represent the 
facts; but the point which we 'wish to stress is that it 
appears to allow room for a creative power which made 
the primary shell and which determines the directions
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in which successive explosions shall take, and in that 
sense does not e«clude the emergence of the new 
at every stage of the process.
What has led many historians to reject the idea 
that, from time to time, new elements enter in, has been 
the desire to rescue history from the realm of caprice 
and to constitute it an exact sdience. Their attitude is 
in the nature of a revolt against the exaggerations 
of those who believe in Divine interventions, and who 
can only discern revelation in occurrences which are 
extraordinary and miraculous. We have endeavoured to 
show, however, that those who seek to apply the evolutionary 
method to history are not committed to the point of view 
that the universe is a self-enclosed order; there is 
a theory of evolution , or to be more precise, many 
theories of evolution, which are not incompatible with 
the acceptance of revelation, nor with the recognition
of the Order underlying history as being Providential.
1* 
In fact, the word "evolution appears to possess a
teleological significance. Further, we have to bear in 
mind, that those who believe in evolution are not committed 
to the idea that the rate of progress is constant. The 
birth of a genius has often meant a great leap forward 
in civilisation, and in a similar way there have been 
outstanding periods of deterioration. Revelation has
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nothing to fear from the application of the evolutionary 
method to history, even to that sacred history on which 
it rests; our protest must be against the presuppositions 
of those, who, in order to give coherence to their 
scientific theories, over-ride the realm of fact.
Accepting the position that history is a medium of 
revelation, we have now to enquire as to whether, when 
the Divine idea, manifested on the plane of history, 
has established itself in the mind and conscience of 
the race, we cannot dispense with the history which 
mediated it. Lessing maintained that we could. He 
affirmed that the Old Testament was the First Primer, 
but every Primer has its day and is suitable only for 
a certain age; a better instruction must come and tear 
the exhausted Primer from the child's hands. Christ came, 
and the result of His coming was the New Testament, which 
is the Second Primer, and Lessing suggests the possibility 
of a religion which will supersede Christianity and 
make the Second Primer worthless. ("The Education of the 
Human Race". Lessing). Can we,however, divorce revelation 
from history in this way? Leaving for discussion at 
a later point in our study the question of the finality ' 
of the revelation in Christ, we will try to state the 
case for the continuous dependence of revelation upon 
history.
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First of all we note that Lessing views revelation 
as consisting of the communication of ideas from the 
Divine to the human mind. On that supposition, a strong 
case can be made out for the assertion that when once the 
idea has secured a firm foothold in the consciousness of 
man, the history which mediated it ceases to have significance 
But revelation cannot be limited to the communication of 
ideas. Even if we accept Lessing's dictum "that what 
education is to the individual, revelation is to the 
race,....that education is revelation coming to the 
individual and revelation is education which has come 
and is yet coming to the race" (Ibidj, we may still ask 
as to whether he rightly interprets education when he limits 
it to the communication of ideas. Surely, in education, 
there is the impact of the teacher's personality upon 
the child and not merely the transference of ideas: its 
aim is bigger than that of giving the child ideas and 
can only be expressed as the developing and maturing of 
his personality. If education involves this inter-penetration 
of personality, still more is it the case with revelation.
If that be so, we can see how historical 
fact holds not an accidental and temporal but an 
essential and eternal place in the Christian Revelation, 
and cannot be dispensed with as being merely the instrument 
for the communication of certain ideas, arid which therefore
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becomes of no further use when these are firmly entrenched 
in the human reason. On the contrary, revelation is a 
self-manifestation of God to human personality, by which 
He renews and develops the whole spiritual nature, fitting 
it for His fellowship and service; hence, the historical 
fact, so far from having merely an accidental and temporary 
significancejbecomes a perennial fountain whose streams 
never run dry; or, to change the metaphor, we may say that 
history is the soil in which revelation is set, and to 
uproot it is to separate it from the source from which 
it derives its nourishment and continuous life.
One cannot study the working of any 
of the higher religions without realising that they 
represent a growing experience, mediated by great personalities, 
and maintained and carried forward by the movement of 
historic life. If, for example, we take Christianity, 
it must be admitted that the work of Christ, Paul, Augustine, 
and Luther cannot be reduced to certain abstract principles. 
Principles cannot be separated from personality, as the 
media of revelation, without attenuating it, and robbing 
the religious life of a source to which it returns again 
and again, as to a living fountain, to renew its vitality, 
and by which it secures a standard or norm to test the 
vagaries of thought, which, from time to time, put 
forward a claim to revelation which cannot be substantiated.
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Before we pass on to consider the specific 
relation of the Christian Revelation to history, there 
are two considerations worthy of notice.
(I) Whilst revelation is often made through an individual, 
yet its significance is never merely for him; the recipient 
recognises that it is not only valid for himself, but 
has universal validity. Thus when A.Sabatier says: "It is 
nonsense to demand a criterion of evangelical revelation 
other than itself, i.e. than its own truth, beauty, and 
efficiency 11 (Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, p 56 ), 
and again, "Only one criterion is sufficient and infallible; 
every revelation must be able to repeat and continue 
itself as an actual revelation and an individual experience 
in your own consciousness" ( Ibid, p 62), our answer must 
be, that what cannot have more than individual significance 
cannot be revelation. This becomes clear when we 
realise that there cannot be two contradictory revelations, 
mine and another's. Whilst therefore, we cannot ignore 
the emotional strength with which an idea enters 
into our consciousness as being revelation, nor its 
quality of permanence, nor its continuity with the 
rest of our experience, yet these are insufficient 
criteria if universal validity is its characteristic; 
for in that case, it must needs be related to the experience 
of othenj that is, to history. And it is to be noted also, 
that it gains an increasing depth, strength, and clearness,
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when it is rescued from its isolated position as the 
experience of an individual, and brought into contact 
with the experiences of others, as embodied in history.
(2) We have already noted that revelation has 
a cognitive aspect, that whilst it may begin with an 
undifferentiated feeling, if it is to continue, it must 
acquire cognitive significance. Revelation may not be 
knowledge in the common use of the term, but it is knowledge 
of some kind. It would be absurd to think that revelation 
and knowledge could exist side by side in the one conscious-* 
ness without mutual interaction. The self, somehow, has 
to harmonise these two aspects. Now in the process of 
doing this, i.e. of differentiating the feeling continuum 
and relating it to the rest of consciousness, Iwiguage 
undoubtedly plays a great part. Words are the means which 
we employ, often without being conscious that we are 
doing so, to find a MODUS VIVENDI between revelation and 
knowledge. But language is a product of history; thus 
when We use it to restore the harmony and unity of 
consciousness, we transcend the subjective and individual, 
and revelation becomes related to the history which 
language embodies.
We are now in a position to see the place which the Bible 
occupies as the progressive revelation of God. It only 
becomes intelligible when viewed as history, or, to be more
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precise, as material for history. If treated as a primer 
of science, a text-book on ethics, or a manual on theology, 
its inadequacy is at one* apparent. On any other theory 
than that the Bible is material for history, we are bound 
to be surprised at its contents. Its trivial details 
such as those given in the acccount of the building of 
the Temple, its defettive morality as witnessed in the 
biographies of many of its heroes and heroines and in the 
fact that they did things at the Divine command which seem 
to us to be of an immoral character, and the fact that 
it contains no one system of doctrine expressed in precise 
and unmistakeable terms,and many other features,perplex 
us and will continue to do so, until we escape from the 
view that the revelation of the Bible consists of the 
communication of ideas, and realise that what it gives to us 
is the story of the action of God upon individuals and 
races, and especially His unique manifestation through 
Israel, culminating in the advent of One whom Christian 
faith recognises as the Son of God.
Viewing the Bible as history, the first 
characteristic that we note is its progressive nature, 
though by this we do not mean that from Genesis to 
Revelation we are given a constantly enlarging conception 
of God. As a matter of fact, many of the Psalms have a 
richer conception of God than that which we find in 
Malachi, and the Book of Revelation appears to many to
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be much inferior to the Gospel according to John. Even if 
it were possible to arrange the contents of the Bible in
perfect chronological order, we should not find that constant
f
and continuous dvelopment, which certain types of evolutionary
A
theories seem to demand. The evolution of Israel's faith 
was not in the nature of a mathematical progression. For 
example, the records of the prophets of the 8th century, B.C. 
reveal higher standards of religion than those contained in 
much of the literature of succeeding periods. The movement 
of the religion of Israel may be compared to the incoming 
of the tide: the waves advance and recede, periods of 
degeneration alternate with those of noble vision, but all 
the time the ocean rolls in, and high-tide is reached 
in the coming of the Son of God. It is in the light of 
this culmination of the movement that the Christian faith 
recognises the Bible as revelation. All this is in harmony 
with the view of revelation that we are putting forward, 
namely, that it consists of the interpenetration of 
personality, Divine and human. Personality implies development. 
A static conception of the Scriptures, in which there was 
no movement from heterogeneity to homogeneity, would be 
difficult to harmonise with this attempt to state revelation 
in terms of personality. The anthropomorphism, which 
characterte*ises many of these writings, and which has 
often been the target for the shafts of those who prefer
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intellectual abstractions to concrete realities, is but 
a crude attempt to express the essentially personal 
quality of revelation.
The Bible is history of a unique character, 
and this, not because its writers expressed truths which 
were peculiarly their own discovery, nor that they expressed 
them in a better way than as set forth by others. What 
makes the Bible unique as revelation is not the genius, 
not even the religious genius, of those who wrote it; in 
fact, it may be conceded that many of its passages have 
parallels in literature; but the Bible is revelation 
because it is the main stream of development, leading 
directly to that which Christian faith recognises as the 
highest and final revelation of God. Its supreme significance 
is not that it contains many gems of literature, but rather 
that it is the record of God's discipline and moulding of 
a race through many centuries, that through it, there should 
be manifested Him who was the effulgence of God's glory 
and the very image of His substance. In it we discern 
the march of events, from tribal morality to the beatitude 
concerning the pure in heart; from idolatry, through 
henotheisrn, to monotheism; from the anthropomorphic 
conception of God to that of God as the indwelling Spirit; 
from the thought of Him as Creator to that in which He
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stands revealed as sacrificial and redemptive love; from 
the image of One who was merely transcendent - upon whose 
face no man could look and live - to that of Him as seeking 
to win our fellowship through Grace and Forgiveness, and 
calling us to the high privilege of being co-workers with 
Him; from the revelation of His goodness, continuing the 
good works of the parent in the child, to that of Immortality, 
--- with many turnings aside and many lapses, yet the 
direction in which events move is towards Christ, who, as 
the "end" is the interpreter of the movement. It is to 
be noted that God acts in deed as well as in word; He not 
only manifests Himself in the speeches of the prophets, but 
in events. What more potent illustration of this than the 
Jewish Exile, which led the nation to realise the inadequacy 
of many of her religious beliefs, and brought her into 
touch with a wider civilisation, especially that of 
Babylon and Persia, from which she derived conceptions 
that were to play no small part in the evolution of her
religion.
From this, it becomes apparent how intimate 
are the relations between revelation and history. It is 
fatal to think that we can dispense with the latter, for 
that leaves revelation in mid-air, without support. 
Revelation is a jewel with a fresh lustre for every age. 
Perhaps, when the Eastern races give themselves to the 
serious study of the Scriptures, they will discover in
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them many a glint of the Divine Truth, which has escaped 
the Western mind. The motive which has prompted men to 
attempt the severance of revelation and history has been 
that they thought, by so doing, they were making religion 
more secure and giving it a foundation other than that of 
a history which was merely temporal and accidental. Our 
study has shown us, however, that history is never merely 
temporal and accidental. And further, whilst such a 
procedure frees religion from the dangers occasioned by 
historical investigation, it leaves it exposed to a far 
more subtle and serious danger, namely, that which arises 
from the vagaries of philosophical speculation. Apart 
from history, revelation becomes pure subjectivism, without 
norm or standard, and liable to be drained of its life-blood 
by parasitic superstition and a false individualism.
In what sense , however, can the Scriptures 
be said to give us a norm or standard of revelation? 
Certainly not in themselves, and apart from a present, 
living experience. To us, Lessing's contention is irrefutable, 
that, granting the historical character of the Biblical 
books, they could never of themselves give more than 
extreme probability, whereas faith requires certainty. 
We are bound to recognise, as he does, the heterogeneity 
between historic belief and religious faith, and to
^atJt,
rcoognioc- the force of his exclamation: "When will one
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cea§© to hang nothing less than all Eternity upon a 
spider's web" (Vide. G.B.Foster. "The Finality of the 
Christian Religion", p 82). The function of the Scriptures 
is not that of giving us certain ideas of God, which the 
reason of itself is powerless to discover, but rather that 
of introducing us to an historic personality. The Scriptures 
are not the supreme revelation, but the Christ of whom 
they speak, and the norm or standard is His personality, 
as evidenced by the Scriptures but not confined to them; 
as seen working itself out in the lives of individuals, 
and in the customs, laws, and institutions of our 
social life. The supreme revelation of Christ transcends 
that of the Scriptures, as the appearance of the flower 
differs from that of the stem on which it grew, but which, 
at the same time, is homogeneous with it in nature. 
Sabatler's distinction between the Religions of Authority 
and the Religion of the Spirit is false, if taken as 
absolute, but it serves to emphasise the fact that when 
we speak of "the essence of Christianity", we must not 
confine ourselves to the beginnings, but must include 
In the term the experience of the Church and of all saints, 
in so far as this may be regarded as the unfolding of the 
significance of the Person of Christ as outlined in the 
Scriptures. 
, ..• If the position which we have outlined be
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accepted, one of the grave difficulties in the way of 
the acceptance of the Scriptures as revelation disappears. 
I refer to that which is created by the application of 
the canons of historical criticism to the Biblical 
literature, which has deleted many of its passages and 
fundamentally altered others. It is not surprising that 
the ordinary man finds himself in a quandary, and 
sometimes wonders whether he can trust the norm or 
standard. But if the Scriptures are taken, not as a 
norm lying outside other revelation and separable from it, 
but as an integral part of it; and if the supremacy we 
giye to them is that of revealing the historical Christ, 
whose lineaments are not out of harmony with man's 
progressive apprehension of God in the ages which have 
followed, the difficulty is minimised, if it does not 
disappear. We need to bear in mind the words of Hermann 
Schulti: "Faith in the historical Christ does not at 
all involve deciding points of historical science, as 
for example, the problems with which the investigations 
of the life of Jesus haveta to deal. It is not at all 
a question of anything that scientific criticism could 
throw doubt upon, of anything merely past, but of an 
active personality that has stamped itself as living 
on the spiritual history of man, and whose reality as 
it is in itself, anyone can test by its effects, as
(80)
immediately as he can test the reality of the nature 
that surrounds him and the relations in which he stands!! 
(Vide. G.B. Poster. "The Finality of the Christian Religion". 
P 404.)
The position stated above makes the
Scriptures not the norm, but the mediator of the supreme 
revelation, and yet leaves us with and objective Christ, 
whom religious faith acclaims as such. The Scriptures 
are not something given in an external fashion, but are 
themselves the outcome of religious experience; and thus 
when we say they cannot be the norm or standard of the 
Christian faith, we are not reducing that faith to 
subjectivity, but rescuing it from the subjectivity which 
such a position entails. We need always to keep before us 
the fact that it was not the Scriptures that made religion, 
but religion that made the Scriptures, and therefore they 
cannot be the ultimate source of knowledge and criterion 
of Christian faith and life. They but give us the first 
impressions of the supreme revelation of God, the final 
significance of which can only be perceived in the 
actual realisation of the end which it was designed to 
accomplish.
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Section.6. THE TRUTH AND CRITERIA OF REVELATION. 
The position which we have sought to maintain is 
that revelation is a self-manifestation of God, which, 
to a greater or lesser degree can be apprehended by 
the Self, that is, not by some single phase of it - 
emotional, volitional, or cognitive - but by the Self 
as a whole. If that be granted, we are justified in 
describing the content of the revelation apprehended by 
u£ as "knowledge of God". To call it knowledge means 
that it has certain features in common with knowledge 
in general; for example, it has a content which the 
mind can appropriate; whilst the words "of God" differentiate 
it from other knowledge by marking out the qualities 
which are peculiar to its nature. By reason of this 
double character, which links it to knowledge in 
general and yet distinguishes it from such, we may 
anticipate that its criteria will be in some respects 
similar to, and in others different from those which we 
apply to other realms of knowledge.
If we say that revelation is knowledge of some 
kind, it is incumbent on us to say what we mean by 
knowledge. It Is no longer possible to hold the somewhat 
NAIVE conception that knowledge is merely the cognition 
of things. The ini* limits of knowledge were not generally 
recognised in the Greek Age, but, even then, Plotinus 
held that a knowledge of things, existing outside our
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thought, is an absolute contradiction; that knowledge 
is, in fact, but a self-cognition of thought. The final 
blow at the NAIVE conception of knowledge was dealt by 
JCmnt, who showed that in the apprehending of knowledge 
the mind brings something with it, that it is active in 
the process, and not merely a TABULA RASA on which sense- 
impressions are recorded. The idea that knowledge consists 
merely of an accumulation of "sensa", which are then 
sorted out and arranged into a system by means of a 
cognitive faculty, certain of the"sensa" being rejected as 
false, inasmuch as they do not fit into the system, is no 
longer tenable. On that basis, revelation could neither be 
affirmed nor denied, and became solely a matter of 
individual preference.
Eucken has a very illuminating sentence
to this effect: "Real knowledge is not an adjustment and 
accumulation of impressions, starting from man and 
directed towards human ends, but it is a penetration 
into the real nature of things, and an inner expansion 
through participation in a wider life" {The Life of 
the Spirit". Tr P.L.POGSON. p 258). Without adopting 
the philosophic standpoint of Eucken, one feels that 
this definition does bring out the concrete character of 
knowledge. On this basis we should define that knowledge 
which is the content of revelation, as being the penetration
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into the real nature of God, and an inner expansion 
through participation in the Infinite life.
The problems of Epistemology in general
do not come within our scope. We assume that the mind's 
nature is to affirm truly of reality; otherwise we 
arrive at a universal scepticism, which i£ of a 
self-contradictory kind, for if there is not anything 
that we know, we cannot even affirm that we know that 
we do not know. Rejecting the fallacies of Hume, we take our 
stand on the inherent capacity of the Self to apprehend 
partially fbut not thereby falsely f the meaning of the 
reality of which we form a part.
One characteristic of all knowledge is 
that the element of relationship enters into it, a 
relationship between an experiencing subject and an 
experienced object, though this must not be construed 
as though it implied "floating ideas" which linked 
subject and object together. We cannot know a thing-as- 
it-is-in-itself for the simple reason that there is 
no thing-in-itself to know. We cannot know God-as- 
He-is-in-Himself, for such a being never existed. 
When we affirm that all knowledge has in it this 
element of relationship, our position must be distinguished 
from that of Relativism (c/f "The Idea of God".Pattison. 
116), for we posit it as a characteristic of
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knowledge whereas they speak of it as though it were 
its defect. To know things as they are in relationship 
is to know them truly; any other kind of knowledge would 
be in the nature of a false abstraction. We must abandon 
the idea, which is as theoretically unjustifiable 
as it is practically useless, that revelation gives us 
an idea of God-as-He-is-in-Himself as distinct from God 
as He-is-in-His-reiAtionships.
It is often thought to be the case,
that if it be conceded that relationship enters into all 
knowledge, it becomes merely subjective, and is to that 
extent untrustworthy. This position, however, cannot be 
sustained. To say that the only knowledge possible is 
the knowledge of a thing as it is for consciousness, 
cannot be taken to mean the denial of an objective world, 
nor, as applied to religion, the denial of God as object. 
It is a grave mistake to assume that objectivity consists 
of things outside ourselves, unrelated to consciousness, 
and incapable of being known. Professor Stout has defined 
the position with respect to perception, as follows: 
"External objects are cognised as existing independently 
of us, just as we exist independently of them...The 
external thing does not consist for us merely in the 
sensible features by which it is qualified. There must 
be something to which these sensory contents are referred
(85 )V ' p
as attributes" (Groundwork of Psychology .ps£&-). That
A
Is to say, there is , in perception, the implicit 
recognition of an object which is more than the
qualities which hold our attention. Similarly with 
revelation; God exists, independently of our apprehension 
of Him, and is more than the content of the religious 
consciousness.
. - -In fact, all knowledge presupposes an 
object. This is the case even with respect to illusions. 
The difference between knowledge and illusion, is not 
that in the one case there is an object whilst in the 
other there is none, but rather a difference in the 
quality of knowing. The question is as to whether 
we have rightly and adequately apprehended a part of 
complex reality, or in other words, it is not a question 
of objectivity but of truth. The term "subjective" is 
often used to indicate that quality in an experience 
of which we cannot give others an adequate notion, 
the untransferable and inexpressible element. There 
can be no doubt that this is very pronounced in the 
apprehension of revelation. On this ground, the argument 
of subjectivity has been employed to destroy the idea 
of revelation. But subjectivity and falsity are not 
synonymous terms, and the real question, as we have 
pointed out above, is the question of Truth. The subjective
(86) 
is not necessarily the false.
With respect to knowledge in general, 
the question has often been raised as to how we get 
from our own minds to objective reality. If we accept 
the definition of Sucken (p. 82), this problem does not 
arise. There is no question of "getting to" something. 
The mind lives, moves, and has its being in reality, 
and what it moves from, in the progress of knowldgeqp is
a reality that is only confusedly aware of itself and 
its environment, and what it moves to, is a clearer
(re* ~&** « J&,v<*A*e<ap*y «£ /?<Uc*<^m, . fi 332) .
conception of both. A similar difficulty meets us with
A
respect to revelation. If by revelation we meant "getting 
to something" which is outside and unrelated to ourselves, 
the task of defending it would be well-nigh hopeless. 
We can never justify revelation, save on the assumption, 
that "in God we live and move and have our being", and 
that revelation is not only an unfolding to us of the 
Divine naturetai but also of our own deepest and truest 
relations with it.
We have now to take a brief survey of theoriwa which 
postulate a complete disparity between revelation and 
knowledge, and seek to lift the former above any 
criteria whatever. In the 2nd Century, A.D., we find one 
of the early apologists, Athenagoras, laying down the 
position that revelation is by faith, and that faith
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is superior to knowledge. The prophets are regarded as 
passive instruments of revelation, as organs of the 
Spirit, who are moved upon as are the flute or the 
lyre (Fisher. History of Christian Doctrine, pp 64.03.). 
This distinction between faith and knowledge is interesting, 
inasmuch as it is still authoritative in the Roman 
Catholic Church. It must be admitted that if we limit 
the word "knowledge? to those truths which can be 
logically demonstrated, then it follows that the deepest 
certainties in our religious experience fall outside it. 
But the point is as to whether we are justified in so 
limiting it. Our knowledge of God certain cannot be 
compressed into syllogistic forms, but that cannot 
mean that it has no right to be called knowledge. If 
any fact of experience possesses content, if it is 
anything more than an undifferentiated continuum of 
feeling, it thereby possesses the right to be classed 
as knowledge. To be able to say to an unbeliever:"I 
know; I cannot give you any reasons for what I know; 
the truth which I am uttering is in the nature of 
revelation, and belongs to a realm in which reason 
has no say; 11 is certainly to put religion beyond .he 
power of criticism, but it seems to me to expose it to 
a much worse danger, namely, that that which is not 
revelation may be asserted as such, and if there be no
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criteria, we are left without defence. Moreover, we have 
seen that the revelation which came in the prophets 
bore upon it the stamp of their diverse personalities, 
they were not the flute and the lyre on which the 
Spirit played, but active participiants in conveying 
to us the "music 11 of God. The attempt to lift revelation 
beyond the reach of all criteria whereby it can be 
said to be such, is, in reality > to strip it of all 
content, and make it meaningless. Faith is not unrelated 
to knowledge, still less is it the antithesis of knowledge, 
it is a mode of apprehending the knowledge of God 
which transcends the power of human reason but 
is continuous with it.
It is obvious that the position of
Athenagoras has affinities with that of Kant, though mt 
it must also be admitted that there are marked dissimilarities. 
The idea of revelation as being the impress of the Spirit 
on a subject who was passive would have been entirely 
repugnant to Kant. The likeness between the two lies in 
the fact that the "faith" of Athenagoras is substantially 
the "practical reason" of Kant. Since both lack content, 
they are to all Intent, indistinguishable. We have already 
had occasion to deal with certain aspects of Kant's 
thought, and the only point we are now concerned with, 
is to show, that his separation between "noumena" and
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"phenomena", whilst it does lift both Morality and 
Religion above all criteria, and therefore apparently 
secures it against all rational criticism, yet the real 
effect of doing this is to make both meaningless. 
It seems to us, that PCant himself, at times, realises this 
and seeks to break through the dichotomy which his theory 
necessitated, as for example, when he introduces the 
maxim: "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst 
at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law" (Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. 
p 46). This is essentially at variance with the principle 
on which his system rests,that"nothing can possibly
be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can
<*> «--/   t»«~t*
be called good wifch qualification, except a Good Will". 
A "barren" Good Will simply disappears when any content, 
even that of Universality, is introduced into it. Our 
position is that all knowledge, including the knowledge 
of God, is qualified and conditioned by our own mind, 
that it is "phenomena" 9 that the absolute authority of 
the "moral law" and of revelation is not due to its 
position as lifted up above all relations, but rather to 
its intrinsic quality. To say that the "moral law" and 
revelation enter into the world of phenomena and appearance 
is not to deny their place in the world of noumena and 
reality, inasmuch as phenomena are but noamena imperfectly
(90)
apprehended, and appearance is our pathway to reality. 
The difficulty with Kant's argument is, that whilst 
he used it, not for the purpose of weakening our belief 
in God and the soul, but rather for the purpose of 
strengthening it against sceptical attacks, it can so 
easily be turned in the other direction; that is to say, 
it may be maintained that if we can know nothing but 
phenomena, we have no right to speak of any reality 
behind them, and thus it becomes the bulwark of agnosticism. 
There is a distinption between the "practical1* and 
the "theoreticalS reason, between knowledge and the 
knowledge of God, but it is a distinction within the 
unity of knowledge, and not the separation postulated
by Kant.
We claim that it is possible to have a real 
knowledge of God, and that the way in which this comes 
to us is not that of an authoritative pronouncement 
by Him, upon which we are impotent to form a judgment, 
but by the way of experience, individual and social, and 
that our nature is such that we are capable of evaluating 
it. The problem moves down from Kant, through Lotze 
to Ritschl. When we come to state the criteria of 
revelation we shall see the importance of RAtschl's 
"Judgment of Value", but what we are emphasising here 
is that he , like Kant drew a clean-cut line between
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different kinds of knowledge, i.e. between scientific 
and philosophical knowledge and religious knowledge, 
whereas our position is rather that they are two species 
under one genus. He treats them as two well-marked 
realms, between which there can be no collision, so 
long as each confines itself to its proper province. 
Our answer must be, that it is not possible for "faith" 
and "knowledge" to exist unrelated in the same consciousness, 
and that it is futile to strive to keep them, as it were, 
in water-tight compartments. There are no separate 
provinces In the consciousness any more than there are 
separate faculties in the mind: both faith and knowledge 
have a content for consciousness.
Another phase of this method of seeking to 
lift revelation above all criteria is seen in the 
attitude of those who maintain that the content of 
revelation is limited to certain historical facts, which 
are given authoritatively and are to be accepted on 
trust; such as the Bible, the Incarnation, Death, and 
Resurrection of Christ; and to certain inferences which 
may be legitimately drawn from these. Unwittingly 
Professor Peake stumbles into this position, when he 
says: "But the Gospel stands or falls by a series of 
facts in space and time, and by certain theological 
affirmations which it makes about these"(A.S.Peake. "The
(92)
Bible", p 471). In fairness to him, it ought to be 
pointed out that this quotation is scarcely consistent 
with other arguments in the same book, but the words 
do express the attitude of many. Our answer to this 
objection must be, that facts QUA facts, that is as 
unrelated to consciousness and devoid of cognitive, 
emotional, and volitional significance, simply do not 
exist. Given that significance, they become objects 
concerning which we may form judgments. The powers of 
human judgment may be ever-rated, but, unless we have 
that power, the issue must be the nescience of Manse11
(MetaphyseCs". 1866. pp 582£f), or the agnosticism of
•f «< 
Herbert Spencer (First Principles). In a way, I suppose
the atttitude of those who would limit revelation to 
certain historical facts and the inferences that may 
be drawn from such, does allow for the criterion of 
historicity, but historicity is only one of many 
Criteria, and to treat it as though alone it possessed 
incontestable authority cannot be justified. Any theory 
of revelation, which seeks to lift revelation out of 
the dust and tur»oi 1 of discussion , by ascribing 
to it an authority,upon which man has no right to 
a judgment, does so at the cost of impoverishing its 
content by cutting it off from sources that enrich 
and vivify.
(95)
We now proceed to elucidate the position that knowledge 
is a genus, under which may be subsunwd not two species, 
but many, and that these differences are such as to 
materially affect the form of the criteria which we 
employ to determine their validity. Knowledge is a unity 
which emb**ces and not excludes diversity, a unity which
&-T^
we reach not by ignoring aa£ cancelling dif ferences ,but 
by taking them up in a higher synthesis. For example, 
phenomena may roughly be grouped under four headings: 
Matter, Life, Mind,and Spirit. But Life cannot be treated 
as separate from Matter, nor Mind as separate from both, 
nor Spifcit as unrelated to the other three. Life is 
never found apart from Matter, nor Mind apart from Life, 
nor Spirit apart from Mind. In Life, however, as distinct 
from Matter, there is something new, so also in Mind 
as distinct from Life, and in Spirit as distinct from 
Mind, and this something new necessarily carries with it 
the inference of a new mode in our apprehension of it. 
The new factors require a new method to discern, order, 
and evaluate them. To eliminate these "novelties", or to 
Imagine that we have done Justice to them by giving them 
a name such as "epiphenomenon" and then treat them as 
though they did not count, is to be false to the primary 
source of all our knowledge, namely, experience. Bach new 
factor must involve at anyrate an adjustment in the
(94) 
criteria which we apply to them.
Now revelation, which, regarded from the 
human standpoint ts "knowledge of God", naturally falls 
under the highest of these categories, that of Spirit. 
The nearest analogy to our knowledge of God is the 
knowledge which comes through friendship. Its essential 
characteristic is that it is personal. There is similarity 
between the knower and the known; there is the element 
of responsiveness, mutual interaction, reciprocity! 
there is the fact that the relation between the subject 
and object is not in the nature of something static; the 
friendship remains firm and unbreakable, but it continually 
assumes new shapes. Moreover in the knowledge of a 
friend the emotional and volitional factors are very 
pronounced. Most of all, we note that in the knowledge 
of friendship, what we may call the element of "value" 
enters in as an essential and important factor. The 
most important thing in my knowledge of a friend is 
that he is my friend. Of course, this is but an analogy 
and must not be pushed to extremes; the differences 
between the knowledge which comes through friendship 
and that which comes through revelation must not be 
Ignored in considering their similarities. It seems to 
us that the differences group themselves about the fact 
that in revelation God is immanent and transcendent
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to a degree which is unknown in friendship. Despite these 
differences, we appear to be on safe ground in saying 
that the predominance of the emotional and volitional 
factors, the necessity of sympathy and love , the 
element of value, and the peculiar character of religious 
experience as being a participation in the life of God, 
are factors which cannot be ignored in determining the 
criteria of revelation, which will in consequence be 
different from those which we employ with respect to 
scientific knowledge.
The problem that faces us is this: when we affirm 
of an experience, whatever the nature of that which 
mediated it, this is a Aelf-manifestation of God, flesh 
and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but the Father 
in Heaven, what grounds have we for saying so? What 
shall determine whether our affirmation is true or false? 
Our contention is that the peculiar nature of this 
experience, which differentiates it from all others, 
necessitates criteria which are appropiate to its nature, 
that to employ the same criteria for revelation that 
we use in scientific procedure is as foolish as to try
to
see an amoeba through a telescope or to survey the 
heavens with a microscope.
Scientific criteria are predominantly 
intellectual. The goal of the intellect is the apprehension
of the whole universe as a nexus of relations. The
generalisations of science are observations classified
under logical forms. There are phenomena however
which cannot be •xpressed in logical form, but of whose
truth we have no doubt whatever. We affirm therefore,
that intellectual truth,that is,the truth which is
amenable to logical form, is is but one aspect of truth,
and that experiences which may be said to outrun or
overflow these forms are not therefore false. There must
as a consequence be some criteria other than that of
the intellect by which we can affirm these experiences
as being true. Truth as disinguished from purely intellectual
truth will take all factors into account.
I very much doubt whether any intense
human experience can be expressed in syllogistic form. 
A lover's passion for his beloved outreaches all 
intellectual forms but we cannot brand it as false 
because it over-leaps the criteria of scientific procedure., 
nor in our desire to be scientific can we be false to 
experience and reduce it to something less than it is, i.e. 
to the sex-urge. What ground is there for saying that 
an experience like that of listening to an Oratorio 
of Handel's or being enthralled by one of Titain's 
masterpieces is a less efficient apprehension of reality 
than a logically-correct scientific formula or a
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proposition in Euclid? Those who speak of truth as 
being limited to the intellectual forms of it, and 
characterise all other uses of the word as being 
metaphorical must find it difficult to say on what
te&
grounds we are debarred from applying ^& adjective "true" 
to such experiences as these.
Some of the deepest certainties of our
being cannot be adequately expressed in the forms of the 
intellect, nay more, the moment an experience* has 
been crpstallised into the form of a proposition, it has 
lost something in the process; perhaps it has gained 
something also, but the only point that I want to make
is that the proposition very inadequately expresses the
U- 
experience, btt4, is somewhat in the nature of an abstraction
from it. If one were to catch a lark and put it in a 
cage, and note and classify its behaviour, one's 
Observations would be true so far as they went, but 
not of the lark - only of the lark-in-the-cage. Not 
less true would be the experience of watching the lark 
soar aloft, filling the heavens with indescribable music. 
Or one may take an example from the realm of Art. 
A picture which aims at accurately reproducing a scene 
as it is would correspond to intellectual truth; it 
could be tested as to size, shape, colours, position,etc, 
but true Art as distinct from such copying has in it
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a beauty which eludes all definition. As to whether 
a picture is a bit of true Art or no, cannot be settled 
by a faultless syllogism. Professor J.B.Baillle's 
main theme in his "Studies in Human Nature" is that 
truth, as used in the narrower sense, is but one way 
in which the mind seeks fulfilment, and that if "full 
truth" of mind is to be reached, it must be approached 
from all sides and not merely from one side of our 
nature. Perhaps enough has been said to justify us in 
introducing into our criteria of revelation a factor
which is not strictly amenable to logical exprssion,/»
namely that of value. The personal nature of revelation
( see p 94) is such that the criterion of value is
an important one in elucidating the claim of any
experience to be of the character of revelation. On
the other hand, it seems to us that it cannot be the
sole criterion, inasmuch as some of the content of
revelation can be expressed in the logical forms with
which the intellect is competent to deal. The reconciliation
between value and intellectual truth constitutes a
metaphysical problem, the solution of which is by
no means easy, but in the succeeding section a suggestion
which may be helpful im clearing the way to such a
solution is put forward.
"Truth is the quality of knowing as it
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performs efficiently its function, namely, that of 
apprehending Reality as it is" (L.A.Reid. wiknowledge 
and Truth", p 112 185). If knowledge were a copy of 
Reality, then truth would be the perfect correspondence 
between the two. But there is no such possibility - 
the only Reality with which we can deal is in knowledge, 
and therefore in any judgments we make we are limited 
to the constituents of knowledge itself, and cannot 
compare it with an absolute standard which lies outside 
itself. What we can do is to see that the criteria 
we employ \& suitable to the nature of that to which 
*E t& applied, as a means of determining whether we 
have efficiently apprehended Reality. The affirmation of 
revelation implies that a certain portion of our experience 
is in the nature of a Divine self-communication, that its 
origin is not in ourselves but in a transcendent and 
immanent Reality, who is God, and that it is mediated 
to us through the fact that our life participates to 
a lesser or greater degree in the infinite life of God. 
The question is as to whether, in the apprehension of 
this experience as revelation, the knowing function 
has worked efficiently. It seems to us that the criteria 
by which this may be determined are 3 in number.
(I) The knowledge which revelation gives 
to us must be coherent with other knowledge in the same
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individual consciousness. It is as true of the knowledge 
of God as it is of other knowledge, that an hypothesis 
has a fair chance of being true, if it fits in with 
other hypotheses in the realm of knowledge. This is 
but the affirmation that there cannot be in consciousness 
two Orders of Reality with no integrating principle to 
secure their harmony. It is unthinkable that God should 
reveal Himself along lines that contradict the rest of 
experience rather than along the lines of that experience. 
For example, the revelation mediated by Nature cannot 
be in permanent irreconcileability to that of the Bible, 
nor can the latter be in continuous and unresolvable 
contradiction to the immediate experience of the soul. 
This criterion needs to be employed with great care, 
for there is a profound truth in the sentence that God's 
ways are not our ways nor His thoughts our thoughts, 
that is to say, we are always limited by our finitude. 
It is one, however, which we cannot ignore. (This theory 
of coherence must be carefully distinguished from the 
epistemological theory of coherence, which asserts 
that the knowledge of things as they are for us must be 
like the things as they are in themselves. This is 
valueless, since we can never know things as they are 
In themselves, and have therefore no means of comparison). 
In connection with our criterion, the words of Butler 
are well worth pondering:"The Scheme of Providence,
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the ways and works of God are too vast, of too large 
extent for our capacities. Yet, if a man were to walk by 
twilight, must he not follow his eyes as much as if he 
were to walk in broad day and clear sunshine? Or, if 
he were obliged to take a journey by night, would he 
not give heed to any light shining in the darkness, till 
the day should break and the day-star arise" (Sermon. n The 
Ignorance of Man"j.
(2) The knowledge which revelation gives 
must be coherent with history. This is but to supplement 
what has been said above, inasmuch as history may be 
described as the record of social experience. For example, 
revelation cannot contradict history; it cannot affirm 
a date for the creation of the world different from that 
which is established by historical records and remains. 
This must not be taken to mean that revelation cannot 
be embodied in myth and in inaccurate history, but rather 
that such myths and histories constitute the form rather 
than the essence of revelation. This criterion of 
coherence with history becomes of supreme importance, 
when considering the specific nature of the Christian 
Revelation. In some sense, we must hold that Christ 
is the final revelation, and therefore if our criterion 
is to stand, He who is the crown of all human experience, 
in whom there is summed up all that is truest and
(10*)
most real in itj together with the historic facts of 
His Life, Death and Resurrection and the Influences 
which have radiated from His Personality must be the 
criterion of revelation in a supreme sense.
(3) The third criterion is that which Ritschl 
emphasised, namely, that of value. It may be said that 
if Christ is the supreme criterion, no other is needed, 
but then it is rery doubtful, whether apart from this 
judgnent of value, we could establish the finality of 
Christ. As applied to revelation, this criterion may 
be expressed thus: revelation cannot contradict the 
deepest and most profound convictions at the centre 
of man's being. From the human side, religion has its 
origin in practical needs to which revelation is the 
Divine answer. The attitude of a thirsty man towards 
water is quite other than that of a scientist towards 
the rainbow. Discovering it, he drinks eagerly, and if 
a scientist were to come along and seek to stand between 
him and the satisfaction of his thirst, he would thrust 
him on one side; the scientific explanation would have 
to wait on the satisfaction of the felt need. Religion 
has this practical character, revelation being apprehended 
as that which answers to man's spiritual needs. Value 
therefore in this case becomes a criterion of great 
importance.
(103)
The weakness of Hitachi's position lay largely 
In this, that he took the affirmation of the judgment 
of value to involve the denial of all metaphysic. No 
doubt his theory was in vital antagonism to the traditional 
metaphysic, but that is not the same as saying that it 
was hostile to a metaphysic of any kind. In fact, so far 
is this from being the case, that a modern philosopher 
can speak of "Value as a Metaphysical Principle" (Hibbert 
Journal. Vol XXII. No I). By his repudiation of metaphysic, 
he clouded somewhat the fine contribution which he made to 
the question under discussion. This must not be allowed 
to deter us from appropiating what is helpful in it. 
For whilst it may be admitted that "value" is not the 
equivalent of "e xistence", yet it forms a very effective 
criterion which we can apply to revelation. For, if God 
be the highest we can know, and if revelation be His 
self-manifestation, it follows that any judgment we may 
make with respect to it will have to reckon with this 
element of value.
In brief, our criticism of Ritschl 
would be: (a) It is illegitimate to maintain that 
religion can afford to be indifferent to the Order 
postulated in the scientific explanation of the Universe, 
and equally so, to put values and facts in opposition and 
affirm that the fptfmer are decisive in all questions of 
religion. Both value and fact are component elements in
Ultimate Reality, and the task of philosophy is not 
that of denying either, but of showing their harmony. 
It is not to be presumed that Ritschl treated religious 
knowledge as other than factual, but he failed to 
recognise the possibility of an ideal harmony between 
the Two Orders, this largely being the consequence of 
his aversion to Metaphysic. (b) As against Ritschl, we 
must affirm that a value judgment is such for personality*
Z^^^L 7?. 7^«c*«v*-/wA Ja£-Zo£:
(See"Justification and Reconciliation*1 ,>p -S^Sr). In any
^
judgment of value, the Self is involved, and not merely 
certain phases of it, such as feeling or will. There is 
such a thing as intellectual value, and if value is 
to be employed as a criterion of revelation, it must 
be in the sense of personal value, that is, a value for 
the whole Self, (c) It must be clearly recognised that 
feeling cannot be the only criterion of revelation. The 
poet or artist may feel intensely that his work is not 
the product of human capacity, but that does not give 
to it the quality of revelation. For the individual, 
feeling is undoubtedly primary as a criterion of 
revelation. The secondary place which the rational 
aspect occupies with respect to the religion of the 
individual is well brought out in the sayings of Jesus: 
"Except ye turn and become as little children, ye shall 
In no wise enter into the Kingdom of Heaven" (Matt 18/15), 
"If any man willeth to do His will, he shall know of
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the teaching whether it be of God, or whether I speak of 
Myself" (John 7/17), and in many passages of a similar 
character; yet those who imagine that it is exclusively 
so are strangely blind to the fact that the words "How 
think ye?" and "Consider" were often used by Him. 
It must be admitted, however, that the religious 
experience has an immediacy that rightly belongs to the 
realm of feeling anlintuition and is rarely the outcome 
of the ratAocinative process. Man does not argue the 
proofs of God, and then, having formed a judgment, discover 
the vision. The vision comes first and the ratiocinative 
process begins in the endeavour to relate it to the rest 
of experience. All this shows the importance of the 
feeling element, but that it is not everything may be 
seen in that, in the light of patient analysis, a man 
may reject that which feeling had invested with the 
character of revelation, and pronounce it to be illusion. 
It cannot too strongly be insisted upon, that our use 
of the term "value" means personal value, and not merely 
value for some aspect of our personality. Theoretical 
as well as practical considerations enter into value, and 
that cannot be practically true which is theoretically 
false. In the main, however, we agree with Ritschl, and 
affirm that that which has no value for personality 
cannot be revelation.
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We may illustrate the principles which we have been 
seeking to expound by reference to Jung's theory of the 
LIBIDO ( Vide: "Is Christian Experience an* Illusion"?. 
BaiUnforth. Ch VIII). Jung maintains that what we call 
revelation is not really so, but consists of phantastic 
forms produced by the unconscious activity of the XXXE 
LIBIDO, that is, as I understand him,from repressed 
complexes existing in the unconscious. If we apply our 
threefold criteria to this theory, we note first of all 
that it is not coherent with individual experience. That 
is not what an individual discovers in revelation. In 
certain cases the repressed complexes might produce the 
physical and mental conditions under which revelation 
appears, they cannot produce the thing Itself. Moreover it 
is not coherent with history. On Jung's theory, the 
noblest characters in history were created by repressed 
complexes which mechanically operated to make thsnadt what 
they were. And finally we may note, that Jung interprets 
an experience only by its origin and takes no account of 
the factors which make it what it is^such as its value 
for personality. On these grounds we reject such a 
theory as manifestly absurd. This instance has been 
taken as an extreme illustration as to how Psychology 
may overstep its bounds. The Psychologist as such cannot 
pronounce on the validity of revelation, inasmuch as
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the factors which constitute it such lie outside his 
domain. He can give us the psychological truth about 
any experience, even of the religious experience, but 
that is only one aspect of it, which may be important or 
unimportant, but which only constitutes a portion of 
the full explanation. If that which man perceives as 
being the self-manifestation of God is not inconsistent 
with the criteria we have laid down; if, above all, it 
immeasurably increases the value of his personality, 
we see no reason to deny that he has rightly apprehended 
the experience in judging it to be of the nature of 
revelation.
In concluding this section, reference must 
be made to an opinion which often finds expression, 
that value is a nebulous, floating element and 
is lacking in any definite standards. This is not 
the case. For example, Aesthetic value has its 
standards; otherwise Art would consist of nothing 
more than the whimsical outpourings of the individual's 
feelings, that somehow happened to produce a thing 
which charmed and exalted those who beheld it. On 
the contrary, Art has been well defined as "the 
expression through sense of universal truth", and its 
criteria may be enunciated as follows: "If the artist's 
experience is such that he can put such very life 
into the dead stuff of clay, or paint, or sound, or
(108)
movement, so that he who sees it and has perception 
acute enough feels again through the experience of 
the art-creation the universal impulses within him, 
then is the experience of beauty in both artist and 
aesthete a true experience, and its expression adequate" 
{Knowledge and Truth". L. A. Reid. p 233 J. Applying this 
to the realm of religion, we may say, that if an experience 
be such, that he who experiences it, feels himself to 
be in contact with Him who is the object of all religion, 
whose nature may be said to be Absolute Truth, Beauty, 
and Goodness, in such a way that his life is thereby 
immeasurably developed and enriched, then, for him, 
that can be nothing other than revelation, whatever be 
the means, LIBIDO, or anything else, which have contributed 
to the result. If he can reproduce the experience in 
 uch a form of words or life as to awaken a similar 
experience in others, he may be doubly sure of the fact 
that it was that which he took it to be. The expression 
however will only more or less imperfectly convey the 
significance of the experience, but the experience itself 
is not invalidated by the inadequacy of the frrrns in 
which he may seek to express it, and if these be such 
that in those whose religious instincts have not been 
atrophied, it reproduces that experience of richer, wider 
life then it has become revelation to them.
(109)
Our argument has led us to the position, that on 
purely episteraological grounds, no objection can be 
made to revelation as such. We have seen that the deep 
religious experiences of individuals and races are not 
cancelled by labelling them as subjective, that the 
question was not one of subjectivity but of truth. We 
extended the meaning of truth by showing that it intruded 
more than that which might be classed as intellectual, which 
was occupied with subsuming under logical forms the 
results of observation. The question that we have left 
undetermined is a metaphysical one and concerns the 
place which value has in Ultimate Reality. The problem 
Is as to whether we can conceive of this as harmonising 
the two distinct Orders, those of value and existence, 
and a suggestion which may be helpful to this end will 
set forth in the following section.
Bibliography. Section 6. (Page 109.A.)
(1) J.B.Baillie. "Studies in Human Nature".
Bell. 1921.
(2) Balmforth. "Is Christian Experience an
Illusion"? 
Student Christian Movement. 1923.
(5) Bosanquet. " rrinciple of Individuality
& Value". 
Macmillan. 1912.
(4) Coe. "Psychology of Religion"
Chicago University Press. 1920.
(5) Eucken. "The Life of the Spirit".(Tr Pogson).
Williams & Norgate. 1909.
(6) Fisher. "History of Christian Doctrine"
T & T Clark. 1908.
(7) Garvie. "The Christian Certainty". Ch XV.
Hodder & Stoughton. 1910.
(8) Hoernle. "Matter, Life, Mind, & God".
Methuen. 1923.
(9) Mansell. "Metaphysics".
A & C Black. 1866.
(104 Peake. "The Bible".
Hodder & Stoughton. 1913.
(11) Pattison. "The Idea of God"
Oxford University Press. 1917.
(12) Pratt. "The Religious Consciousness"
Macmillan. 1920.
(13) O.C.Quick. "Value as a Me44*hysical Principle"
Hibbert Journal. XXII.I.
(14) L.A.Reid. "Knowledge & Truth".
Macmillan. 1923.
(15) Ritschl. "Justification & Reconciliation"
(Tr. Mackintosh, pp 203-238). 
T & T Clark. 1900.
(16) Royce. "Sources of Religious Insight".
T & T Clark. 1912.
Bibliography, contd. (Page 109.B.)
(17) Sabatier. "Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion".
Williams & Norgate. 1904.
(18) Sorley. "Moral Values & the Idea of God".
Cambridge University Press. 192I.
(19) Spencer. "First Principles".
Williams & Norgate. 1910.
(20) Stout. "Groundwork of Psychology". Ch IX.
University Tutorial Press. 1903.
(110)
Section,?. REVELATION MD PERSONALITY.
(Some metaphysical considerations) .
The aversion to metaphysic, which is so charcterisfcic
of fc&e religious thinking today, is to some extent,
a revolt against a type of metaphysic which is discredited
and outworn, and in so far as it is this, is justifiable.
There are, however, two other factors which have contributed
to this result, (a) First of all there are the triumphs
which the Inductive Method has achieved in the realm
of Science, which made it absolutely certain that it
would be applied to religious phenomena. The results
have been such as to suggest that along this line a
greater and more certain advance might be made than by
following the path of abstract reasoning, (b) And
secondly, largely as the result of Kant's emphasis on
the activity of the subject in the acquiring of "theoretical"
knowledge, the experiencing self has become the fixed
point, the centre of gravity, in our thinking. The
psychology of religion is attracting more and more
the attention of religious thinkers, inasmuch as in this
region, they feel that they are on solid ground, in
comparison with which the realm of metaphysic wears
the aspect of mist and cloudland.
It is doubtful whether this condition 
of things can persist. Theology QUA theology simply 
disappears, if it cannot pass beyond the analysis of
(Ill)
religious states and is confined to an examination of 
the subjective conditions under which religious 
phenomena come to be manifested. And what is true of 
theology is equally true of religion. What the religious 
man desires to know is not merely the conditions under 
which a certain experience came to him, but also as 
to whether it is trustworthy and real, and if so, why? He 
can never rest content to leave it an open question 
as to whether his religious experience is built upon 
revelation or upon the product of his own imagination. 
He will want to know whether it is to be viewed as self- 
manufactured or divinely-manifested. Unless revelation 
can be given a place in our conception of Ultimate 
Reality, it becomes meaningless, and if we retain it at 
all, it can only be on the understanding that it denotes 
not the source but the characteristics of religious 
experience. Ritschl exclaims: "The Absolute! How queer 
that sounds! I still faintly remember that I too busied 
myself with the word in the days of my youth, when the 
Hegelian terminology threatened to draw me into its 
vortex. That was long ago. In a measure, the word has 
grown strange to me. I found there was no far-reaching
thought in it" ( Vide. Foster. "The Finality of the
&. 
Christian Religion, p -§£). But an Absolute, in some
sense, is a necessity of religious thought.
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Revelation postulates the incoming of 
something from a realm of Reality other than that 
which constitutes the domain of Science. To refuse to 
face up to the difference which our belief in revelation 
makes with respect to our conceptions of Ultimate 
Reality savours somewhat of obscurantism. So far, in 
our discussion we have not sought to go beyond the 
psychological and epistemological, and there are those 
who would say that we cannot get beyond these. At anyrate, 
we must make the attempt, otherwise revelation becomes 
an unverifiable hypothesis, and as compared with the 
facts of the scientist's world, a pale and bloodless 
thing. We cannot rest content with that position, but 
must proceed to see if it is not possible to form a 
concept of Ultimate Reality, in which the Orders 
postulated by revelation and science shall be harmolnious.
There are many ways of approaching the
problem, which are far from satisfactory, as for example, 
that which sets out to find a proof for the existence 
of Ood. A brief survey of the forms which this has 
taken will enable us to see the futility of the proceeding, 
(a) Let us first take what has come to be known as the 
Ontological Argument for the existence of God. It has 
been stated in many ways, but its essential characteristic
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is to affirm that the IDEA of God necessarily involves
His REALITY. It is not enough, in answer to this, to 
rely on cheap criticisms, similar to that which Kant made, 
that the idea of £100 in one's pocket is quite other 
than the reality, which really missed the whole point 
of Anselm's proof, which did not identify the idea of 
God with other ideas but discriminated it from them. 
The idea of God is of such a character, that is, it so far 
transcends other ideas, that it is not unreasonable 
to ascribe it to a Divine self -manifestation. The point 
at which the Ontological argument fails is not that which 
Kant imagined, but rather that it cannot give to us the 
God whom our religious nature cra-ves, namely, a God with 
determinate qualities. Its logical issue is Bather 
that of an ENS REALISSIMUM, A Being who is the sum of 
all Reality, rather than One adequate to be the object 
of religious faith.
(b) Similarly, the Cosmological Argument
for the existence of God cannot be regarded as satisfactory. 
To arrive at the Uncaused by the affirmation that a
REGRESSUS AD INFINITUM of camaes is logically
impossible, and then to label this "God", does not help 
one very much. The data on which the argument starts out 
are such as to preclude it from reaching its goal. Somewhere 
in the process the leap has to be taken from the caused
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to the uncaused, and this logically is not justifiable. 
The bridge between the two is missing. At the most, its 
affirmation of God can only be regarded as a possible 
inference, not as a proof.
<c) Nor is the Teleological Argument
altogether satisfactory, despite the fact that it has 
been much refined upon since Paley stated it in the 
simple terms of design. To Kant this was the least 
objectionable of the Theistic Proofs, and yet he saw 
the weakness of it, and his objection seems to us to 
apply to all forms of it which ignore the element of 
"value 11 and argue merely from things that "exist": w 
All that the argument from design can possibly prove 
is an ARCHITECT of the world, who is very much limited 
by the material on which he works" (Vide "Essay on Atheism"). 
Later, we shall develop an argument, which is teleological 
in its nature, but which differs from those we are now 
considering, inasmuch as it starts out from the universe 
as experienced by us, and brings in the postulate of 
a Divine purpose , namely, the creation of "value".
(d) Kant's own solution of the problem 
is far from satisfactory. He affirmed the existence of 
God on the ground that Virtue and Happiness belong to 
two different world**, the former to the Intelligible, 
the latter to the Phenomenal; the Complete Good would
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be the harmony of these; he therefore postulates God 
as the teleological ground of both worlds, guaranteeing 
the union of virtue and happiness, and therefore the 
realisation of the Complete Good. One doubts whether 
Kant Intended this to be taken as a proof of the existence 
of God; if so, it is obviously unsatisfactory, inasmuch 
as it is built on certain abstractions from the Universe, 
namely virtue and happiness, all the rest of experience 
being ignored. By a similar method, taking the opposites 
of virtue and happiness, it would not be difficult to 
affirm that the power behind the universe must be 
malevolent. All that Kant's argument proves is, that 
to postulate God's existence solves an urgent ethical 
problem, namely, the disparity between virtue and 
happiness, and in that sense it may be regarded as one 
of the convergent lines of reasoning which make the 
existence of God seem probable.
(e) Finally, there is what has come to be 
known as the Historical Proof, an argument founded 
E CONSENSU GENTIUM. It begins with the fact that in 
the human family there is a widespread, if not a universal 
consciousness of God, and proceeds to argue that the 
source of this can be no other than God Himself. At 
first, it appears to be a very formidable argument, 
but a little consideration shows us the weaknesses 
inherent in it. Ffcr instance, to agree that there are 
Gods or God can be of little value unless there is some
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Mtture of agreement as to what we mean by Gods or God. 
When stated in its crudest form, the Historical Proof 
makes shipwreck on the fact that the content of this 
universal religious consciousness ranges from the 
grossest materialism to the most refined spirituality. 
It can,however, be stated in a way which allows for this 
difference, which recognises the long stretch between 
the fetishism of a Bechuana chief and the spirituality of 
Thomas a 1 Kempis, and thus makes room for the idea of 
development. In this case, God is postulated to account 
for the developing spiritual experience of humanity; the 
long upward movement of the race would be meaningless, 
If there were no Reality corresponding to the idea 
of God, who initiated and directed it. Thus stated, 
the argument carries great weight, yet its inadequacy 
is apparent. It can never get us beyond the idea of a 
finite God, who has hitherto been able to secure progress 
for the human race, but who, for all that we know, may 
ultimately be baffled by the complexity of things.
As we survey this rapid summary of the
Traditional The istic Proofs, and note their inadequacy, 
we cannot be surprised that there has ensued a decided 
Inclination to reject metaphysic and to content oneself 
with the scientific explanation of religious phenomena, 
leaving the question of their ultimate origin an open
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one. It appears to be impossible to find a satisfactory 
proof, without surreptitiously introducing into the 
premises that which we set out to prove. The late Professor 
Pfleiderer expressed what many feel: "No-one now holds 
it to be possible to prove the world's existence from an 
abstract conception of God, or, from an abstract conception 
of the world, to reach by inference, a God who is separate 
from the world"(Gifford Lectures on "The Philosophy and 
Development of Religion. Vol I. p 157). The Theistic Proofs, 
even though they were found to be logically satisfactory, 
could not put the issue beyond doubt, for man is more 
than a rational being. In the hint given by Pfleiderer, 
we see where the weakness of the older metaphysic lay. It 
began by treating abstractions from Reality, as though 
they were the whole of Reality..To do this, and then to 
seek to relate our conclusions to religious experience, 
may be compared to building a chipaey in the air and then 
fixing it upon the house. Metaphysic must begin where 
Psychology and History leave off, that is to say, it 
must start from the process of life.
Keeping this in mind, the task in front of us 
is not that of constructing a logical proof of the 
existence of God, but rather, of finding a concept 
which will make room for God, Man, and the World, 
and the relations existing between them. What follows
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therefore, IB not offered as a final solution of the 
metaphysic of revelation, but is in the nature of a 
suggestion indicating the line along which such seems 
possible.
We have seen that fchr best analogy for our knowledge of 
God is that which we have of a friend; it is more than 
that, but we cannot discover anything that approaches it 
so nearly. It is at anyrate PERSONAL knowledge, and an 
analysis of the characteristics of Personality will 
be helpful in explicating its nature.
The word "personality" is sometimes
employed in other ways than that in which we propose to 
use it. For example, it has a definite significance as 
a term in Jurisprudence; and in common parlance, it is 
used to sij§ify forcefulness of character. We describe 
a man of great personal gifts as a personality. These 
uses of the word are not altogether dissimilar to ours, 
but they must not be confused with it. We are to employ 
it to signify the unity, identity, and value of the self, 
viewed not in isolation, but in the wide range of all 
its relationships. Life is so infinitely complex, that 
to draw a clear line as to where , in individual cases, 
personality begins, is not possible, but the distinctive 
elements of the thing itself are by no means in doubt. 
A person is to be distinguished from a brute by two
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things, (I) Rationality. He not only knows, but he knows 
that it is he who knows, (2) Self-determination; in some 
degree, at anyrate, his actions have this characteristic. 
He is able to remember and to anticipate, knows what 
has been and what is likely to be, and finds himself 
face to face with alternatives that necessitate choice. 
Moreover, whilst personality must not be identified with 
moral personality, the latter Is essential to it. A 
person is conscious of a"categorical imperative", in 
obedience to which, his truest life is realised. Personality 
is the home of all values, intellectual, moral, and 
aesthetic. As regards man, it is finite and developing, 
but we are not justified in denying it to him on the 
ground that he does not possess it in all its fulness. 
Pull personality would be the completion and not 
the contradiction of that which he now is. In its 
lowest form, it is the unity of psychical elements 
which constitute, or cohere in, an  go: it is 
immaterial to our argument which of these positions 
Is assumed:, in its highest expression it is the utmostta 
to which man can reach, e.g. a completely self-determined 
nature would constitute the goal of moral personality. 
It is necessary, however, to stress the unity of the ego. 
Prom the psychological point of view, this is now taken 
for granted; the mind is not regarded as being made up
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of faculties, one of which thinks, another feels, and 
a third wills, but as a unity of which thinking, 
feeling, and willing are aspects. The affirmation of this 
unity, which constitutes selfhood and individuality, and, 
as viewed in its relationships, personality, is fundamental 
to our argument.
The individual and social aspects of
personality are well brought out in the definition which 
Boethlus gives: "A person is the individual substance 
of a rational nature" (Vide. "God and Personality". 
C.C.J.Webb. p 47). The definition is inadequate inasmuch
£^n-t/c»-<2-t>-e-i»
as personality ie more than the possession of a rational
nature, but the first half of it does mark out the
fact that a person recognises himself as individual
and unique, whilst the second makes it clear that
this involves him in relationships with others. Personality
is that oneness of the ego, through which a man's life
has significance for himself, for others, and for God.
The social aspect is the one which is most likely to
be ignored, and therefore requires to be emphasised. We
have travelled a long way from the position:
"Bach in his separate sphere of joy or pain
Our hermit spirits live and move alone".
"We can no longer regard persons as like so many
peas in a row. In thought, affection, and will we share
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in the lives of others, and they in ours. We are persons
not by reason of our isolation, but because we possess 
the power to transcend it". (See Lofthouse. "Ethics and 
Atonement". Chapter 9.)
In the theory which we are seeking to substantiate, 
revelation is thought of, not as a something coming to us 
AB EXTRA, and imprinting itself upon the mind, apart 
from any activity of the mind itself, but rather as a 
personal relationship, implying activity on God's part 
and ours. It is like the red of the rose not painted on 
it by the hand of the sun reaching forth to it from 
without, but developed from the nature of the rose itself, 
yet not without the influence of the sun. And just as 
there must be some affinity between the rose and the sun 
to make this possible, so revelation implies that within 
the human there is the capacity for the Divine. Just as 
with respect to two persons, mutual understanding is 
only possible on the supposition that language ( I use the 
word in a very broad sense as including gesture, attitude, 
etc) has a similar meaning for both speaker and hearer, 
so revelation would be Impossible apart from something 
which was common to God and man. The position we are taking 
is, that this something, which is common, can best be 
expressed by the word "personality".
The objections to ascribing personality 
to God are numerous and familiar. For example, Paulsen 
speaks of personality as being "THE FORM PECULIAR TO
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HCJMAN Lira", an^emphasises the words by putting them in 
italics. After defining it as "self-conscious and rational 
thought and volition", he goes on to affirm:"The difference 
between the human and the divine inner life must indeed 
be great and thorough-going, so great, that there can be 
no homogeneity at any point. Neither the volition nor the 
thought of the All-One, if we are at all permitted to 
speak of His volition and thought, can be grasped by us" 
tlntrod to Philosophy", pp 252 f) t This argument, which is 
the most powerful that can be brought against ascribing 
personality to God, is by no means unanswerable. It will 
be freely admitted that there is a distinction between 
personality in God and man, but this must not be so 
extended as to mean absolute dissimilarity. Browning 
expressed it very finely :
"....progress, man's distinctive mark alone, 
Not God's and not the beast's; God is, they are,
Man partly is, and wholly hopes to be"
(Death in the Desert.11 576/8).
The ethical attributes of God must have a richer and 
deeper meaning than the same qualities in man. Goodness 
in man is that which has come through a process of 
development, is derivative, and yet in the making, 
whilst in God it is originative and eternally complete. 
That however, is not to deny that when we use the 
word "goodness" of God and of man, we mean it for the most
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part, in the same sense. Lotze has a very powerful 
argument to the effect that in God alone is perfect 
personality to be found, whilst in all finite creatures 
there exists only a weak imitation of it; the finiteness 
of the finite is not a productive condition of personality
but rather a hindering barrier to its development
/X 
(MifcroCosmfls.Bk ^fe, Ch 4). We agree with this, providing
we understand by w a weak imitation of it", that it is 
similar in the same sense that a child's first attempts 
to speak are an imitation of its mothers language. On the 
negative side, the affirmation of personality in God 
means that we reject the conception of Him which regards
»_^. Jj^n-*
Him as mechanism; on the positive side, there are^those 
qualities after which we are for ever reaching and which 
we recognise as constituting our personality: He possesses 
them in their fulness and perfection. If we accept 
Paulsen's argument that man is personal, God is other than 
personal, and that there can be no homogeneity at any point, 
revelation in the sense in which we understand the word 
is impossible.
Idealistic philosophy has always been strongly 
opposed to ascribing personality to God. Sometimes the 
arguirent has taken the form that to do so is to be guilty 
of an anthropomorphism, which is derogatory to our 
conception of God as the Absolute. But anthropomorphism 
may mean, either applying to God conceptions of what
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is lowest and most limited in man, or, on the other hand, 
thinking of Him in the highest categories possible to 
the human understanding. It is in the latter sense that 
we use the term, and it is difficult to see how we can 
avoid doing so. We can no more think of God in terms 
which lie outside our understanding than we can express 
a philosophy in a language of which we are wholly 
ignorant. If we identify the Absolute, as Bradley does, 
with the Whole in which God, Man, and the Universe are 
included, then we cannot legitimately apply the term 
person to the Whole. But whilst such a Whole may have 
a meaning for philosophy, it has none for religion, 
since the latter postulates a God distinct, though not 
separate,from Man and the Universe. Further, if by 
God as Absolute, we mean that which is stripped of all 
attributes and taken out of all relations, such a God 
cannot be personal, but it also follows that we are 
plunged into nescBience, for we can only know things in 
their relations. If we are asked to say what God is 
in Himself, apart from His relations with Man and the 
Universe, we cannot answer, for to attempt to do so, 
would be to speak of a God who sever was.
When we say that God is perfect Wisdom, Power, 
and Love, however inadequate the expression may be, 
it is the only one of which we are capable, and it
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implies His personality. Revelation is simply the 
unfolding of the significance of Him in whom we live 
and move and have our being; or better still, it is the 
enrichment of our life by participation in the wider 
life which is to be found in Him, and the process requires 
personal terms to express it. If we seek to affirm that 
God is supra-personal, we do not escape the difficulty, 
for,in so far as this is not meant as a denial of His 
personality, it is simply a mode of stating that which 
we have been enunciating ; if it means more than this, 
it can only be a word invented to cover the confession 
of our ignorance of His nature.
Defining revelation in terms of personal 
relationship has three adva\ages: (I) It brings it into
A
line with the actual history of religion in general,
(2) with the historic facts of the Christian Eaith, and
(3) it enables us to think of fod in His relation to man 
as being at once transcendent and Immanent. As regards 
the first point, a modern writer has said: "All in all, 
the evolution of religion is to be witnessed where social 
integration is proceeding, most of all where custom is 
becoming reflective loyalty, where loyalty is coming to 
understand itself as love, ( which particularises 
individuals), and where love asserts itself as demand for 
justice, ( which is the recognition of persons as finalities
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for thought and action; religion is the discovery of 
persons" (Coe. "Psychology of Religion", p 240). 
As regards the second point, we cannot read the Bible 
without noting that its revelation is wholly conceived 
as personal. The anthropomorphism of the Old Testament 
writers was but a crude attempt to express the fact of the 
Divine Personality. Passing to the New Testament, we do not 
find God spoken of as "the Absolute", "the Infinite", "the 
power other than ourselves which makes for righteousness", 
but as the Father. It is obviously an advantage to begin 
our task with a conception which is in line with the 
evolution of religion in general, and with the historic 
facts in which the Christian finds the substratum of 
his religion.
But the advantage is still greater with respect 
to the third point. All genuine religion involves 
the paradox that God is the Divine majesty, separated 
from the true worshipper by vast immensities, and that He 
is equally the near, "closer than breathing, nearer than 
hands or feet". The doctrine of Immanence may be pushed 
to the extreme until it obliterates the distinction between 
God and His Creation: on the other hand, the doctrine of 
Transcendence may, in the same way, come to mean the 
absolute separation of God from His Creation. In both cases 
revelation becomes impossible, inasmuch as its essential 
quality is that of relationship, and anything which
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destroys the relationship, also destroys the possibility 
of revelation. Our task therefore is that of stating 
transcendency and immanence in such a way that they 
shall not be mutually exclusive. If God is both, and not 
merely a hybrid, being partially the one and partially the 
other, we have got to find a concept under which their 
harmony may be subsumed. It is here that the idea of 
personality, expressing itself in Love, comes to our aid. 
Love is a union which transcends without obliterating 
the differences of individuals: it is Absolute and yet not 
unrelated: and whilst nowhere is there a fuller consciousness 
of the individuality of each and of the distinction 
from one another than in Love, yet, just here, in proportion 
to its depth, such mutual exclusiveness is cancelled. To 
state revelation in any other terms than those of 
personality, appears to involve us in the direst antinomies, 
J.e. In a Pantheism in which distinctions are ignored, or 
in a Deism in which relationship, Divine and human, 
is impossible; in either case, no room is left for revelation,
Assuming then that revelation is the finite personality 
participating in the infinite personality of God, and 
becoming entiched thereby, let us proceed to unfold 
the significance of this for the problem before us, 
bearing in mind that we are seeking to claim for 
revelation a place in the Ultimate Reality. The methods
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pursued with this end in view have been various. For 
example, there was that, which finds little countenance 
In our times, of starting with certain abstraction^, 
more or less axiomatic, and constructing from these 
a coherent system, Spinoza and Hegl are striking 
examples of this type. Another method may be illustrated 
by reference to a comparatively modern writer, A.W. 
Momerie, who, is his thesis on "Personality", begins 
with the argument that knowledge presumes a thinking, feeling, 
willing subject, and thus arrives at the conception of 
human personality. He then analyses the nature of the 
Universe and finds in it evidences of mind and purpose, 
from which he draws the inference that it must be the 
expression of an infinite ego. This really does not get 
us any further than some of the arguments we have
o~~*U at cJCJQ-*T. od(^
already considered, and it has this fetae^iie-r disadvantage 
that it is singularly unconvincing to the pessimistic 
type of mind, which sees the Universe as irrational chaos.
The method which we are to pursue is 
quite different from this, inasmuch as we are to 
treat personality not as an abstraction, but as actually 
in relations with the Universe. As it is in itself, 
apart from such relations, it is unknowable. We begin there­ 
fore with an analysis of concrete human personality and not 
as viewed apart from the Universe in which it shares.
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It is useless to seek for God anywhere save in human 
ejft^erience. Unless the finite is somehow within the 
Infinite, progressively sharing in His nature and life, 
the way to a satisfactory metaphysic seem«s barred. 
The reason for our belief in God must be sought in 
experience rather than in a very doubtful argument 
that the universe is a cosmos . The modern tendency to 
treat man as the measure of all things encourages us to 
approach the problem from this side. The question is 
really as to whether the nature of human personality is 
such as to support our belief that the finite life may 
and does participate in the Infinite life of God. If 
that could be sustained, whilst it would not prove 
any particular experience to be revelation, yet it 
would supply a sufficient metaphysical basis for our 
belief in revelation. The argument which follows seeks 
to elucidate THE TRANSCENDENT NATURE OF PERSONALITY. 
(A) First of all we note that personality 
transcends its physical organism. It is now generally 
recognised that the brain does not and cannot explain 
the mind. The position that mind is a secretion of the 
brain as bile is a secretion of the liver, if ever 
it was meant seriously, is at anyrate now untenable. 
The wordp of a modern scientist express very cogently 
the revulsion from such a view which has taken place;-
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"Matter is the vehicle of Mind, but it is dominated 
and transcended by it. It is quite credible that the 
whole and entire personality is never terrestrially 
manife8t"( Lodge. "Life and Matter".p 125).
(B) Further, we may note that in modern
conceptions of personality, it is admitted that the Self 
is larger than that whlcX finds expression in consciousness; 
that there is that in us which does not emerge into 
consciousness, what Hamilton described as fmental latency", 
Carpenter aa "unconscious cerebration", and James as 
"subconscious or subliminal process". The terms in which 
these writers ejft&ress their views point to a radical 
difference of opinion as to the nature of the facts, 
Carpenter, for example, assigning them to automatic 
activity of the nervous system and postulating that 
they are entirely physical in their nature - a position 
which would find little support amongst modern psychologists - 
but the point to note is that there is a general agreement 
as to the presence of facts which have a significance 
for the lelf, but which lie under the threshold of 
consciousness. We must not, however, claim too much 
for the subconscious. The phenomena are undoubted, but 
there is no generally accepted theory as to their 
significance. It is possible that they consist of 
memories, which remain quiescent till brought into 
focus by some fresh stimulus; or of images, which,
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whilst they did not come into the area of things attended 
to, yet left their mark upon the mind, and this, like 
invisible-ink marks which a chemical brings to light, 
only waited for the appropriate impulse in order to 
become manifest. I> is a mistake to set down the 
sub-conscious as being necessarily higher in quality 
than the conscious, nor can Divine revelation be limited 
to this sphere. It is difficult to see why God should 
communicate with a split-off-complex rather than with 
man's conscious states. The factor of the "unconscious" 
can be used very effectively in the service of irreligion 
as well as of religion, a conspicuous example being 
Jung's treatment of religion as originating simply and 
solely in the repressed wish. Religious thinkers therefore 
ought to be very chary of basing their argument on a 
position that can be so easily turned against them. 
In this connection, all that we are justified in affirming 
is the possibility of the Divine personality being in 
touch with the fount of our life at a depth beyond 
that which is revealed in consciousness.
(C) We are, however, on surer ground, when 
we turn to what, from our point of view, may be described 
AS the most significant aspect of personality, namely, 
its IDEALITY. In consciousness, there is always the 
sense of an unrealised possibility, of a something
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better than what has been achieved, of a standard to 
which we must aspire and by which we are judged. This 
"ideality" cannot be limited to the moral aspect of 
our life, for it is equally true of the intellectual 
and the aesthetic. The point that we are trying to make 
clear is, that in personality there is to be found a 
potential infinite. This can be illustrated from various 
angles.
(1) We may express it in this way: A person 
recognises himself as Unique and individual, just because 
he is conscious of something beyond himself, an encompassing 
world, within which he and the things from which he 
distinguishes himself are included. This something beyond 
is potentially infinite, for, however he envisages it, 
he finds a more comprehensive unity in which it is 
embraced. The idea therefore of personality as self- 
enclosed gives way to that of personality with 
infinite outreaches.
(2) It is in the Moral realm that this
ideality is most clearly to be seen. Apart from it, there 
could be no "ought" but only an "is". What enables us 
to use the word "ought" is that we are conscious of a 
standard, a something which is beyond us and yet which 
has a claim upon us. This standard cannot be identified 
with Law or Custom, inasmuch as by it, Law and Custom
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are themselves judged. The Moral Ideal is inexplicable 
except on the assumption that a real Moral Order stands 
over against us, in such a fashion as to compel us to 
realise that its imperatives are obligatory for us. 
In "Outlines of a Philosophy of Life", Alban.G. Widgery 
remarks: "The approval of this experience as a moral 
good and the disapproval of that as a moral bad, depend 
on a peculiar capacity of the human mind, call it 
conscience, moral sense, moral consciousness, or what 
you will. That capacity is not adequately described as 
a judgment of mere reason or a play of mere feeling. 
These are individual experiences which are thus distinguished, 
but to express in theoretical terms just what in each 
instance is the basis of the judgment is not possible. 
This contention corresponds largely with the position of 
those writers who maintain that good is indefinable" p 1X9). 
So far as Psychology and Ethics go, he is right, but 
surely here Is a basis which provides a foundation for 
a new metaphysic whose facts shall be in human experience, 
but whose pinnacles shall reach far beyond it.
(3) The position might be illustrated from 
the Aesthetic side. The artist is aware of a realm of 
Beauty, of which he feels that his loveliest dream is 
but a passing glimpse; he is aware of an infinite and 
harmonious whole, which stands over against that to
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which he seeks to give expression*
(4) This ideality, however, finds its 
best example in the experiences of the Mystic. In 
"The Enneads", Plotinus writes: "Now often I am roused 
from the body to my true self, and emerge from all else 
and enter myself, and behold a marvellous beauty, and am 
particularly persuaded at the time that I belong to a 
better sphere, and live a supreme life, and become 
Identical with the Godhead, and fast fixed therein 
attain its divine activity, having reached a plane above 
the intelligible realm; and then after this sojourn 
in the Godhead, I descend from the intelligible world to 
the plane of discursive thought. And after I have done 
so, I am at a loss to know how it is that I have so 
descended, and how my soul has entered into my body in 
view of the fact that she really is as her inmost nature 
was revealed and yet is in the body" (Vide. J.B.Pratt. 
"The Religious Consciousness", p 363). Expressed in the 
simplest way, we may say that Plotinus is speaking of 
the ideality which is in personality, and yet for ever 
bt/ond it; which, in moments of high emotional tension 
appears to be our own, but which is afterwards seen to 
be something yet to be achieved. It is interesting to 
note that in the experience of Plotinus, the aesthetic 
as well &B the moral finds a place, and if he excludes the
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rational element, it is because, in such an experience, 
this element is, as it were, necessarily secondary and 
in the background. The point to be emphasised is, that 
the very nature of personality is such as to imply an 
objective -Something or someone with whom, in its truest 
hours, it shares its life, whose height and depth are 
ever beyond it, and yet ever in some measure being 
realised, and which possesses in itself a timeless 
and eternal aspect. No satisfactory explanation of the 
presence of conscience , aesthetic ideals, and of all 
those elements in human experience, which are for ever 
beyond us and yet in some measure within us, can be 
given, which does not imply a metaphysical objective.
Professor James hinted at this when he 
maintained: "that disregarding the over-beliefs, and 
confining ourselves to what is common and generic, we 
have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous 
with a wider self, through which saving experiences come, 
a positive content of religious experience, which, it 
seems to me, is literally and objectively true, so far 
as it goes"(See James. "Varieties of Religious Experience" 
^^^^^^&£.5I5). Where we differ with him is that he 
so often seems to Airait these states to the sub-conscious. 
Emlie Boutroux puts the position far more clearly when 
he says: "Is there for us, as conscious beings, besides
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the Individual life, a universal life, potentially and 
already in some measure real? Is our reflective and 
individual consciousness, according to which we are 
external to oae another, an absolute reality, or a 
simple phenomenon, under which is concealed the universal 
interpenetration of souls within a unifying principle 11 ? 
(International Journal of Ethics. XVIII. p 194). So far 
as I can see, there is nothing in this position which is 
inconsistent with those generalisations of human experience 
which we get from Science, and it cert*inly gives us 
a metaphysical basis for our conception of revelation 
and lifts it out of the realm of the subjective. 
It would appear that in this way, we reach a 
super-historical reality manifested in history and 
experience, eternal truth bursting through all the 
conflicts and mutations of time. It agrees with the 
conception which we emphasised ( p 127.) that God is 
Love and that in man is the love which can respond, 
a conception which is absolutely necessary to the 
unfolding of the meaning of revelation in terms of 
personality. Those who deny this theory must give a 
reason adequate to account for the progressively 
ideal elements which are to be found In human 
personality.
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The question that we now have to face is, as to what 
are the grounds on which we affirm that the presence 
of ideals is evidence, that in these, the finite Self 
is participating in the Infinite life of God. The 
quotations which we have made from James and Boutroux 
would appear to indicate that there is no objection from 
the psychological point of view to our acceptance of 
revelation as an hypothesis which tends to explain certain 
noticeable characteristics of personality. Further than 
that, I do not think Psychology can go, inasmuch as its 
scope is to deal with phenomena, whereas we are concerned 
with the ultimate significance, that is to say, with 
the meaning which these possess. It does not seem to us 
to be possible to prove revelation, using the word "prove" 
in the sense in which we should employ it in Natural 
Science. At this stage, the choice of one of two courses 
offers itself to us; (I) We may close the account by 
saying that we have gone as far as we can, that revelation 
is an hypothesis which explains more or less imperfectly 
the ideal elements in personality, and leave it at that, 
or (2) we can advance further and see what is our 
conception of Ultimate Reality into which the conclusions 
reached above would fit. In our judgment, to limit the 
search for Truth to the methods pursued by Natural Science 
savours somewhat of obscurantism. The nature of the
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human mind is such that we are bound to follow the 
second course, and to advance into the realm of metaphysic. 
If the ground here is not quite so firm as that which 
we have been treading, it needs to be borne in mind 
that the higher forms of knowledge have not the same 
certainty as those which are beaeath them; i.e. the 
facts with which biology has to deal are much less stable 
and more intricate than those of geology, and similarly 
with the relation of psychology to biology. We cannot 
allow this, therefore, to deter us from making the quest.
Lotze, in the concluding section of
his treatise on Metaphysics wrote: "The true beginning 
of Metaphysic lies in ethics...! admit that the expression 
is not exact, but I still feel certain of being on the 
right track, when I seek in that which SHOULD BE the 
ground of that which IS". He appears not to have been 
quite satisfied with the term "ethics", and that for which 
he was groping would appear to be expressed better by 
"Value", of which moral values predominate, though they 
are by no means the only values. Following out this 
suggestion, we proceed to argue that Ultimate Reality 
is inclusive of "existents" and "values".
(A) First of all, we note that value, at least 
intrinsic value, is always value for a person, or persons. 
The values which we are in the habit of ascribing to 
material things are not values in the strict sense of
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the term, but only instrumental. In dealing with value, 
therefore, we are dealing with that which only possesses 
meaning with reference to personality.
(B) Now values are an essential element of 
Reality. The Reality of a rainbow is not exhausted 
in the physical phenomena which Science describes ; these 
constitute but one aspect of its significance for us; we 
must account the way in which it impressed us with a 
sense of beauty as being equally Real. The idea that the 
scientist describes for us the thing as it is, whilst the 
aesthete describes certain secondary qualities with which 
it impresses us, is untenable, for the thing is its 
qualities, and our sense of its beauty stands on an equal 
footing with our sense of the material constituents in 
it. It is not possible to sustain the position which 
Locke took up in drawing a distiaction between a thing 
and its qualities. Not only primary and secondary qualities 
but also what Bosanquet would call "tertiary" qualities, 
that is, those qualities which induce appreciation 7 
are inherent in and constitutive of the thing. We are 
acting in an arbitrary fashion when we seek to confine 
Reality to that aspect of things which constitutes 
the particular domain of Natural Science. The music of 
a Beethoven Sonata is as real as the wood and metal of 
the instrument on which it is played, and there is no
(HO)
justification for denying either the Reality of the 
material things which constitute the organ or of the
   thetlc qualities of the music by which we are enthralled.
All Knowledge, religious or otherwise, includes 
this element of value. Included in our knowledge of anything 
is the idea of what I can do with it, and what expect from 
it. Professor Royce says somewhere that a man does not 
know a lion who can go up to it, and stroking its mane, say: 
"Nice little lion". We should therefore differ from the 
position taken up by G.B.Poster, when he says: "So when we
•peak of faith, when we confess faith, we do not just on 
that account speak the language of knowledge as science 
counts knowledge, FOR SUCH KNOWLEDGE LEAVES NO ROOM FOR
THE SUBJECTIVE*, THE HUMAN, THE PERSONAL " (The Finality
.£. 
of the Christian Religion, p 158). As a matter of fact,
the subjective, the human, the personal^ enter into all 
knowledge, and at the most, it can only be a question 
of degree. The following quotation will help to make this 
clear: "The selective Interest, which we may fairly take 
as characteristic in some measure of all experience, 
leads to the remark that experience as a process may be 
tfurther defined as a process of self-conservation, and 
80 far justifies us in describing it as life or BIOS. 
It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the obflects 
of experience are not primarily objects of knowledge
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but objects of conation i.e. of appetite and aversion. 
For though an object must be cognised before it can 
be liked or disliked, still it is to interesting objects 
that the subject mainly attends, and it is with these 
therefore that the subject acquires a closer and 
preciser acquaintance" (Ward. "Naturalism and Agnosticism." 
p 151 j. If we accept this position, and it seems to us 
to be incontestable, it becomes clear that general 
knowledge, which was supposed to rest on facts, as 
distinct from the value which these have for a person, 
is dependent on this "selective interest" which implies 
a consciousness of value. The idea, therefore, that 
scientific knowledge is of a kind from which all that 
is subjective, human, and personal have been eliminated 
simply will not hold. These enter into all knowledge, 
and if they are more prominent in the knowledge of God 
than in other realms, that is only what we should expect 
from the very nature of it.
(C) There are still those who would maintain, 
however, that our knowledge of a thing possesses an 
objectivity which is wanting in our knowledge of values, 
and therefore that the latter suffers from the defect 
of subjectivity. If by this is meant, that it is the 
individual that contfers value, as for example, that an 
ideal only has value when it is recognised as such
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by an individual, that is a proposition which cannot 
be sustained. The beauty of a picture is none the less 
real tauixsc even though an inartistic person falls 
to appreciate it, nor is the reality of a moral ideal 
impugned, by reason of the fact that some choose to 
ignore it. We do not create values, but discover them. 
A judgment of value does not mean that I desire a certain 
object or that I am pleased with it, any more than that 
a judgment of sense-perception means that I have certain 
sensations. Possibly, it is by conative or affective 
expercince that we arrive at a judgment of value, and in 
the same way a sensation may lead to a judgment of 
sense-perception. But in neither case does the origin 
eonstitute the meaning of the judgment. In both, there is 
the reference to something beyond the mental state of 
the subject, to a value which we apprehend or to an 
object which we perceive.
(D) itow, as we have seen, value always involves 
an ideal standard, and thus presumes an "order of values", 
even as in the case of things, laws presume a scientific 
order. But it would seem to be necessary, if our argument 
is to succeed, that we should be able to show that the 
order of values is a unity. This is not quite so easily 
accomplished as the task of showing the unity of the 
order which is the domain of science, inasmuch as the
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former is of that spiritual quality which language is 
BO inadequate to express, yet the task is by no means 
impossible.
Professor Sorley, in "Moral Values and the 
Idea of God", attempts it by first showing us the unity 
of the order of moral values and then subsuming all values 
under these. This is hardly satisfactory inasmuch as it 
involves confusion of thought to subsume all values 
under the order of moral values. We have no right to 
make the term "moral" inclusive of intellectual and 
aesthetic values. The solution appears to us to lie 
in this direction: all instrifasic, as distinct from 
instrumental, values may be classified under the three 
higher values: Truth, Beauty, Goodness. The problem 
then becomes that of discovering how these three groups 
may be regarded as a unity. What is there that is common 
to them, which is distinctive of their character as 
values, and which constitutes them as such?. To that the 
answer would seem to be, their wholeness. .. each of the 
three orders of value are concerned with an inner 
coherence, harmony, and order. They are each attempts to 
express the wholeness of possible experience. Man as 
distinct from the Ultimate Reality is ever seeking union 
with it, and these three orders of values are the means 
through which he progressively realises it. The standard
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of value therefore is that of unity with Ultimate Reality, 
a unity which conserves and yet transcends all 
difference, in a word, the unity of perfect Love. 
It may be objected that the three orders of the higher 
values are not always consistent, as for example, that 
the aesthetic and the moral l^ty be in conflict. This, 
however, can only be regarded as transient, inasmuch as 
in practice these contradictions are continually being 
overcome. They no more invalidate the unity of the order 
of value, than the clash of duties invalidates the moral 
order, or some inexplicable fact the rational order. 
All that we contend for is, that value in its ideal 
significance, has this property of manifesting Reality 
in its wholeness, that is, as possessing inner coherence 
and harmony. Truth, Beauty, and Goodness ideally are one. 
But this unity itself has personal characteristics. Do 
we not speak of the Love of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, 
implying thereby the possibility of communion with them. 
It seems to us therefore that we are justified in 
affirming that our apprehension of intrinsic value is 
a yearning for union with and understanding of the 
beloved, who is near enough to be loved and far enough 
and lovely enough to whet desire.
In what position does revelation stand 
to this standard of value? It is this wholeness, conceived
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as personal, seeking to transcend without cancelling 
the differences between us and Himself. Revelation is the 
affirmation that our strivings after wholeness*!* are 
the work of the Universal Spirit drawing us in Love unto 
Himself.
Ultimate Reality must be conceived as a unity, but so 
far in our reasoning we have not reached this conception. 
The point at which we have arrived is that of two orders, 
each a unity in itself, the order of existent* which falls 
within the domain of science and the order of values. 
We have sought to show that the latter is real, without 
In any way questioning the reality of the former. To 
leave these two aspects of Ultimate Reality unrelated 
would be to perpetuate the error of the Dualists who 
resolved Reality into ftatter and Spirit and left it at 
that, or the antinomy of the Practical and Theoretical 
Reason as enunciated by Kant. The crux of metaphysics 
is not that of proving the existence of God, but that of 
providing a concept of Ultimate Reality which shall 
include existents and values. Monism fails because it 
blurs the distinction, Pluralism because it leaves 
Reality a mass of unresolved contradictions, and Naturalism 
because it seeks to interpret in similar terms what are 
obviously distinct from each other. The only satisfactory
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solution of the problem would seem to be along the 
lines of a Theism, which recognises the discordance 
between existents and values, but which discerns in 
the fact of "ideality",as implicit in personality, 
the impulse which makes for unity; in other words, the 
unity which Theism postulates is being progressively 
realised through persons apprehending values and translating 
them into existents.
Along any other line, the fact of Evil appears 
to present an insurmountable obstacle to any consistent 
theory of Ultimate Reality. Tragedy is as real as Truth, 
Beauty and Goodness, and cannot be set down as mere 
illusion, for the illusion itself would be evil. 
Nor is the difficulty overcome by the affirmation that 
there is more of good than evil. It is not the amount of 
evil but the fact that prevents us from arguing from any *»
imperfect world to a God who is all-powerful, all-wise, 
and all good. In our judgment, the overcoming of evil 
constitutes a good without which the Infinite Good would 
be incomplete. It is in the facing of hazard and harflslip 
that value is wrought out, and that the ideal becomes 
also existent, If it be said that evil when it has been 
conquered still remains evil, that the future cannot 
blot out the past, we deny that the future cannot 
affect the past. The first scene in a play may be
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harrowing, and yet be transfigured by what follows. 
It Is no indictment of the world that evil and tragedy 
are the conditions under which its highest good may be 
wrought out. Surely that is the meaning of the Cross. 
The evil that sent Jesus to the Cross was none the less 
evil by reason of the fact that the Love which bore it 
transfigured it into ineffable glory.
The theory which we are seeking to develop 
postulates freedom, that is to say, self-determination 
on the part of man, and purpose on the part of God* 
The realm of existents witnesses to the ultimate power 
behind the Universe, the realm of values to the ultimate 
Person whose purpose is being realised in it. Nor can 
the two be s^arated, for the Power which is manifested 
in existents and the Person who is manifested in all 
values is One, the ground of all Reality. The answer 
may be made that it is impossible to prove that the 
order of values implies Divine purpose, that it is open 
to anyone to regard this order as a mirage that lures 
us to expect great things only to disappoint us. T^e agree 
that in the scientific sense of the word, it is not 
possible to"prove" that the order of values is to be 
trusted, and yet it seems to us that the "ideal£n nature 
of man by which he recognises values is as much to be 
trusted as the "intellectual" nature by which he infers 
rationality. Moreover those who deny this Divine
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purpose have to reckon with an historical revelation 
which came in J««us Christ, with a life that tasted 
tragedy to its bitter dregs and yet wrought out of it 
the unspekable glory. To distrust our sense of value 
is not only to blot out all meaning from the universe, 
but to distort beyond recognition the significance of 
all that Christ said and did.
The argument as outlined above, although 
teleological in nature, differs from the older teleology 
which ignored the realm of values, and argued only from 
existents. Our argument has proceeded An the basis that 
metaphysic must begin, neither with man not with the 
Universe, but with man in his relations with the Universe, 
The older form of teleology had to contend with the 
argument that the world was not the best of all possible 
worlds; our form of it does not imply that it is, but 
rather that it is a world fitted for the development 
of values, which are to be progressively realised by 
persons. We have advanced beyond Kant who postulated 
God as the ground for the reconciliation of Virtue and 
Happiness: we postulate Him as immanent and transcendent 
Love, whose purpose for the world is that man should 
realise values which could not be realised apart from 
the triumph over hazard and hardship, and in the light 
of whose purpose, the discordance between Ideal and Fact
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may be interpreted. On this basis, revelation does 
not impinge on human freedom, being the supreme 
value, which becomes value for us, when chosen by 
us, and wrought into existence.
Let us seek to express the results in 
terms of religion. The all-embracing value which 
includes those of Truth, Beauty, and Goodnes^,is 
Divine Love. The sum and substance of God's 
revelation is Divine Love. Its purpose is to make 
us participants in that Love, through the unfolding 
of values which we are able to recognise as such. 
It preserves as,only Love can, distinction within 
unity, its issue being not the one-ness of mystical 
absorption, but the unity which comprehends without 
destroying the individuality of the many. In the realm 
which is the domain of science, there is nothing that 
conflicts with this idea of purpose being wrought out 
through revelation. It seems to us, therefore, that 
in the theory, which we have sought to elucidate, 
we have a metaphysical basis, which leaves room for the 
idea of revelation as being God's way of evolving 
and maturing human personality, and which permits us 
to regard it, not as the contradiction, but as 
the complement of science, endowing the things,
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with which science deals, with instrumental values for 
the realisation by human lives of the Divine Love, 
which is the sum of all value.
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Section.8. CHRIST AS THE FINAL REVELATION. 
Having defined revelation in the terms of personality as 
the relationship between God and man, the self-manifestation 
of the Divine realised by us on the plane of history and 
experience, we shall now seek to reconcile this position 
with the claim that is implicit in all Christian thinking, 
namely, that Christ is the Ffcnal revelation. The terms 
which we have so far employed would, on the surface, appear 
to be more consistent with an ever-progressive revelation, 
the finality of which would come rather at the end of 
the series than at the beginning. History and experience 
do not seem to possess those characteristics of stability 
and absoluteness which would lead us to discover anything 
in J,hem of which we could predicate finality. The question 
as to the Finality of Christ opens up many problems 
ia the realms of Theology, Comparative Religion, and 
Ethics, which go beyond the scope of our thesis, and 
although of great importance, for that reason, must be 
left untouched. All that we can attempt, at this point, 
is to seek to define the nature of the Final revelation 
In Christ, and to see how far it is compatible with 
the theories which appear to challenge it, such as 
those of Historic Method and Relativity, in a word, 
to give this aspect of finality a place in the development 
of our conception of revelation in terms of personality.
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I think it may be taken for granted, that 
although finality may be interpreted in many wajy, yet 
its affirmation, in one sense or another, is vital to 
Christianity. So far as the New Testament witness goes, 
there can be little doubt that this was the position 
which Christ claimed for Himself, and which was also 
claimed for Him by His immediate followers. It is 
difficult to see how Christianity could maintain itself 
or exercise an authoritative influence over human lives 
if that finality were undermined, and the claim of 
Christ were whittled down to that of being one of many 
prophets, or that of the highest and best yet revealed, 
but leaving it an open question as to whether He might 
not be sujfrseded by one greater than Himself. If it be
A
said that other religions also claim finality for the 
prophets in whom they had their origin, the answer* must 
be that this does not prove that the claim of any is 
Invalid, but only that finality is a demand of the 
religious spirit. All that it necessitates is that 
we should examine the claims, and see how far and in 
what sense they can be sustained.
First of all, we must note, that if certain theories 
with respect to Historic Method are accepted, it 
is difficult to sustain the claim of Christ or any
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other to finality. These theories affirm that finality 
must come, if anywhere, at the end of the series and 
not in the midst of it, that the final revelation must 
be last in time as well as fullest and best. This argument 
has a strong appeal, especially to those who are deeply 
imbued with the spirit of the Historic Method. If the 
limits of revelation are fixed by something that has 
to be accepted as final, it would seem as though we were 
introducing a barrier to progress, by inserting a. static 
eltaent in what is a developing process. The whole 
concept of finality appears to belong to that realm of 
Aogmatic assertions which provokes the wrath of the 
scientific enquirer who discerns in such static concepts 
a ktaace to freedom of thought.
Let us carefully examine the argument put 
forward in the name of the Historic Method against the 
finality of any revelation. Amongst those who have held 
this view, Leasing appears as one of the pioneers. The 
acceptance of his argument as outlined in "The Education 
of the Human Itece" would effectually shut out the claim 
to finality on the part of any positive or revealed 
religion. In fact, with him, revelation was but an 
auxilliary in the process by which Reason appropriated 
certain truths, and its function limited to speeding 
up the process and giving to mankind a little earlier, 
truths which, apart from revelation would have been
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discovered later by our own unaided faculties. Thus 
the only finality is perfected Reason. The Jewish and 
Christian revelations were useful in their time, when 
the human race was in its spiritual minority; they were 
like the picture-blocks by means of which children can 
learn to spell, but which may be dispensed with when the 
mind has mastered the lesson. Lessing never used the 
term "Historic Method", but all through the little book 
to which we have referred above, his thinking is dominated 
by it. One may venture to say that it is impossible to 
read Lessing without realising how much religion in 
general owes to this method. For example, Lessing's 
argument was really a masterly answer to the Wolfenbuttel 
Fragments of Reimarus, (of which Lessing was editor), 
for the arguments which Reimarus directed against 
revelation lose all force, when it is viewed as an 
historic process. Further, the Historic Method has 
rendered incalculable service in the way of establishing 
the science of Comparative Religion, enabling us to see 
the measure of truth in religions other than our own, 
so that we no longer speak of the false religion of the 
heathen, but are impressed with the conviction that 
in no age and in no clime has God left Himself without 
a witness. A very significant admission on the part of 
Lessing is that he recognises the debt of the Old Testament
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people to the wise Persians. Thus this principle not 
only saved the Bible for modern (critical) faith, 
but enabled us to do something like justice to the 
great ethnic religions by recognising that which was 
of real value in them. As we have seen, however, Lessing's 
argument was fundamentally unsound by reason of the 
fact that he misconceived the metaphor "Education" (See p 23) .
But to dispose of Lessing is by
no means to dispose of those who maintain that the 
application of the Historic Method makes the possibility 
of revelation untenable. It is now stated in other forms 
than those which were used by him. History is conceived 
as a development, a continuum in which there are no 
great gaps, and every event if refll^rded as the natural 
outcome of that which went be fore ; its record is thought 
to be that'of a series in which the more highly differentiated 
and perfect is to be found at the end nearest to ourselves. 
Without in any way slurring over the benefits that have 
accrued from the application of the Historic Method, we 
must affirm, however, that facts carefully observed and 
fairly interpreted must have first consideration and 
that we have no right to distort these in order to make 
fool-proof some theory into which they do not happen to 
fit. For example, I do not think that those who deny 
the finality of the revelation in Christ would be prepared
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to say that progress since His time has been beyond rather 
than towards Him. Similar examples might be used from 
many sources to show that historical development has been 
something quite other than orderly, continuous^and 
necessary progress. A modern writer has warned us as to 
the limits of this theory: "Historic Method has its 
limitations. It is self-sufficient only within an area, 
which is indeed, tolerably extensive, but which does not 
embrace the Universe" ( "The Foundations of Belief". 
A,J.Balfo*r. p 337).
Another form which the argument from Historic 
Method took may be illustrated from the well-known 
saying of Strauss: "The idea does not shake out its 
full content in a single exemplar" ( Vide, "The Finality 
of the Christian Religion". Foster, p 38). If, when we 
speak of the finality of the revelation in Christ, we 
Hihlt ourselves to the historical figure presented in 
the Gospels, the only reply that could be made to 
itrauss would be that in His case the exceptional 
happened. We are not,however, driven to such straits. 
The finality of the revelation in Christ is made through 
a personality, and must include not only the historical 
facts of the Gospels, but the sum-total of the influences 
which have flowed from Him, and which have found 
expression in individual experiences of His Grace,
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In Institutions, and in ideals which have permeated 
the race. We may recognise the truth in Newman's theory 
of the development of Christianity,(without committing 
ourselves to the inferences which he made therefrom), 
that Christianity is the tree of which the Historical 
Christ of the New Testament is the seed. Strauss appears 
to think of a personality as that which has clean-cut 
boundaries - a thought which is to4ally at variance 
with modern conceptions of personality - and imagines 
that in the case of Christ, these are constituted by 
the record of the Gospels.
In view of the limitations which Mord Balfour 
suggests as being attached to the Historic Method, 
and of the fact that we now view personality as being 
potentially infinite in its outreaches, we feel justified 
in refusing to allow any inferences drawn from this 
method to constitute an A PRIORI objection to our 
approach to this problem of the finality of the revelation 
in Christ.
There is yet another phase of modern thought which 
appears to present an initial obstacle to any conception 
of finality and even to the idea of revelation itself, 
namely that which goes by the name of Relativity. In the 
realm of phsyical science, the discoveries of Albert
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Klmstein promise to effect as great a revolution as that 
which was brought about by the formulation of the 
Evolutionary theory. We are here concerned, however, not 
with Relativity as a mere scientific theory, but rather 
with its philosophic implications as affecting the basis 
of revelation and the finality which is essential to 
Christian life and thought.
Briefly expressed, this modern
scientific theory affirms that our knowledge of all 
phenomena is purely relative, and that the medium of 
observation vitiates the result. For example, if the 
velocity of light is 300,000 kilomaters a second, a 
clock at that distance would be to us a second slow. 
If we could approach the cAock, travelling at the same 
rate as light, we should discover that the hands of 
the clock go forward two seconds for every second of 
our journey, and similarly, travelling away from the clock 
with the velocity of light, the hands would remain 
stationary. The ramifications of this theory are 
extraordinary, but it is the conclusion to which it 
leads that interests us, namely, that scientific knowledge 
can no longer be regarded as the sure and certain reality 
established beyond the shadow of a doubt, and true 
Independently of the observer. As a writer has recently 
put it: "I think we are now in a position to deny with
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confidence that we can have knowledge of reality in the 
material universe through any normal form of consciousness 
though we can, by means of assumptions of various kinds, 
construct hypotheses which serve well enough for all 
practical purposes" ( Hibbert Journal. Vol XXI. No i.p 59) 
Hitherto the popular assumption has been that scientific 
knowledge possessed an objectivity and reality beyond 
all question, but it seems that now we are faced with a 
new position according to which it is relegated to the 
rank of subjectivity and appearance.
The above writer imagines that all this 
makes the problem of revelation a simple one, for what 
Relativity has done is "to confirm the traditional belief 
that the knowledge of God can be attained not by any 
process of reasoning but only by what we call Revelation. 
The limits of normal consciousness are defined more 
clearly than they have ever been defined before, and 
ttiose limits are found to be extremely narrow, so narrow 
indeed that even its ethical code must be revealed 
*ab extra% if it is to satisfy? ( Ibid, pp 62f). 
In other words, we are invited to take refuge from the 
relativity and subjectivity of scientific knowledge in 
the absolute and objective knowledge of God given 
in revelation. This is indeed turning the tables on our 
quondam critics.
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If this position could be accepted, our problem would 
be solve* and the scientist would have to bow before 
the august prophet and confess: tt I am ignorant; thou 
alone hast knowledge uncontaminated by the relative and 
the subjective". But the argument of the above mentioned 
writer breaks down for this reason that it is based on 
the assumption that there is an objectivity apart from 
Its relation to a subject, that the real has a reality 
apart from its apprehension as such, that there is a 
truth-in-itself as distinct from a truth that is true-for- 
us. We have already had occasion, in our criticism of 
lant (See pp 88-90) to rebut any such contention. 
All knowledge is a knowledge of things in relation: 
any other knowledge would not be knowledge at all for 
things exist in relation: to postulate a knowledge which 
is unrelated to a knowing subject is absurd* What the 
theory of Relativity does therefore is to make it 
scientifically certain that this kind of subjectivity 
enters into all knowledge. We must therefore reject the 
conclusion of this writer, that Relativity, by 
demonstrating the subjective and fallacious character 
of scientific knowledge has opened up a way to conceive 
of a kind of knowledge called revelation, which is clear 
of this defect.
But If all knowledge, including revelation^
(161) .,-
is relative, in what sense can we speak of the revelation 
In Christ as being final? We simply cannot, if we assume 
that relativity and finality are mutually exclusive. 
It is an assumption,however, that is by no means 
axiomatic. We may take an example from the moral realm 
to make it clear that we are not justified in taking for 
granted this mutual exclusiveness. A duty is final for 
me, though the conditions which create it a duty are 
relative. Let any of the circumstances by which it is 
constituted a duty for me be varied, and it may cease to 
be duty, but, given the circumstances, it is absolute 
and final. The Finality of Christ cannot be a finality 
"in vacuo", but only such for conscious spiritual beings. 
We can therefore put aside this preliminary obstacle 
to our discussion; if it be brought in at all, it must 
be brought in as a factor in the argument and not as 
an initial barrier to our approach to it.
Let us clearly define what we mean by Christ as the final 
revelation, for the term is capable of many definitions 
and it is only by being clear at the outset that we 
can hope to make progress in the problem we are facing.
(I) The term may be taken as meaning that 
the record of Christ's life, death, and resurrection, 
including His teaching, is decisive in all moral and
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spiritual problems, and that to it nothing can be added 
by way of explication or development. This theory is 
beset with many difficulties. In the first place, it 
claims for the New Testament record that which it does 
not claim for itself. We recall the words, all the more 
significant inasmuch as they occur in a passage which 
asserts the Finality of Christ: "I have yet many things to 
say to you but ye cannot bear them now" (John 16/12). 
How can that be final, in which many things are left 
unsaid? There are a multitude of problems peculiar to 
our age on which Jesus could not have spoken at that time, 
for His words would have been as 'unintelligible to His 
hearers as if He had uttered them in "twentieth Century 
English. Concerning these therefore, we are only left 
with a general guidance, which various minds will 
interpret afifferently. In the second place, such a theory 
has to deny the validity of Historical Criticism or is 
confronted by the fact that at any time its proof-texts 
may be disturbed. And last of all, it fails to do justice 
to our experience of the Holy Spirit. For these reasons 
we must reject it as unsatisfactory.
(2) Nor when we speak of the finality of 
Christ, do we mean that in Him the Absolute Personality 
of God came to earth. The record of His life shows us 
that He neither claimed nor demonstrated those attributes
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of Omniscience , Omnipresence, and Omnipotence, which 
are usually ascribed to God. Moreover God Eternally is 
that which Jesus became through struggle and conflict. 
We are told that He GREW in stature and in wisdom and 
in favour with God and man, that He was PERFECTED 
through suffering. To affirm that Christ was the 
Absolute Personality of God KaxyixtBx*xx&fe become Incarnate, 
would appear to carry with it as a consequence the idea 
of a God who was not Omnipotent, a position which, to 
the present writer, seems to be irreconcilable with the 
tenets of a Christian Theism. Christ was an individual 
in a way which we cannot think of God as an individual 
without falling into the worst type of anthropomorphism.
(5) It is possible to distinguish three 
phases in the Personality of Christ, the Pre-existent, 
the Incarnate, and the Exalted. And the common error 
is to ignore the first and the last of these, and to 
limit the finality of the Christian revelation to the 
manifestation of His Incarnate Life. Such a limitation is 
very unsatisfactory. It is Christ's Personality, taken 
as a whole that is final, and as Harnack so finely 
expresses it: "It may be said that the more powerful 
the personality which a man possesses, and the more he 
takes hold of the inner life of others, the less can 
the sum total of what He is be known only by what he
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himself says and does" ("What is Christianity" .p 10). 
It seems to us that any theory of the Finality of 
Christ, which fails to take into account the Risen 
Christ and His continuous and progressive manifestation 
to the individual and the Church, through the Holy 
Spirit, is foredoomed to failure.
(4) It needs to be emphasised, however,
that the personality whom we assert to be final, includes 
the historical Jesus. For whilst it is true that a powerful 
personality cannot be known merely by what he says and 
does, it is equally true that He cannot be known apart 
from these; they are the data by which we ideally 
construe the person. We are not justified in postulating 
an abstract and metaphysical conception of Christ's 
Personality, and then distorting the historic record 
to make it fit In with our theorizing. The Christ of 
Faith must be one with the Christ of History, and not 
a construction of our own mind at utter variance with it. 
If we assign a unique significance to the Person of 
Christ, it must be derived from the data, and not imported 
into itj it must be a judgment of which history and 
experience rather than any metaphysical presupposition 
form the basis. Whatever may be the limits of the 
Historic Method, we are compelled to use it up to a 
certain point, otherwise our faith becomes a mere
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incapable of being stated, let alone discussed. Our study 
of the Finality of Christ must therefore keep in view 
these two phases of His Personality, the record of the 
Gospels and the witness of the Church. To ignore the 
former is to lift revelation out of its historical setting 
and to leave it subject to individual caprice; whilst to 
ignore the latter is to take up a position which 
effectually bars the way to development and progress. 
It is the Christ of the Gospels and of the Church, 
interpreted to human hearts by the Holy Spirit, of whom 
we predicate finality.
(5) From all this, it follows, that the 
Finality of Christ must not be set forth in a way which 
tends to erect a barrier to religious progress and to 
quench the ardent search for fuller light. The word "final" 
may be used in the sense of being "complete" or as being 
"determinative". It is in the latter sense that we apply 
it to the Christian Revelation. The revelation of God 
can only be complete in the actualising of the far-off 
Divine event, towards which Creation moves, but in the 
midst of tfce process, as the nucleus which determines the 
form of a crystal, is Christ. The simile, however, but 
inadequately expresses what we mean, for Christ is not 
merely $he "determinative 11 , but the "goal" of the 
movement, and the revelation of God will be final in
(lee;
the sense of being complete, in so far as the character 
of Christ has become universal in man.
Generally speaking, the fiaality of the revelation in 
Christ is accepted intuitively by the Christian believer; 
he feels that it has this character and more than that 
he does not ask. He finds in Christ that which satisfies 
the practical needs of life, and beyond that he has no 
desire to go. If asked to justify his position, he would 
probably answer*, "I find it difficult to present in 
logical form my reasons for the belief, but one thing 
I know, that whereas I was blind, now I see". And yet 
finality of an objective kind is always implicit even 
in such an intuitive acceptance, and faith would receive 
a severe shock if it could be demonstrated that what 
had been accepted as coming from Christ was really 
the product of one's own thoughts and somewhat in the 
nature of a beneficent illusion. A medicine man who 
boldly proclaimed that it was not his physic.but the 
imagination of the people who bought it that effected 
the cure, would soon be left without a patient, and a 
religion that could give no reasons in support of 
the affirmations of its immediate experience would 
soon be in the same perilous plight. Our deepest reasons 
for belieiving in the finality of the revelation in Christ
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may, like our appreciation of a masterpiece in Art, lie 
beyond all expression in words, and yet in both cases 
some reasons can be given for our belief.
Our belief in the Finality of Christ is 
a judgment of value, but value includes intellectual 
elements and in no case can be confined to feeling and 
intuition. To make an affirmation, and follow it up 
by saying, "I can give no reason for the statement, 
and I am not anxious to discover any, I simply know that 
it is so, and you can take my word for it", is not a 
procedure which will commend itself to a thinking age. 
We must seek somehow to give expression to the intellectual 
element that enters into our value judgment that Christ 
Is the final revelation of God to humanity.
One way of approach to this problem
is to compare the various religions and demonstrate the 
inherent superiority of Christianity. We have nothing to 
fear from the application of such a method. As compared 
with Buddha, Christ came to offer us life and that more 
abundantly; as compared with Mahomet, it is only 
necessary to set side by side the stern monotheism of 
the Arabian prophet and the redemptive passion of Jesus 
to see how utterly the latter transcends the former. 
How insignificant is the word:"Allah is One and 
Mahomet is His prophet" compared with "God so loved the
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World, that He sent His only begotten Son". It will not 
be denied that Islam owes something both to JudAAsm 
and Christianity, but supposing that this were not so 
and that Mahomet's teaching were original, the life 
and words of Jesus are as much superior to those of 
the Arabian prophet as Love is to Force, and Grace to 
Law. Christ towers supreme over all other religious 
teachers. Not even the fact that many or all of His 
sayings may be parallelled by quotations from other 
teachers can destroy this abiding sense of His greatness. 
The loveliest sentences in Wordsworth can be matched 
by quotations from very mediocre poets, but it was his 
genius to fuse them into the pure gold of poetry. Even so 
is it with the words of Jesus. And yet, the supremacy of 
Jesus does not rest upon His teaching, but upon His 
personality, of which this was but one manifestation, 
a personality which impressed itself upon those in 
touch with Him as being that of God, which has been the 
quickening impulse of civilisation and which today 
commends itself to us as being of infinite value.
The attempt to establish the Finality of 
Christ by this method of comparison seems to us to 
present difficulties which are by no means easy to 
surmount. For example, if we are to follow it, we must 
find some standard by which to judge. Mere comparison
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apart from a standard which is capable of being justified 
' '  ' '- 
cannot be distinguished from mere assertion. This
difficulty however will meet us in the method which 
we ourselves propose to pursue, and will not prove 
Insuperable. The real objection to the method of 
comparison is that it cannot prove the Finality but 
only the superiority of Christ over other religious 
teachers. To assert the frrmer, we have got to go 
beyond the method of comparison and to show that Christ 
IS the standard itself.
Equally questionable is the assertion of 
finality on the ground that Christ meets all our needs. 
Using the words in the sense of needs of which we are 
conscious /these fluctuate^and therefore do not constitute 
a basis of sufficient stability on which to build the 
argument. The function of the final revelation would be 
to arouse needs that are latent. If, however, we qualify 
the word by some such adjective as deepest, highest, 
truest, this difficulty is met. But then, we have 
introduced the question of a standard, and the identify 
of Christ with this standard of value is all important.
It is with the aid of our conceptions
of value that we can best envisage the problem before us. 
When we say that Christ is final, we are making a 
judgment of value. The affirmation has reference not 
to His place in the time series, but to the intrinsic
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worth of His revelation. By it, we mean that Christ 
sums up in Himself all the values of the revelation 
which preceded Him, and becomes the creative nucleus 
of all possible revelation. A finality in any other 
sense than that of value would take us into a realm 
outside experience, in which neither affirmation nor 
denial can have validity. The question really is as to 
whether there is a final value, and that value identical 
with Christ.
It has often been said that the theories 
of Kvolution and Historic Method prevent us from 
speaking of finalities, but that is true only of the 
exaggerated forms of these theories which carry their 
principles beyond the position that can be substantiated 
by facts. The idea of Evolution is not that of limitless 
change, it is not the equivalent of the old Greek notion 
of perpetual flux. In the Biological realm, species 
once developed are seen to persist in proportion to 
their power of adapting themselves to the changes of 
the world about them, and in man, where this power 
is almost unlimited, the species is virtually permanent. 
A.C . Bouquet has put the matter very faii$y in the 
following quotation: "It does not follow that the 
recognition of the relative in history involves the 
conclusion that these great manifestations are all
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temporal and domm ed to disappear. We find no difficulty 
in regarding the great acquisitions of science, statecraft, 
 rt, social and religious life, as permanent. Endless 
progress, or rather, endless differentiation, is a 
conclusion without warrant, and only probable to those 
who have rejected all metaphysical conceptions of the 
transcendental background of history and any religious 
faith in the unity and reasonableness of Reality. Historical 
thought lends itself in no wise to this nihilism. On the 
contrary, there seems little reason to suppose that the 
future will show an immeasurable welter of religious 
productivity. It is much more likely that there will be 
development on the plateau we have already reached and 
a conflict between already existing forces as our 
civilisation continues 1* ("Is Christianity the Final
Religion", p 205.).
The Question may be asked: if Christianity 
is final, how stands it with respect to other revelations. 
Has all that has gone before to be taken as other-than- 
revelation. Such a position would be absurd, and if 
finality were to be defined in such a way as to necessitate 
this conclusion, commonsense would compel us to revise 
our position. If we speak of finality at all, it can 
only be as embracing the Relative rather than excluding it, 
as a value which takes up into itself all that is of
(172)
worth in what has gone before and in itself becomes the 
nucleus of unfolding values in the future. We can 
illustrate the principle from the process of Evolution. 
The first appearance of life in the Universe was final 
with reference to inanimate nature, similarly the first 
appearance of consciousness with reference to life, and 
so on; or if we accept Mr Lloyd Morgan's theory of 
Emergent Evolution, we may say that the NIBUS which links 
all the varied planes of existence is final with respect 
to any of them. A finality out of all relations is 
simply meaningless.
Is it possible to attribute to any value finality, and 
to say that in Christ this is realised? We contend that 
it is; that the final value must, by its very nature, 
be personality, and that the revelation of this final 
value was made in Christ, and is being progressively 
realised in the world and especially in the lives of 
those who believe on Him,
In developing this thought, though
pursuing it along our own lines, we propose to utilise 
the argument enunciated by Troeltsch ( Vide. "Is 
Christianity the Final Religion". A.C . Bouquet.). 
Troeltsch classifies the great ethical and 





(2j Brfchmanism and Buddhism.
(3) Monistic Pantheism. 
Dualistic Mysticism. 
Moral Theism.
He then proceeds to rule out the last group on the 
ground that these constitute great philosophic attempts 
to construct a "rational" religion, but that such rational 
religions are always offshoots from the positive historical 
religions and are never possessed of any strong independent 
impulse. His next step is to stamp Judaism and Islam as 
at once inferior because of their legalism. Turning his 
attention to Brah»anism and Buddhism, he notes that 
whilst on their redemptive side they approach Christianity, 
yet the Brahman Deity is a cold abstraction and the 
Buddhist Deity mere blind chance, into line with which 
the soul comes, through breaking its will and nullifying 
its thought, and so is saved by being absorbed into its 
own nothingness. Christianity alone has revealed a living 
Godhead, which, whilst it is in act and will opposed 
to all mere appearances, and challenges the soul to 
sever itself from the world and unite itself with 
the Divine, nevertheless sends the soul back again 
into the world purified from sin and care, to work in 
the world for the building up of a Kingdom based on 
the infinite value of personality.
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If we carefully analyse the argument given above with 
a view to discovering the principle of elimination 
which Troeltsch has employed, we shall discover it in 
the words: "the infinite value of personality". The 
revelation in Christ is supreme because it reveals and 
embodies this supreme value. Leaving Troeltsch at this 
point and developing our argument, we affirm that this 
revelation of "the infinite value of personality" is 
final in relation to all revelation which preceded it, 
and we may even go so far as to say that it emerged 
from it as life emerged from inanimate nature, but 
just as in life there was something new, containing 
within itself infinite potentialities, so with the 
revelation in Christ. We may go further and admit that 
the revelation which came in Christ is capable of 
development, but this is in the direction of the 
unfolding of the revelation and not away from it, 
even as life in its infinite variety of forms is not 
disassociated from its first appearance.
The revelation in Christ is
final as the creative nucleus for the building up 
of a universal kingdom based on the infinite value of 
personality. Not all, however, would accept the 
standard that personality is the final value. 
For example, Buddhism, Brahmanism, and all Pantheistic
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modes of thought would repudiate such a contention. 
But the validity of the standard cannot be made to 
depend upon a general acceptance of it. That personality 
is the final value is ultimate, and the denial of it
>
is really the denial of one's own existence and significance. 
It is the final value for life, in the same sense that 
Duty is final for the moral life; that is to say, just 
as the repudiation of the finality of Duty would produce 
moral chaos, so the repudiation of personality as 
the final value leads to nihilism. Life is simply a 
meaningless riddle, if it-has no beginning nor end, or if 
these be viewed as nothingness; it only becomes intelligible 
when seen as the possibility of developing personality. 
The movements of our own times are all in the direction 
of recognising personality as possessing fundamental 
and decisive value, and it will be interesting to see 
how some of the Eastern races will reconcile the denial 
of personality as a religious ideal with the affirmation 
of its supreme worth in the sphere of politics. We 
conclude that it is impossible to express the highest 
value in terms that are other than personal, and therefore 
the denial of personality as the supreme value is the 
denial of all intrinsic value whatever.
It is scarcely necessary to show 
that the revelation in Christ was for the purpose of
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building up a kingdom based on the fact of the infinite 
value of personality. His teaching was such as to enable 
us to think of our relationship to God in terms that are 
personal rather than mechanical. It may be admitted that 
this conception was partially expressed in Judaism, 
with these characteristic differences, that, up to the 
time of JeremiAJS. it took the form of a relationship 
In which the unit was the nation and not the individual, 
and 7in general ?it was set forth in a legalistic form 
rather than in the tender and intimate way in which 
Jesus unfolded it. Jesus taught us to call God by that 
most august and yet most intimate of all names, Our 
Father in Heaven, and that not even the barriers of Sin 
could keep man back from the fellowship which the word 
"Father" implies, inasmuch as these were broken down 
by the free forgiveness offered by God in Himself. In 
so far as Judaism was the religion of the Torah and 
Islam that of the Koran, they are both lacking in 
this conception of free uninterrupted fellowship with 
God. The religion of Jesus is that of spiritual freedom 
in which alone the supreme value may be realised. 
Central to His teaching, there is the thought of God 
as forgiving redemptive Love, and Love is the highest 
attribute of personality. Judaism never rose to that 
conception of God as the fount of universal, unmerited
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Grace and forgiving Love which found expression in the 
teaching of Jesus. He lifted finite values on to an 
infinite plane, and gave to that which was simply human 
a Divine significance.
The conception of the Fatherhood of God had 
for its correlate that of the Brotherhood of Man. Here 
the social aspect of personality appears. In Him men 
not only found the way to Peace with God, but the ideal of 
all human relationships. The recognition of the infinite 
value of personality is the only bond of social life, 
the universal truth in which mankind may discover its 
unity. With the recognition of that principle, each man 
becomes an end in himself and not the tool of an 
ecclesiastical system or of the State. Individuality 
and Sociality find their common ground in personality, 
and the teaching of Jesus is the reconciliation of these 
two, which are often thought to be mutually exclusive.
His revelation was that of redemption
from this world, and yet it redeemed men from the world 
to send them back into the world to find in that which 
had hitherto been a drag and a snare, the means for the 
development which was implicit in such redemption. The 
infinite value of personality presumed immortality, but 
the life beyond was not viewed as a substitute for the 
life that now is, but rather as its ideal and inspiration.
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As final revelation, it was made not merely in a word 
but in a life. The full significance of this will appear 
in the next section, but at this point it is necessary 
to point out that He came not to speak of redemption 
but to redeem. He spake that which He was. It is not 
merely by meditating on Christ's teaching that mankind 
finds its ideal and inward peace, but through personal 
fellowship with Him. His words are but an introduction 
to His Personality, to a communion with One whose 
significance for us is inexhaustible, who had many more 
things to say to mankind than could be said in the days 
when He sojourned amongst us as Incarnate Son of God. 
His Death meant the laying down of a life which expressed 
the Divine potentiality of the human, that,through His 
sacrifice, a Universal Kingdom based on the infinite 
value of personality might be reared. His resurrection 
was not, as some have said, the proof of the Divine 
"conservation of value 1*, but rather God's pledge that 
the personal value realised in Christ was meant to be 
realised in all human lives.
As we have already pointed out, Christ's 
Personality is infinitely more than the revelation of it 
which we get in the New Testament. Every personality 
is greater than his biography, and the New Testament 
cannot even claim to be a biography of Christ, but
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is rather in the nature of MEMORABILIA. Christ's Personality 
finds expression in the unity of believers, which is His 
body. The Christian Centuries therefore must bear their 
witness to Christ as the creative source of full, free, 
rich personality. History will, we think, bear us out 
when we say that no influence has been so great for the 
enrichment of personality on all sides as His.
It is on this ground that Christ realises
in Himself and is creative of this^ highest of all possible 
values, that we claim finality for Him. Finality is not 
a metaphfiical abstraction but a value. As shown in the 
previous section, to say that it is a value is not the 
same thing as affirming that it is subjective. The 
question is not one of subjective and objective, but of 
Truth. So far as we can judge, all intrinsic value was 
realised in Him, and through Him there has come the 
inspiration and guidance by which the infinite value of 
personality is being achieved. Therefore since we can 
conceive of nothing higher than personality, we affirm 
Christ as the final revelation, in whom all others 
find their consumnation and their crown, the creative 
nucleus from Whom there comes the inspiration and 
direction which lead mankind to richer and fuller 
forms of personality.
It may be asked as to what right
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we have to assume that personality will always and under all 
circumstances be the Highest Value. The objection may 
be made that our argument is too geocentric. Can we 
not picture other worlds than ours in which different 
conditions prevail? Or can we not picture a disruption of 
this world and the emergence of new conditions in 
which values will be fundamentally changed. As regards 
the latter form of the argument, we can but answer that 
it plunges us into the realm of sheer unbridled imagination. 
We only affirm the finality of Christ for the Universe 
that we know. As to how Christ could be final for all the 
fantasies which the imagination of man pleases to 
conjure up, we cannot say. Aa regards the former ppint of 
view we have to confess that the geocentric form of 
language is that which alone is known to us; but we may 
infer from our own experience that if there are other 
inhabited worlds than this, the Word which was manifested 
to us in the Son of God as Love, will be manifested to 
them in a way in which they can realise that they are 
not outside God's providence and redemption. We cannot 
argue, however, to the unknown. Our concern is with God's 
relation to those whom we know as persons, and to go 
beyond that is to pass into the realm of guesswork.
It appears to us, that those who think it 
to be possible to erect a logically-correct proof of 
the finality of the revelation in Christ, of a metaphysical
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kind, which will establish it on its own basis and apart 
from all its complex relationships, are pursuing a quest 
similar to that of those who imagined that there was 
such an object as a thing-in-itself. We admit that in the 
method followed out by us, we have relied on a faith, namely, 
that values are an element of Reality, and that though 
values change, yet value as the expression of that which 
is of intrinsic worth to a person abides. A faith in 
Value is no more irrational than a faith in Reason. In 
both cases, at'the last, our finitude brings us to the 
position where we have to make a choice, and all that 
we need concern ourselves about is that the faith we 
choose should not involve the conception of a fundamental 
dualism in the nature of Ultimate Reality.
When the finality of Christ is
expressed, as we have sought to do, in terms of personality, 
room is allowed for our apprehension of it as a growing 
experience, that is to say, for progress and development. 
There is much to be said for the view that the "final" 
regarded as the "complete" revelation can only come 
at the end of the series, when the Personality of God 
and man shall be in spiritual accord. This appears to 
have been the view of Paul when he wrote: "And when all 
things have been subjected toto Him, then shall the 
Son also Himself be subjected unto Him, that God may be
(183)
all in all " (I.Cor. 15/28. ) But we have dealt with 
finality as something other than completeness, as the 
dterminative of revelation, in whose light the age-long 
course of revelation finds meaning, and as the goal 
to which the process moves; its progress never having 
been beyond Christ and, so far as we can judge, not 
likely to be so. He is the great synthesis in whom the 
antitheses of experience are harmonised, and the nature 
man's personality is such that he can imagine no ideal 
which is not met in Him, and realised through Him.
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Section. 9. REVELATION THROUGH INCARNATION. 
Our consideration of the finality of the revelation in 
Christ naturally leads on to a study of the mode in 
which that revelation was made, namely, the Incarnation. 
The culmination of the process of self-manifestation on 
the part of God is expressed very finely by the writer 
of the Epistle to the Hebrews: "God, having of old time 
spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers 
portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these 
days spoken to us in a Son, whom He appointed heir of 
all things, through whom also He made the worlds". 
The word "Son" suggests a spiritual nature so united to 
God as to be a full expression of what He is to man. 
The final self-manifestation of God must, in some sense, 
be not a message, but His own advent in the form in which 
we could understand and appreciate. The nature of the 
Incarnation raises grave problems, many of which are 
beyond our power to solve, and reverent minds may be 
inclined to urge us to descend from such high realms 
of speculative thought, and to content ourselves with 
the fact alone. That, however, is not possible, inasmuch 
as a fact includes a meaning, there is no such thing 
as a bare fact, and the whole process of revelation 
becomes meaningless, unless we can view it as a unity 
of which this was the goal. Admitting that Faith
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transcends Reason in the sense that our belief is always 
a bigger thing than we can give reasons for, and that 
the full significance of the most stupendous fact in 
history is not within our reach, yet it must also be 
granted that if the Incarnation were to contradict 
Reason, then, in loyalty to Truth we could no longer 
give to it a place in revelation.
Let us begin with the recognition of the 
fact that Christian Faith has always given to Jesus 
the position of "Incarnate Son of God". It is better to 
express it thus than to speak of Him as Incarnate God. 
The Father did not become Incarnate, nor the Holy 
Spirit, but the Son. In preserving the unity of the 
Godhead, we shall do well not to be unmindful of its 
distinctions. It must be obvious that there was in 
the Godhead that which could not find expression in 
Incarnation, as for example, Omnipotence, Omnipresence, 
and Omniscience. The nature of the Incarnation is such 
that it involves, in some way, the idea of a KENOSIS, and 
it must be apparent that the Godhead could not, in the 
absolute sense, accomplish that KENOSIS without incurring 
the risk that His purpose might fee frustrated, and the 
World be left without a Deity and therefore without Hope.
But what was not possible to the Godhead 
as a whole might be possible to the Second Person in
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it, that! Is, to Him in whom the Godhead realises its 
objectivity. It will be admitted that in respect to this 
question, wea are moving in a realm crowded with difficulties, 
and that the language we use can, at the best, only be 
regarded as symbolic, yet to express the matter as we have 
done tends to make reasonable that, which, in its 
infinite depthjinust ever be mystery and elude the full 
grasp of the finite mind. The Son of God, in becoming man, 
what might be called the external attributes
of Omnipotence, Omnipresence, and Omniscience, that He 
might, under the limiting conditions of human nature, 
realise the internal attributes of Holiness and Love. 
It is for these reasons, that it seems to us that we do 
wisely to avoid speaking of God Incarnate, and to express 
the fact as being that of the Incarnation of the Son 
or the Word.
In the pages of the New Testament, Jesus is 
consistently set forth as the Incarnate Son of God. 
This truth is expressed in various forms, but is explicit 
throughout, being a characteristic of the Synoptic 
Gospels as of the Johannine, permeating all the Epistles, 
and finding emphatic enunciation in the Acts of the 
Apostles and in Revelation. It is not our purpose to 
sustain this argument in detail, inasmuch as the task 
has been done so well by many eminent scholars, as for
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example: R.L.Ottley, ("The Doctrine of the Incarnation" 
pp 65-151.). All that we propose to do is to summarise 
the facts which point to Jesus as being Incarnate Son of 
God.
First of all, there is the witness of 
His self-consciousness as we can elicit it from the 
Gospels. The records reveal Him as One who was conscious 
of standing in a unique relationship to God. The question 
as to whether that uniqueness was in kind or degree is 
an idle and unprofitable one, the discussion of which 
usually ends in barren logomachies. The essential fact is 
His consciousness of this unique relationship. It appears 
in the authority with which He challenged existing 
standards and institutions (Matt 5/17-48); in the fact 
that He used, or accepted the use by others, of Messianic 
titles which seem to bear this significance, such as 
Son of God, Son of Man, Christ; in that He claimed the 
power to forgive sins; and in perhaps what is most 
significant of all, His sunlit sureness of God. Whilst 
His life and words revealed the sinfulness of sin in 
a way that no other has done, and whilst He taught His 
disciples to pray for forgiveness, yet, so far as we 
can judge, there was absent from His own life any 
consciousness of imperfection or sin. The only passage 
in the Gospels which bears even a suggestion of imperfection
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"Why callest thou me good, none is good save One, God" - 
(Luke 18/19), is certainly a very precarious foundation 
on which to erect a denial of His moral perfection, and 
all the more so, inasmuch as it is capable of being 
interpreted in a way which by no means carries this 
implication. When the Gospels have been sifted by the 
process of historical criticism, and all allowance has 
been made for the disturbing element of hero-worship 
in the mind of the writers, there still remains for us 
the figure of One who embodies the essentials of a life 
that is higher than any we have known, who actualised what 
in us is potential, and realised on the stage of history 
that which for us never gets beyond aspiration and 
endeavour.
The witness of His followers is equally 
emphatic. Their estimate of Him implies the Incarnation. 
They call Him "Lord 1*, they link His name with that of 
God, and in His name they pray. Nothing is more significant 
than this, that whilst the ethical teaching of Jesus 
was so great and beautiful, yet it was not that, but rather 
His Death and Resurrection which they stressed. Central 
in their propoganda was the preaching of Him; they were 
not content to enunciate afresh ideas which they had 
XBEixKflt received from Him, but bent all their efforts to 
the winning of those who should pledge their lives in
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personal loyalty to Him.
Nor can we ignore the witness of
History. The Church, through all the ages, has put the 
emphasis not on the ethical teaching of Jesus, but on 
the necessity of acknowledging His claim upon our lives. 
The Christian faith has claimed that what was to the Jew 
a pious hope has been actualised in the person of Jesus. 
Especially important in its bearing upon this question 
was the substitution of the Lord's Day for the Jewish 
Sabbath. To ignore the Person of Jesus, and seek to 
confine Christianity to the Sermon on the Mount , as 
is so often proposed, would only be possible by blinding 
ourselves to all that was most vital in the preaching 
of the early disciples and in the history of the 
Christian Church. Right at the heart of our faith is 
the conviction that, in some sense, Jesus was Incarnate 
Son of God, not merely a man who lifted himself to the 
highest moral achievement of the human race, not merely 
a teacher whose spiritual insight placed Him at the head 
of all others, but One who was sent, whose mission it 
was to reveal to mankind the very heart of God, the 
inmost essence of His being.
To this statement of the position
certain objections may be made. We pass by those which 
are directed against the Virgin Birth, for the reason
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that we do not consider that the doctrine of the Incarnation 
would be endangered, if the Virgin Birth were excluded 
from its consideration. It cannot be regarded as the proof 
of the Incarnation, for its own credibility depends to 
a large extent on our acknowledgement of the fact of the 
Incarnation.
It may be urged, however, that the Incarnation 
involves a miracle of so stupendous a character as to 
make it A PRIORI incredible. To this we may answer, that 
the facts of the life of Jesus, however interpreted, 
involve a stupendous miracle, and that if everything 
which involves miracle has to be given up, a great many 
things besides the Incarnation will have to be surrendered. 
We should do well to ask if the miracle involved is out 
of proportion to the task that it was designed to accomplish,
Asy^sK^tr 0*1-0" tt^A* f
namely, tne breaking down of the barriers of Sin, which
A
stand in the way of man's perfect fellowship with God. 
Further, if revelation be defined in the way that we 
are seeking to do, in terms of personality, does not 
the fact of miracle become antecedently probable, by 
reason of the fact that personality is the realm of 
self-determined action. The miracle of the Incarnation 
does not seem on the face of it to be more miraculous 
than the emergence of life in the world of matter.
A further objection to the Incarnation
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Is that which is based on the facts which the twin 
sciences of Anthropology and Comparative Religion have 
brought to light. It may take one of two forms, (a) It may 
be asserted that in other religions than Christianity 
there are ideas which approximate to the idea of the 
Incarnation, or (b) that the expectation of an Incarnation 
is well-nigh universal, and that it is not difficult to 
see how the early Christians came to put forward the 
idea that it was fulfilled in the person of their 
religious leader. Our reply to the first form of the 
objection is, that the supposed parallells, such as those 
derived from the Greek Mythologies and the Ancient 
Religions of India, are so palpably dissimilar to that 
free, ethical, redemptive act of God which found 
expression in the coming of Jesus, that it is a misnomer 
to call them parallells. With respect to the second 
form of the argument, does it follow that because there 
was a general expectation, there could be no historic 
fact which should fulfil it? On the contrary, it would 
appear from a study of history that God's revelations
^A^^
have come to those whose minds kad been prepared by 
anticipation to recAive them. Let it be granted that 
the general expectation creates the necessity for
cJi
a very careful study of the historic accounts, yet
it cannot be said to constitute an insuperable A PRIORI
objection. It has been finely said that the Incarnation
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was God's answer to the prayer of the ages, (Illingworth 
in "Lux Mundi"). There is one aspect of it which prevents 
us from affirming that the expectation created the fact, 
namely, that the latter so transcends the former in its 
moral grandeur and spiritual majesty.
We proceed as before to interpret the
supreme act of God's self-manifestation on the plane of 
history, in terms of personality. One of the chief obstacles 
to a reasonable and consistent statement of the doctrine 
of the Incarnation has been that we have been obseesed 
with the terms of a metaphysic which inadequately interpret
the facts as they present themselves to the modern mind.
t 
We are thinking of such terms as OQSIA or Substance,
Person, Nature. Their persistence is largely to be 
accounted for in that they had a place in the historic 
creeds of Christendom. The question as to the position 
which must be assigned to the creeds in their relation 
to the great essentials is one on which there is 
considerable divergence of opinion, but it would be 
generally conceded that, viewing the matter from the 
historical point of view, they appear to circumscribe 
certain tracts of truth, rather than to express the 
fulness of the Christian message. They stand out as the 
landmarks of certainties which, in our time, may be 
better expressed in other terms. If it were not so, the
freedom of one age would become the task-master of its 
successor. This much needs to be said in justification 
of the attempt to restate the fact of the Incarnation 
in terms which find no place in the historic creeds and 
whose significance represent a comparatively modern 
phase of thought.
First of all it must be noted that the Incarnation is 
not an isolated fact, unrelated to the revelation which 
had preceded it and also to that which follows. All 
revelation is a unity, it is the progressive and consistent 
self-manifestation of the Divine Personality. The coming 
of Christ was not an after-thought of God in order to 
rectify a miscalculation which Be had made in creating 
a world in which man was free, which freedom had been 
abused. Bishop Westcott referring to the passage 
*let us make man in our image, after our likeness", uses 
these words: H In this august declaration of God's 
purpose and God's work we have set before us, clear beyond 
controversy, the primal endowment and the final goal of 
humanity. We are taught that man received, received 
inalienably as man, a fitness for gaining through growth 
and discipline and continuous benediction, union with 
God. God's image was given to him Jhat he might gain 
God's likeness. This original capacity of man was the 
measure of the love of God for His cr*4ture. Sin could
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not increase it: nothing less than personal union with 
God could fulfil it. The fitness and the necessity of 
the Incarnation exist therefore, from the moment man 
was made." fChristus Consummator M . p 104.). Apart altogethei 
from sin, the union of the human race with God is 
involved in the idea of the perfection of the world. 
Christ is the creative Word through whom the Worlds were 
made and the historical act of Incarnation is a clearly 
marked area in the redemptive purpose of God. In 
Creation God was revealing Himself and the Redemption 
wrought through Christ was but a fulfilment of the promise 
of the revelation made in and through the Universe.
It follows therefore that the
revelation in Christ is not the denial of Natural 
Revelation , if we may use a term which has singularly 
unfortunate associations, arid which is a self-contradiction 
if employed as the antithesis of the Supernatural. The fact 
that the World in which we live has the power to awaken 
in our minds thoughts of One who stands above it as 
Creator, Administrator, or Moral Governor cannot be denied. 
Nature is more than a mirror which reflects back to man 
his own highest thoughts, it speaks of Another. Man's 
first gropings after the Infinite were undoubtedly 
prompted by the character of the world in which he 
found himself, with its marvellous powers of awakening
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curiosity, wonder, fear, awe, and reverence. To say 
that Nature provoked the yearnings and aspirations which 
Christ alone can satisfy may be granted, but this must 
not be taken to mean that Nature is limited to stimulating 
the desire for revelation. On the contrary, a study of 
Primitive Religion tends to show that Nature, though 
in imperfect measure, revealed the Being who could meet 
man's religious gropings.
Nature, however, is inert, God is Spirit, 
and we are tempted to ask in what sense that which is 
so utterly dissimilar can become a self-manifestation 
of Deity. We might seek to escape this difficulty 
by postulating some form of Mentalism, Pan-psychism,or 
Idealism. The first of these may be illustrated by 
Lotze. (See "Microcosmus". Eng Tr. Especially Bks III-V 
and Book IX. Chs 1-3). He treats things as having minds 
through which they possess a consciousness of their 
own being. He appears to have taken this line in order 
to substantiate the position that things were something 
for themselves (Vol II. pp 642-658). This is necessary 
inasmuch as, though we must recognise the activity of 
the mind in perception, yet to deny that there is anything 
other than the mind's activity would result in universal 
scepticism. But it is possible to affirm that there 
is something other than the mind's activity without 
having recourse to Lotze's theory ( See pp 85-85).
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The next step for Lotze to take was obviously that of 
developing the idea of a spiritual unity, along the line 
of Idealism. He was prevented from doing that, however, 
inasmuch as he held that consciousness centres in feeling, 
and that the consciousness belonging to one soul excludes 
from itself the consciousness belonging to another. Though 
postulating the "minds of things" he would not admit the 
"souls of things". Again and again he tries to erect a 
bridge between matter and spirit, as for example, when 
he sets forth the idea of mediation by means of 
IMPRESSIONS ( Microcosmus. Bk II. Ch 3.) , but he fails 
to do this, and leaves us with two worlds unrelated, 
a material world on the one side, in which no soul nor 
spirituality enters, and on the other side, a kingdom of 
souls, into which nothing of the reality of the material 
world can enter. Lotze failed because he sought to 
endow matter with properties which, obviously, it does 
not possess. He was led to do this through his conception 
of the material and the spiritual as being separate, 
the former being, as it were a layer on the top of the 
other. If one may use Prof Morgan's word, he did not 
take into account the NISUS which unifies all the various 
grades of being. The objection which we have urged 
against Lotze's Mentalism applies equally to all forms of 
Pan-psychism. Nor is Idealism the way out of the
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difficulty by which we are faced. It labours under the 
disadvantage of seeking to express by a common 
denominator things which are essentially different.
We therefore reject these theories and 
proceed on the basis that Man is organic to Nature, 
that is to say, Nature is nothing apart from the Self 
and the Self is nothing apart from Nature. As Emerson 
put it, * A man is a centre for nature, running out 
threads of relation through every thing, fluid and 
solid, material and elemental" ("Uses of Great Men"); 
Nature cannot be adequately studied apart from its 
inter-relations with personality. The scientist may 
imagine that his view of Nature is the truest, inasmuch 
as he has eliminated from his method all personal 
considerations, but what he really means by "personal 
considerations" would be better expressed by the word 
"prejudices". He may approach Nature with an open mind, 
but if he approached it with an empty mind, he could 
not discover its meaning. The scientific view of the 
world is not therefore as impersonal as at first sight 
it appears to be. Similarly with the aesthetic and moral 
view. Here the personal element is more pronounced, 
for both deal with values, and these have only 
significance for persons. It is because of this 
inter-relationship between Nature and Personality that
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the former may become a revelation of God.
The antithesis between Nature and Spirit 
is due to our treating an abstraction from experience 
as though it were the whole. The concept of disembodied 
Spirit is not germane to Christian thinking. Paul, speaking 
of the change which occurs at death has no use for it; MM he 
says:"He giveth it a body as it pleased Him". It is really 
a legacy from Greek thought, being found both in Plato 
and Aristotle, their view of the Ultimate Reality being 
that it was Spirit as contrasted with the world of 
Matter (Hyle). Unless we can eliminate the idea that 
Matter and Spirit are antitheses, the idea of a revelation 
in Nature will have to be surrendered. Surely, however, 
Matter is not alien to Spirit, but that through which 
the latter expresses itself. It may be hostile to our 
immediate purposes, but even then, it is that in conflict 
with which we make our souls. The idea that Matter limits 
Spirit is only true within a restricted area, and the 
highest Personality would be one in whom the former was 
so subordinate to the latter as to be its perfect expression. 
We must be careful not to think of God as a mere artificer, 
and yet there is a sense in which we may say that just 
as every great picture and every exquisite song 
enshrines something of the personality of the artist 
and the musician, so the world of Nature has in it the
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mark of the Personality of God.
The Incarnation is the supreme example 
of how Spirit and Matter are harmonised in personality. 
The difference between the revelation in Mtomi Nature 
and that in Christ is not that the former is impersonal 
and the latter personal, but that the latter was made 
in the form in which the deepest intimacies alone can 
be expressed, in One who was fashioned in the likeness 
of man. As such, it was the consumnation and interpretation 
of all that went before. Revelation is progressive in 
its nature, but this can best be expressed not as 
though it were layer added on layer, but as operating in 
similar fashion to the growth of spiritual life in an 
individual, where the new factors do not necessarily 
cancel the old, but take up and transfigure all that is 
of worth in them. The revelation in Nature is not 
cancelled but fulfilled by that which came in Christ. 
"The Christian revelation is not something which safcnds 
apart from nature, history, and the religious experience, 
complete in itself. It is something which realises itself 
through them, and whose full meaning becomes apparent 
only through the progressive apprehension in which 
they are determining factors" ( "Christian Theology in 
Outline". W.Adams Brown, p 50.).
The Revelation in Christ imparts a
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new significance to that which xAs given in Nature. More 
than that, it brings into play a new factor. We may 
express it thus: what the dawn of life was in the 
inaniamate world, the coming of Christ was in the sphere 
of revelation. Let it be granted that the Incarnation was 
implicit in the first whisper that Nature breathed to 
man of a Divine Being away beyond himself, even as life 
was implicit in the matter in which it emerged, yet the 
emergence marks a new and distinctive era, and throws 
a flood of light on all that went before and opens out 
infinite possibilities for all that follows. The view 
which is here put forward is very different from that 
which was held by the Deists, namely, that revelation 
could only be a republication of the Laws of Nature. 
The revelation in Christ is the emergence of a new element, 
which enlarges and transfigures that which Nature gives, 
and which adds to it something new and of infinite worth.
The method which we are pursuing disposes of one 
of the stock arfcutyftnts used for the purpose of denying 
the possibility of revelation, namely, that it contradicts 
the Uniformity of Nature. On our basis the Uniformity 
of Nature itself becomes a revelation of the consistency 
of God. But this uniformity must not be interpreted as 
though Nature were a self-enclosed order unrelated 
to personality. The latter rises above Nature and yet
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is continuous with it. Any attempt therefore to treat 
Nature as a static entity whose meaning lies in itself, 
is inadequate, inasmuch as it ignores the possibilities 
inherent in Nature, and its fundamental inter-relatedness 
to personality. Nature is the groundwork of an immortal 
achievement and its full explanation is found not merely 
in the atoms which constitute it and the Laws which express 
the general characteristics of its operations but also 
in the coming of the Son of God in the form of man.
We now pass to a consideration of the revelation which 
came through Incarnation in its relation to the prior 
self-manifestation of God in History. There is a sense 
in which we can speak of all history as being a revelation 
of God. Whilst the revelation that came through the Jewish 
Race was the main stream which led unto Christ, yet we 
do well to recognise that many tributaries contributed 
to it. The exploration of our problem is, however, best 
carried out by keeping to the former. In Israel we see a 
Race chosen, disciplined, moulded by God to manifest His 
Holiness and Love to the World, and that from its loins, 
as it were ̂ there should come the One who was to fully 
express to humanity the Divine Nature. If it be asked 
as to why Israel was chosen in preference to any other 
nation, our reply must be that ultimately the answer
(202)
lies hid in the inscrutable mysteries of God. Any 
suggestion of favourit ism,however, disappears when 
we remember that the choice was not for privilege but 
for service.
Amongst the vicissitudes by which she 
was prepared for her great task, two are outstanding, 
namely, the sojourn in Egypt and the exile in Babylon. 
The work of archaeologists of the present century has 
unearthed records which throw considerable light upon 
those far-off periods and efaable us to see some of those 
influences which contributed in no small measure to the 
evolution of the Religion of Israel. But no study 
of the historical conditions under which the process 
was wrought out can satisfactorily account for the 
appearance of the ethical monotheism which was the 
nation's distinctive contribution to humanity. It is 
in the personality of her Lawgivers, Priests, Judges 
and Prophets, pre-eminently in the last, that the 
explanation lies. It was not history, but what they 
discovered of God in History ; that made Israel great. 
They themselves felt that the revelation which was 
theirs* was no self-discovery , that it was the uncovering 
through them to the world of the great Divine purpose, 
and so far as we can judge, we should affirm that they 
did not err in postulating God as the source of their
(203)
message. This seems to be borne out by the fact that their 
message had meaning, not only for their own age, but 
for all the ages which have followed.
It is a mistaken notion, however, to think of 
the revelation as being conveyed mechanically, as water 
through a pipe, nor was it merely as a river which took 
on the colour of the bed over which it flowed. They 
were not mere clairvoyants. Such conceptions do less than 
justice to the personality of the great leaders of 
Israel. They were not mere instruments of revelation but 
participators in it. It was the issue of their free 
and ethically-conditioned fellowship with God, in which, 
in a measure, they were identified with His Holiness 
and Love. Thus, whilst their message was wholly theirs, 
it was also His. If such be the nature of revelation, 
it follows that it will vary in quality and intensity 
with the human capacity for fellowship with the Divine. 
Ilie limitation of revelation was theirs and not God f s. 
It was only His in so far as in His wisdom there lies 
the inexplicable mystery of Love which willed a world 
that should be united to Him of its own will and not 
through compulsion. The full revelation of God could 
only be made through One whose personality was in essential 
accord with Himself, in whom the spiritual personality 
which was potential in man was realised.
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The revelation made to the prophets was not 
for their own personal advantage, but for the Society 
In which they moved. It was limited therefore not only 
by their capacities,but by the conditions of those for 
whom it was intended. This principle appears to us to 
hold not only of the revelation which came through 
the prophets but also of that which came in Christ, 
and for that reason we rejected the idea that the Christ , 
as limited to the New Testament^could seat be the final 
revelation, which must be that of the Christ of the 
Gospels interpreted to humanity by the Holy Spirit. 
Here we may use Lessing's metaphor and point out how 
the teacher is limited at every stage by the capacities 
of the pupil. The alternative to this theory of a 
progressive revelation, dependent in some measure upon 
our capacities, is that of a mechanical kind, which 
would come to us bearing on it the undoubted signature 
of God, but in that case man f s freedom would disappear, 
and the very end for which revelation was given , namely 
to bring man into freely conditioned fellowship with 
God would have been sacrificed.
We have already had occasion to note
the progress made in Israel's religion (see pp 75-76), 
but before we pass on to study certain characteristics 
of the Incarnation which are relevant to the object we
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have in view, we must take cogniscance of the fact that, 
running right through its Literature, there is what 
we might call the spirit of expectation, the Old Testament 
being not only the record of a revelation, but also of the 
yearnings and aspirations for a fuller revelation. It is 
beyond our scope to enter into the details of the Messianic 
hope, which is characteristic of Jewish thought from 
the early days of the monarchy right down to the time of 
Christ's coming, which assumed many forms varying from 
the basest and most materialistic longings for a national 
deliverer to the most sacrificial and intense yearnings 
for an ethical salvation; at one time being limited to 
the mere desire for a king of Davidic descent, and at 
other times reaching out after the advent of God Himself 
into the world. These hopes and anticipations are woven 
into the Old Testament wtttings in a remarkable way; they 
were the prayer of the ages, to which the coming of 
Jesus was the answer, though the answer infinitely 
transcended the prayer.
Our concern is not to expound the theology of the 
Incarnation, but rather to see the place which it 
holds as revelation, and to note how when restated 
in the terms of modern conceptions of personality, 
many of its problems and difficulties may be met.
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In connection with the great historic fact which lies 
at the heart of our Christian Faith, there are three 
problems which recur again* and again. The first has 
reference to the nature of the Godhead, the second to 
the relation of the Divine and Human in Jesus, and the 
third has to do with the fact that in His incarnate 
life there is evidence of real growth and development, 
A Philosophy of the Incarnation lies beyond our scope,- 
but we believe that the trend of much present-day thought 
tends to relieve the great antinomies which gather 
round this subject.
(A) Let us first seek to discover what the 
nature of the Godhead must be to permit of the possibility 
of the Incarnation. The final formulation of the Nicene
C 'theology rested on the basis of the symbol o **> oou^c o y
' ' f ' _ In it the terms o U*-L «* and UTTO **- i * <rL <$ are
sharply distinguished; the former receives a sense 
midway between that of abstract "substance" and concrete 
"individual being", inclining to the former; the latter 
a sense midway between "person" and "attribute", 
inclining to the former. The phrase adopted to express 
the fact of the Trinity was ^^ o<s<r-t<* (' ^ 
e\ -77'c.er-l*' VTTO ^-rix'*-? <*-L r (See Ottley. "The 
Doctrine of the Incarnation, pp 361-5). These terms 
which stood for much in the Christian Faith from the
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4th Century onwards, are now singularly inept to 
express that which they were designed to conserve. 
We cannot rest content to state our problem in words 
whose meaning oscillates between abstract "substance" and 
concrete "individual being", between "person* and 
"attribute". The problem urgently demands a restatement 
which shall be based not on such ambiguous and somewhat
y ' c / __Impersonal terms as ou *>~^°<. and UTTO <*-/ <* ar-ts tut 
upon some fairly well-defined term which tends to bring 
out clearly the personal nature of the relations involved, 
It will not be denied that much work has still to be 
done in the way of defining the concept "personality", 
but we would contend that even now it is sufficiently 
clear to be of some service in elucidating our problem.
We have seen that personality is essentially 
social in its nature (See pp 120 f.), that whilst it has 
for its centre, to use the term of Boethius,an "INDIVIDUA 
SUBSTAKTIA", yet it is infinite in the potentiality of 
its outreaches. This social character of personality 
may be illustrated by the fact that in Jurisprudence, 
an incorporated society such as a Trade Union is treated 
as a unity and designated a "person" in respect to its 
legal standing. It will be granted that there is a real 
difference between the personality of a society and that 
of an individual, but that the term is thus used
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is a significant recognition of its social characteristics.
Can we think of the Godhead as a society 
of which lather, Son, and Holy Spirit are component 
members? It appears to us to be fraught with danger 
to use the term unguardedly, not the least of which is 
that it tends to turn the doctrine of the Trinity into 
Tritheism. There is however an intimate society which, 
in its IDEAL SIGNIFICANCE, tends to help us in conceiving 
of a unity$ which is perfect and yet which preserves the 
personality of each of its components, without blending, 
but as being One in Love - we refer to the ideal expressed 
in Marriage. We are speaking of it, not with respect to 
its physical or actual realisation, but purely as an 
ideal, which, if realised, would express a personality 
including and yet transcending all difference, literally 
one and yet each component part having its distinct 
function. We admit the imperfections of the analogy, 
which are largely to be set down to the material aspects 
of such a union, but if we can get our minds clear of 
these associations, is there not something in it which 
gives us, as it were, a glimpse of the relationship 
existing between the Father and the Son? Do not the 
words of Jesus such as "no one cometh unto the Father 
but by Me", W I am in the Father and the Father in Me", 
begin to glow with meaning when thus interpreted?
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There is always a danger of Erotism creeping in when 
these analogies are employed and Mysticism has often 
erred in this respect, especially in defining not the 
relations of the Father and Son, but those of Christ 
and the believer, and yet we suggest that the Mystics 
were right in interpreting the deepest of spiritual truths 
along the line, which alone can suggest, even though 
it be through a very imperfect analogy, the unity which 
transcends without cancelling all difference.
If the nature of the Godhead be thus 
conceived in terms that are personal, the unity of
revelation will be found in the "Word" or "Son",
w*\ 
manifested in Creation, Sn Providence, in History, and
in the life and message of great creative personalities 
such as the prophets, and finally allying Himself with 
the form which constituted the Crown of His Creation, 
Humanity, that without destroying its essential nature 
as free personality, He might bring to perfection that 
which His Love had created. We speak in finite terms 
of that which is Infinite, finding in things created 
the symbols of the Uncreated, but that is the only 
language that we know. To use abstractions to get us 
over the diffic\l4ty does not bring us any nearer to 
the heart of Eternal Reality. It may be that what we 
are seeking to express in terms which postulate Time
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as Real could be better conceived as an Eternal process 
in the heart of the Godhead, but the attempt to accomplish 
this through stripping terms of all the sigjificance 
which they have for us but leads to a barren abstraction, 
the creation of our own habits of thought, as far removed 
from Reality as it is possible to be, and for all practical 
purposes signifying no more than a confession of nescience. 
A comparison of the thoughts here outlined with those 
set forth in the monumental work of Athanasius
«   x _ «» > * '
ft £fi. t TJS g fqfK 0 f> t^-TT^J <r- f
( Ottley. Ibid, pp 344-361) will reveaA some differences
of emphasis; i.e. he makes the Incarnation dependent
entirely on the fact of Sin whereas we find it implicit
in Creation, and his statement of it is not expressed
in such personal terms as we have used, yet the fundamental
agreements will be found to be much greater than the
differences.
When the unity of revelation is thus set 
forth as having its basis in the Son's creative and 
redemptive work, the strongest objections that can be 
raised against the possibility of the Incarnation tend 
to disappear. If, in essence, the revelation in Christ 
be the completion and not the antithesis of that which 
is given to us in Nature, Providence, History, and in 
the spiritual genius of great creative personalities,
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then many of the arguments directed against it, which 
seemed to carry great weight, are seen to be ULTRA VIRES. 
It cannot be said that it is more difficult for the 
Godhead to reveal Himself through that which is likest 
to His Nature than through material things. As we have 
ppinted out, it is ultimately a faith in Value, which is 
as worthy of trust as Reason, that gives us confidence 
to believe in revelation at all, but assuming that there 
is such a fact as revelation, there is nothing irrational 
in that the "Word" or "Son" should become Incarnate. 
The real objection probably rests on a pessimistic 
view of human nature and is to a large extent temperamental 
but surely man at his basest is infinitely above the 
material through which his personality is realised.
(B). Our second problem is concerned 
with Jesus as Divine and human. Here again we have to 
confess the inadequacy of finite thought to comprehend 
all the meaning of these great fundamentals of our Faith, 
and recall the words of Lord Balfour, in which he reminds 
us that the Incarnation is one of those mysteries M 
which, unless it were too vast for intellectual 
comprehension, would surely be too narrow for our 
spiritual needs" {The Foundations of Belief " . p 259). 
And yet, if the subject is to be lifted out of sheer 
unintelligible mysticism, it is necessary to frame some
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intellectual mould in which it shall find its most fitting 
expression.
The Traditional mould was that of Two Natures 
S vo lCf>u *-ets in One Person ^c LOL v Tfocr-T^^- 1 s 
We have already had occasion to notice the ambiguity 
attached to U7Td0-T<x~-t,s and the other term &uo ^**J°-£is 
suffers equally from this fault. In the discussion which 
led up to and was focussed in the Council at Chalcedon , 
(451.A.D.) and which by no means ended with the decision
of that Council, this lack of well-defined terms was the>
root of much misunderstanding and one cannot read the 
history of these controversies without realising how 
inadequate the terms employed were to express the truth 
which it was sought to conserve, namely, the Divine-human 
significance of Our Lord, the importance of which for 
Christian Theology and Life cannot be over-estimated. 
It is our consciousness of the inadequacy of the traditional 
symbols which provokes us to seek a more adequate form 
for the expression of an essential truth.
We begin with the conception of the
personality of Christ as being a unity. Personality cannot 
be first this and then that, first human and then DttAne, for 
lacking the characteristic of identity, it ceases to be 
personality at all. Even the Logos-theory of Philo, 
which has so many affinities with the doctrine of the
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Incarnation, suffers from this defect - the Logos hangs 
in mid-air, neither God nor man - and its acceptance 
would make any idea of a real Incarnation impossible. 
If Jesus is to be recognised as a personality at all, 
and not as a hybrid oscillating between God and man,
f I
this identity must be granted. If we could regard vtf0° 
as being practically the equivalent of personality - 
we doubt very much whether this is justifiable"-then 
so far we should be occupying the same ground as the 
Traditional theory. '
It is the %vo ^ucrtLS that give us most
difficulty. Sometimes the Two Natures were likened to 
the two distinct substances combined in man, namely, 
the material or mortal substance and the immaterial or 
immortal. But the simile fails for this reason, that 
neither soul nor body of itself constitutes a perfect 
nature; neither apart from the other has any meaning 
for personality. Weaker still is the simile which seeks 
to express the distinction and unity of the Two Natures 
by the figure of the heat of red-hot iron. It appears 
to us that we shall better conserve the essential truth 
for which the Creeds have stood by eliminating the 
term of controversy, confining our attention to the one 
and undivided Personality of the Incarnate, and noting 
the BIFTEHENTIA which distinguish Him from ourselves.
(214)
The Two^Nature theory so easily develops into the idea 
of dmplex personality.
The following quotation from Dr Denney 
puts the position very clearly: "The formula of 
two natures in one person does not adequately reproduce 
the impression that He makes. He is all one-that is the 
very strongest conviction ttet we have...All that is 
Divine in Him is human, all that is human is Divine. He 
is not separately,or even distinctly, Son of God and 
Son of Man, but the Son of man who is the Son of God" 
(Bampton Lectures, pp 265 f). The nature of Jesus is 
best expressed, not as Divine and human, but as 
Divine-human. This is not to fall into the error of 
Philo and make Him a sort of hybrid, for in his theory ? 
God and man were regarded as essentially diverse, whilst 
in ours they are treated as essentially akin. Apart from 
kinship between God and man, the idea of the Incarnation 
cannot be entertained. Dr Pairbairn had in view this 
thought when he wrote: "God is, as it were, the Eternal 
possibility of being incarnated, Man the permanent 
capability of Incarnation" ("Christ in Modern Theology!! 
p 473). Receptivity for God must be the completion 
and not the contradiction of human personality. Jesus 
must be perfect man in being Son of God. All this fits 
in with that which we have had occasion to stress, namely,
(215)
that personality is never merely human, that by its 
"IDEALITY" it is potentially infinite.( See pp 151 ff).
There is a sense in which we may say 
that man is potentially Divine-human. Does this mean 
therefore that when we say that Christ as Incarnate is 
Divine-human, that we bring Him down,as it were, to our 
level? Surely not, for we affirm that our potentiality 
Is mediated through Him, and is only in process of 
realisation. Moreover our affirmation is limited to the 
INCARNATE LIPE of Our Lord, and makes no attempt to 
deal with His metaphysical one-ness with God as UNCF^EATED. 
We are simply concerned here with the nature of Him who 
took our flesh, and we affirm that He was Divine-human, 
realising in an actual life the ideal and potency of man. 
We have already pointed out that the Incarnation implies 
a KENOSIS of some kind, but our conception of this 
KENOSIS would be that it is not limited to the 
Incarnation but is involved in the whole process of 
revelation.
Our restatement of the problem along lines
L4
which imply that personality 4* an indivisible unity > 
enables us to see the inadequacy of those views of Christ 
which have qualified His Sonship by an adjective, as 
for example, those which have maintained that He was 
merely ETHICAL Son of God. Ethical Sonship carries with
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it the implication of Sonship in the full personal 
sense, inasmuch as it is impossible to separate one 
aspect of personality from its inter-dependent factors 
and then ascribe reality to that alone. To do this would 
be to reduce it to a meaningless abstraction.
We do not contend that in,the foregoing, we 
have elucidated the great mystery of the Incarnation, 
but only that we have stated it in terms which avoid 
many of the antinomies by which it is beset. We may 
admit that the idea of the kinship of God and man 
and the common factor in the Two Natures can be expressed 
without having recourse to the conception of personality 
which we have employed. Irenaeus, in an age which 
knew nothing of these conceptions of the unitary nature 
of personality and its characteristic IDEALITY, held to 
an idea of the Incarnation which is singularly modern 
and not unlike that which we have been seeking to express. 
All that we contend for is that these conceptions of 
personality are most helpful in elucidating the problems 
connected with the affirmation of Two Natures in Christ, 
and preferrable to many other, as for example, that 
which Irenaeus himself employs: "A mixture. . .without 
confusion" ( "Adv Haer. IV. 20, 4.)
(C) So far, we have been concerned to 
set forth revelation as a process, analagous in some
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respects to that of Evolution, operative in Creation, 
and finding its climax in the taking of our flesh by 
the Son of God, this "final" stage of revelation being 
involved, as it were, in every stage of the process. 
It must be obvious that revelation through incarnation 
could not have been made until human nature had reached 
a standard which was sufficient to make such effective 
to accomplish the Divine purpose. But we are now to 
emphasise that the Incarnation itself is set forth in 
terms which imply growth and development in the personal 
life of Jesus.
In saying this, we are undoubtedly in
line with the portraiture of Jesus which is to be found 
in the New Testament. He is there depicted as One who 
grew in wisdom and stature, in favour with God and man, 
who was tempted on all points like as we are, who 
was made perfect through suffering; there were things 
apparently concerning which He could not speak with 
authority such as the time for the day of judgment, 
and there are occasions on which He manifests real surprise. 
On the other hand we frankly recognise His wonderful 
gift of prevision ( Mark 9/51. 10/50. f. ) , His deep insight 
into the inner lives and possibilities of those amongst 
Whom He moved, and the amazing clarity of His moral 
consciousness. It is the former class of facts, however,
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that constitute our great difficulty, inasmuch as they 
imply development and growth in Jesus, which apparently 
seem to be inconsistent with our faith that from the 
first He was the Incarnate Son of God. The theory that 
His growth was merely EXHIBITIVE will not hold. When 
Cyril of Alexandria says that Our Lord PRETENDS not to 
know the day of judgment ( Vide. "The Doctrine of the 
Incarnation". Ottley. p 620), both our head and our 
heart repudiate such a suggestion. A pretence of that 
kind would have made Jesus not the revealer but the 
concealer, and would have been so utterly unlike Him 
that we have no hesitation in declining to seek to 
escape from our problem in this way. Our position is 
rather that taken by Bishop West on: "as. God self-conscious 
in manhood, He is not at birth perfect in the sense of 
complete attainment; but only in the popular sense of 
being free from sin and from the lack of anything 
necessary to Him at the stage of life in which He was" 
(Vide. "The Person of Christ". Mackintosh, p 493). 
If the Incarnation is to be real, the human personality 
of Jesus must be real, and human personality implies 
growth, the realising of value through conflict with 
existence, the translating of potentiality into 
actuality. There is thus a sense in which we can speak 
of Him as becoming the Incarnate Son of God. Personality
grows by experience, and the personality of the Christ 
nailed to the Cross must have been different in some ways 
from that of the babe in the manger. It is not possible 
to assume that such vital expediences as the Baptism, 
the Transfiguration, and Gethsemane had left no mark 
upon His personality. Putting the matter from another 
angle, we may say that if Christ is to satisfy the 
demands of the religious spirit, His life must be an 
achievement and not an exhibition. On the other hand, 
If it be only an achievement, then it is not the 
revelation of the Infinite Love of God, but rather of 
the heights to which human nature can reach. This is 
the antinomy by which we are beset. The older way 
of approaching the problem, i.e. in terms of SUBSTANCE, 
leads us to a cul-de-sac, and it is only by keeping 
constantly before us the essentially personal character 
of the relations which we are seeking to comprehend, that 
we can hope to grasp in some measure that which, in 
its fulness, must ever be beyond us.
In "The Person of Christ", Professor Mackintosh 
has set forth four positions which may be taken as 
implicit in the completely Christian view of Jesus (pp 469 
(In what follows I am largely indebted to this work, 
but my position differs somewhat in detail from his, 
and I do not know that he wopks out the idea of
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Identity and Difference as being implicit in personality).
(1) Christ is now Divine, as being the object of faith 
and worship.
(2) In some personal sense, His Divinity is eternal,
not the fruit of time.
(5) His life on earth was unequivocally human.
(4) The unity of His personal life is axiomatic.
It is impossible to maintain these four positions without
implying a theory of KMOSIS. They can only be regarded
as self-consistent by the thought that He who was rich,
for our sakes, became poor. If such self-limitation seems
incomprehensible ,we are reminded that it is not without
analogies,more or less complete, in human life."We are
constantly limiting our actually present knowledge without
altering our personal identity" ( Ibid, p 474). The richest
human personality is that which possesses this power of
self-limitation in the highest degree. The fact therefore
that there is no perfect human analogy to the Divine
limitation in the Incarnation is due, if we may use
Lotze's phrase,to the fact that in us personality is
not complete, that it is but a weak imitation of the full
personality which is to be found in God.
The real objection to the idea of
the self-limitation of God is often,at bottom, nothing 
more than a protest against the static and mechanical 
forms in which it has been set forth. For example, it has
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been pourtfccyed as the abandonment by the Godhead of 
certain attributes, whilst others are retained. Prom the 
modern psychological point of view, this is absurd. 
Attributes are an essential part of personality, and 
we cannot cleave personality in two without destroying 
the whole. The KENOSIS cannot mean the shedding of 
attributes, but rather their transfiguration through Love. 
Modern psychology suggests a very pertinent illustration 
in its theory of the sublimation of instincts, as for 
example, the instinct for motherhood which, unable to 
find honourable expression, is subliminated and becomes 
the passion to nurse and heal the sick and afflicted. 
Again, one has to admit the imperfection of the analogy, 
but does it not in some measure enable us to see that 
personality is not the static and immoveable thing which 
some have conceived it to be, that it possesses infinite 
possibilities for experiment and adventure, possibilities 
all the more numerous as the personality is of the highest 
type] and one is entitled to ask as to how we can deny to 
God that which is implicit in our own personal life.
Dr Mackintosh develops the idea that 
as Incarnate Son of God, Jesus possessed the qualities
of Godhead in the form of potency rather than full/ 
actuality, as £UV*U>SL rather than £</£/" f £ 6 ? 
(Ibid . p 477). On our theory that personality in God
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is similar to that in man, save that it is originative, 
and that what we are seeking to become, He is, this 
theory of Dr Mackintosh would allow for a perfect human 
development in the life of Jesus.
But then we have not as yet solved our 
antinomy , how that which was human achievement could 
be the revelation of the Infinite Love of God. It seems 
to me that we are greatly helped in facing this by a 
study of personality as involving identity and difference, 
Personality preserves its identity amidst change. In the 
stream of consciousness, past, present, and future are 
distinguished. Let it be admitted that the memory image 
varies with the growth of the person, and also, that as 
regards the future, the actualities will differ somewhat 
from the anticipations, yet through all these changes, 
the §elf persists and retains its identity. Tastes, 
habits, and beliefs come and go, and there may even 
be a radical change of character as in conversion, but
COH^TiiYi/fS
amidst the changes, something poroiots, the subject of 
these variations preserves its identity. The fact of 
dual personality does not cut across this theory of 
an identity that persists in and is continuous throughout 
the changes. L.T.Hobhouse remarks concerning this: 
"But the germ of this sort of madness is in all of us. 
If we could carry psycho-physical research far enough,
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we should presumably find an ultimate unity in which 
even these extreme differences come together" ( "Mind 
in Evolution 1* p 339). Human personality consists of 
something given, which becomes ours by being worked out. 
We may see this in the fact that often what seems to 
us to be achievement is really a gift. The contention 
that we sustain is this, that Jesus was what He became, 
that the Godhead which He worked out in achievement was 
implicit in Him from the beginning, that the growth 
and development of His personality was a making explicit, 
through a life self-limited by human conditions.,of what 
was already implicit, that He evolved that which was 
involved in His very being. In the sense of attainment, 
He could not be at birth that which He became through 
spiritual struggle and victory. This,however, must not 
be taken to mean that as a Babe He was not Son Of God, 
but only that as a babe this was yet to be realised 4n 
a life which should be obedient at every point to the 
Will of God. It is not only in Christ but also in us 
that something persists despite innumerable changes. 
Apart from this conception of personality as inclusive
of identity and difference, it is difficult to express
eternally
the fact that Jesus was that which He &£*$11X became./\
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In the work to which we have already referred, Professor 
Mackintosh argues that the Incarnation of God in Christ 
is remedial in aim ( pp 440-445). So far as we can 
interpret his words, he would seem to maintain that this 
is its only purpose. The arguments used to support the 
position, however, are by no means conclusive as to this, 
and we could adopt most of them without in any way 
impairing our own view, which is, that the Incarnation, 
in common with all revelation, has for its object the 
realising of all intrinsic value. We admit that sin is 
the chief obstacle to the accomplishment of this end, 
and that it is possible to so extend the connotation 
of the word "sin" as to make it the sole contradiction 
of "value", but such a procedure leads to confusion of 
thought and can scarcely be justified. Moreover that 
can scarcely be the position taken by Dr Mackintosh 
inasmuch as it is the Sthical aspect of sin on which he 
lays almost exclusive emphasis. Whilst granting that 
the supreme significance of the Incarnation was ethical, 
we should contend that as revelation it was designed 
to realise all aesthetic as well as all moral values. 
History bears us out in this by showing the incalculable 
influence which it has exercised in the realm of Art. 
Ugliness as well as sin must be abhorrent to God. 
Further, whilst Lessing's metaphor of "education" as
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applied to revelation was misconceived, yet it contained 
this truth that God cannot be content with anything less 
than the full development of all man's potentialities. 
It seems to us that the phrase " the annihilation of 
sin" is very inadequate to express the wealth of life 
which was to be the issue of all revelation. To say 
that the aim of revelation includes more than the 
annihilation of sin is not n to minimise the awful 
gravity of sin" nor "to impair the K&nrlxg sense of 
adoring wonder with which forgiven men contemplate the 
miracle of Divine love".
A restatement of the doctrine of sin in terms 
that are consistent with the unitary nature of personality 
is sorely needed. As expressed by Hegel, sin becomes no 
more than the middle term of a triad which partakes of 
the nature of a logical necessity - innocence, sin, 
virtue; in Schleiermacher, it is merely a subjective 
consciousness, the negative of the feeling for God; whilst 
in Kant it is confined to Will. Dr Orchard's reconstruction 
(Modern Theories of Sin. pp 107-157), is not altogether 
satisfactory, yet it has the merit of drawing our 
attention to the fact that the real problem is not 
that of sin conceived as an abstraction but *±4=k sin 
as it forms part of experience, in other words, the 
problem is centred in our sense of sin. The revelation
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in Christ intensifies this sense of sin, and reveaAs 
the Divine forgiving love which can transfigure it, 
so that, as Bishop Temple says: "Both sin and the pain it 
brings are part of the process by which finite man learns 
that only in union with the infinite, and in the 
fellowship with all else that is finite resulting from 
that union, can anything good be reached" ("Mens Creatrix" 
p 361). In the Christ, man discovers, in no impersonal 
way, what he was meant to be and what he is, and at the 
same time the forgiving love which seeks,through sacrifice 
reaching down to the lowest depths, to win human hearts 
to a free fellowship with Himself. In Christ therefore 
two streams meet, the Divine light which intensifies 
the significance of sin and the Divine love which cancels 
it. One finds an interesting analogy, which must not, 
however be pressed too far, in the method of the 
psycho-analyst who brings suppressed and unconscious 
yearnings to the surface and then as it were drains them
away .
It is difficult to see how God could deal
with this sense of sin and use it for lifting man into 
Holy fellowship with Himself by any other mode of 
revelation than the Incarnation, without making man into 
the mere puppet of His purpose. To quote Bishop Temple 
once more: "The kind of power that God exerted in the
(227)
world before the birth of Christ was not enough. Not only 
events but hearts and wills must be ruled. So the Love 
was made known in an intelligible form through Life and 
Death, so that omnipotence should be complete, and, by 
the responding love called forth, the free allegiance of 
hearts and wills be won. By Power and by Love God would 
deliver us from Pride, which is the one poison of the 
soul, and bring us into union with Himself" ( Ibid 362.f. ). 
The very method which we have chosen to set forth the 
idea of revelation is the only one which makes room for 
the inclusion of the infinitely rich and &XXEXX varied 
content of the Incarnate life of the Son of God, in 
a way which makes its appeal to all that is highest 
and best in human nature. The attempts made to express 
the truth of the Incarnation in the language of the 
older metaphysics gave to us a picture that was singularly 
remote from the historic Jesus as pourtrayed in the 
New Testament. It etherealised Him in such a way as to 
make Him unrecognisable and so wrapped Him up in the 
coverlets of its own terminology that mankind failed to 
hear His voice. To reinterpret the facts on which Faith 
rests in terms of personality is to bring us once again
*
into vital touch with the Jesus of history and experience.
Again and again, in the course of our 
study we have had occasion to refer to the social aspect
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of personality and to its infinite outreaches. The aim 
of revelation ̂ herefore ^ which has been defined as 
the realisation of all intrinsic value may be expressed 
in the concrete terms of religion as the Kingdom of 
God.How. utterly inadequate the term "annihilation of 
sin" is to express the fulness of the aim of revelation 
is well brough^out when we study its social implications. 
The yearning of man is for a vision of Divine love 
which can transfigure the sense of sin into the 
stairway to the Kfel&x achievement of a full and true 
life of fellowship with God and with all that He has made.
We are inclined to think that it is
the theological bias with which the New Testament is 
approached that has led us to conceive of revelation 
as being solely the annihilation of sin. We think 
of such passages as "I am come that ye might have life, 
and have it more abundantly", or we take such parables 
as those of the Prodigal Son and the Lost Sheep, or that 
other parable of the house left empty into which the 
devils returned in increased numbers, and it seems to 
us that some bigger term than the "annihilation of 
sin" is required to interpret these. Moreover it 
seems to us an error to use terms which even bear the 
semblance of reducing the significance of the revealed 
Love to what is merely negative, and therefore better
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to express the aim as being that of the realisation of 
all positive value.
There is one aspect of the Incarnation 
which is relevant to our problem and which cannot be 
overlooked, namely, that it made possible the advent of 
the Spirit. Apart from such a manifestation of God as 
that which appeared in the coming of His Son,it is 
difficult to see how man could have been made aware 
of the personal indwelling of that Spirit in the heart. 
This must not be taken to mean that the significance 
of the Incarnation ceased tlth the coming of the Spirit. 
What the Spirit does is to take of the things of Christ 
and reveaa. them to us. The Incarnation itself brought 
into being the light through which in ever-deepening 
measure we can explore the wonder, the majesty, and the 
all sufficiency of the life which took our flesh and 
fought our battles, and for our sakes was nailed to the
Cross.
In his book "Christ in Modern Theology",
Dr Fairbairn has this passage: "One of the things 
time has made most obvious to me is this: that of all 
the persons that have contributed to the shaping of the 
character which is destiny, the mightiest was that 
of an obscure man who died years before I was born. But 
his daughter was my mother, and the daughter so loved
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and revered the father, so remembered his saying5 so 
understood his mind, so believed in the faith that 
ruled and guided him, that she had no higher thought 
for her son than to make him such a man as her father 
had been. And so, invisible as he was, he became the 
real parent of the spirit and the character of the 
man who now writes this book. And if God is to become 
the real Father of man, and man the real son of God, 
then all the energies and loves and ideals of the 
unseen Paternity must be incarnated and organised 
In a visible sonship, that they may become creative 
of a mankind which shall realise the filial ideal. 
It is through the one God-man that the many become men 
of God. The nature that is in all men akin to Deity 
becomes in Christ a nature in personal union with the 
Deity, and the UNJO PERSONALIS which is peculiar to 
Him, is the basis of the UNIO MYSTICA which is possible 
to all" (p. 475) It seems to us that only in some such 
way as that Which Fairbairn chose, namely, by keeping 
strictly to the quality of the subject in hand as being 
that of personal relationship, can the fulness of 
that revelation which we have not hesitated to describe 
as "final" be set forth.
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If the aim of revelation is that of enabling man to 
realise all value, then this would seem to require 
Immortality for its consumnation. In apprehending revelation 
and its values, we are always conscious of a value which 
transcends that which we are able to appropriate. The 
ideal aspect of our personality is ever whispering to 
us of things that are yet far off, creating as it were 
desires and aspirations which the brevity of life and 
the fierceness of its struggle prevent us from reaching. 
The argument which we are seeking to formulate is really 
an extension of Kant's ; he contended that man's complete 
good , namely, the reconciliation of virtue and happiness, 
entitled us to postulate faith in immortality, whereas 
our position goes further and affirms immortality as
•>
necessary for the realisation of all value.
The faith in Immortality is not necessarily 
dependent on the fact that the "time-process" as it 
appears to us must necessarily be the same as seen SUB 
SPECIE AETERKITATIS . It is quite possible that what 
appears to us as "time" may better be Interpreted as 
"qualitative difference in Ultimate Reality". In 
memory, anticipation, and appreciation, we ourselves 
transcend time relations, although It is never mere 
transcendence, that is to say, we cannot altogether think 
ourselves out of them. The point that we are making,
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is that any new interpretation of what appears to us 
to be time-process would not invalidate the postulate 
of Immortality as being neceesary for theKMi completion 
of that which is implicit in the process of revelation. 
Unless in some experience we can actualise the values 
which revelation has made clear to us, the whole thing 
becomes a mockery and we may even come to think of it
as mere illusion.
a t
Bosanquet (The Value and Destiny of the Individual1^
deals with this problem - the whole book is concerned with 
it, but especially chapters VIII - X), and postulates 
the "immortality of value" but rejects the idea of the 
"immortality of the individual", This is all the more 
surprising in view of the fact that he constantly makes 
use of Keat's phrase and speaks of the universe as being 
"the vale of soul-making". He says, in explanation of this: 
"Perhaps it is just in the making that souls have their 
value" (p.68.). But if souls are made onlty to be 
absorbed again into the soul of God, it strikes us as 
rather a meaningless process. It would appear to be 
inconsistent to maintain the immortality of value and 
yet to deny the immortality of persons, inasmuch as 
value is meaningless apart from the fact that it is 
value for persons, and as we have seen from our definition 
of personality, the "INDIVIDUA SUBSTANTIA" is essential
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to the conception of it. The idea of personality embraces 
both the particular and the universal, and if Bosanquet f s 
position were maintained, God would be left a subject 
without an object, and so far as we can judge, this cannot 
be differentiated from nothingness^ We may reasonably 
ask as to why the infinite should not exist in and 
through the finite, and the value realised by the 
finite retain its character as both particular and universal. 
If Bosanquet f s position be maintained, it follows that 
the criterion which we employed to define the finality 
of the Christian Revelation f as for example against 
Buddhism), n*ma.ly, that of personality, was not applicable. 
Bosanquet, in his eagerness to exclude anything which 
would imperil the monistic view of things, has scarcely 
done justice to the fact that Eternal Value includes 
Eternal Individuality, that the one-ness is not a barren 
but an inclusive unity.
A truer monism will seek to find a unityin 
in which the differences are reconciled and not cancelled. 
That which is the goal of revelation unifies value 
without cancelling individuality; it is not the unity of 
number, inasmuch as we reject Bosanquet 's position that 
God alone is truly individual, nor is it the unity of 
a society or college; it is something deeper, the unity 
of Love, in which differences are transcended and yet
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retain their unique individual quality. The ultimate 
unity is this, that God shares His Love with those 
whom He has made in His likeness.
The goal of revelation, of which, Nature, 
Prophecy, and our partial glimpses of the revelation in 
Christ are but so many forecasts, is that of a redeemed 
Universe, in which value and existence shall be unified 
in the completion of God's great purpose; when Love 
which was the final revelation of God in Christ shall have 
produced in human hearts the Love that can respond 
perfectly and unbrokenly, when it shall be apprehended 
not as the mere intimation of a gracious purpose, but 
as an accomplished fact in our experience. The 
incompleteness of revelation,Ar f shall we say of our 
apprehension of it, is the postulate though not the 
proof, that life will reach its goal in a larger and 
richer environment. "That death is not the end of the 
individual life is guaranteed by the Christian revelation 
of the love of God. Love is always of individuals, 
and God who made men for Himself will not let them 
merely pass out of existence through the failure of 
their physllal strength" ("Mens Creatrix". p 549.) 
Included in the revelation of God is the Resurrection 
which is something more than the proof of the Divine 
conservation of values, as Hoffding would express it,
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but must rather be conceived as God's pledge that 
the unrealised values, of which we have dreamed but 
not realised shall be ours through Him. And so, we 
are sustained by the same thought as that in which Paul 
found comfort and strength: "I press on, if so be 
that I may apprehend that for which I was apprehended 
in Christ Jesus".
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